


































Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 


























Andrew J. Whitford 
 





“The Quality of the Ordinary”: Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Third World 1975-
1980 
Andrew J. Whitford 
 
The recovery of the Anglo-American relationship in the late 1970s took place in 
the Third World. The “Special Relationship” between the United States and Britain 
reached its post World War II nadir in the decade between 1964 and 1974.  Simultaneous 
to this decline in the relationship was the growing power and influence of the Third 
World in international institutions.  By the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, both the 
United States and Britain were suffering political and economic turmoil brought about by 
increased oil prices, labor unrest, and inflation.  The two countries worked together to 
navigate a broad array of problems to include the Third World’s increasing hostility to 
Israel and calls for a New International Economic Order in the United Nations, a growing 
refugee crisis in southeast Asia, the spread of the Cold War to southern Africa, and 
questions about decline and disorder at home.  In the United States, neoconservatives 
began to assert a greater role in international affairs by questioning both the future of 
British socialism and the wisdom of appeasing the Third World.  Within these 
constraints, British and American statesmen acted to end white rule in Rhodesia to 
contain communist expansion, care for refugees while upholding international law within 
real fiscal constraints, and free American hostages held in Iran.  Through both their 
actions and their improved mutual understanding, intellectually and politically diverse 
statesmen such as Henry Kissinger, Anthony Crosland, Andrew Young, and Peter 
Carrington established a balance in the Special Relationship that allowed the United 
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“It’s the quality of the ordinary, the straight, the square, that accounts for the great 
stability and success of our nation. It’s a quality to be proud of. But it’s a quality that 





Chapter 1: “An Alliance No More?  The 1970s and the Special Relationship” 
In 1975, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America 
were wary rivals in a global ideological and political struggle over which hung the pall of 
nuclear weapons.  The British Empire had dissolved and in its absence Britain had fallen 
from the top tier of world powers into a “State of Emergency”.1 For the liberal 
democratic victors of the Second World War, the post-war social and economic 
consensus that had eased the problems of the 1930s had unraveled during the “shock” of 
the 1960s and early 1970s as the Keynesian balance between inflation and unemployment 
had morphed into “stagflation”.2 The socialist model of politics and economics was 
gaining increasing international acceptance.3  The 1970s were a period of multiple 
domestic and foreign crises that forced the United States and Britain to operate in an 
uncertain world.4 The alliance known as the “Special Relationship” between the British 
                                                           
1 Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 
8–13 is a good recounting of the fall of the Heath government in the aftermath of the Oil Shock of 1973. 
 
2 Niall Ferguson et al., eds., “‘Malaise’: The Crisis of Capitalism in the 1970s,” in The Shock of the Global: 
The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 27–38. 
 
3  The best starting point for a comparison of the different Soviet and American approaches in the Third 
World during the Cold War is Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  Post-Stalin Soviet 
approaches to the Third World are covered in Alvin Z Rubinstein, Moscow’s Third World Strategy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).   
 
4 Recent scholarship on the 1970s in general includes Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global 
History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton University Press, 2011).  Michael J Allen, 
Until the Last Man Comes Home : POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2009). Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift In American Culture, 
Society, And Politics, Reprint (Da Capo Press, 2002); Beth Bailey and David Farber, eds., America in the 
Seventies (University Press of Kansas, 2004). Philip Jenkins, Decade of nightmares : the end of the sixties 
and the making of eighties America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) specifically identifies 1975 
as a turning point in American history where fear and anxiety became the dominant drivers of behavior.  
The domestic economy is surveyed in Jefferson R. Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of 
the Working Class, First Edition (New Press, The, 2010). and Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United 
States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (Yale University Press, 2010).  For the British side, 
see Dominic Sandbrook, State of emergency: the way we were: Britain, 1970-1974 (London: Allen Lane, 
 
 2
and the United States had survived war and peace, but the accumulated crises of the past 
decade shook it as much as they shook both countries.5   
In 1975, the United States had an unelected President and an unelected Vice 
President. 6  In Washington DC the era of the imperial presidency was over and President 
Gerald R. Ford and his Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were helpless to prevent the 
destruction of the Republic of Vietnam by the Soviet backed North Vietnamese Army.7 
In New York City, the year began with a deadly bombing at Fraunces Tavern on 24 
January by the Puerto Rican terrorist group Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional 
Puertorriqueña (FALN) and ended with the still-unsolved 29 December LaGuardia 
Airport bombing.  On 27 October, the FALN bombed the United States’ Mission to the 
United Nations and five New York City banks.8  The Weather Underground staged one 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2010); Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: The Battle for Britain, 1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 
2012). 
 
5 Some of the more important works in the field of Anglo-American relations are  C.J. Bartlett, ‘The 
Special Relationship’ A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945, John Baylis, Anglo-
American Defense Relations, 1939-1984: The Special relationship, 2nd ed (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1984)., Hedley Bull and William Roger Louis, The Special relationship: Anglo-American relations since 
1945,  Peter Clarke, The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: The Demise of a Superpower, 1944-47, 
John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations From the Cold War to Iraq 2nd ed., and 
Donald Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place, 1900-1975: A Study of the 
Anglo-American Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-
Making in the Twentieth Century, 1981 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). A useful study of 
the links between domestic politics and the relationship between the two countries is Alan P. Dobson, 
“Labour or Conservative: Does It Matter in Anglo-American Relations?”  Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), 387-407. 
 
6 A survey of general histories of the United States in this era must begin with James T. Patterson, Grand 
Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974, Reprint (Oxford University Press, USA, 1997); James T. 
Patterson, Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2007).  Peter N Carroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy and Promise of America in 
the 1970s, 1st ed (New York, N.Y: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982) was the first study of the era.  
 
7 George C Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3rd ed, America 
in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996). 
 
8 Reproductions of the FALN communiqués taking credit for these acts can be found at 
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/faln.htm.  Accessed 15 September 2012.   
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of their last bombings when they struck a Puerto Rican bank.  Two days after these 
bombings, the Daily News accused Gerald Ford of telling New York to “drop dead” when 
he refused to provide a bailout for the financially ailing city.9   
It was a banner year for terrorism in Great Britain as well, and not a banner year 
there for much else.10  The year before, the IRA had bombed Parliament.  In London, the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) took hostages in December‘s 6 day 
“Blacombe Street Siege” and through the fall their bombings on the streets and in the 
hotels of London killed 2 and wounded 70.  The PIRA assassinated Ross McWhirter, a 
former student of Secretary of State for the Environment Anthony Crosland, on his 
doorstep.  Prime Minister Harold Wilson was worried that elements in the Army and MI5 
(Britain’s internal security service) might try to remove him from power on charges of 
being a Soviet agent.11  While the worst of the industrial unrest that had plagued the 
Conservative Government of Edward (Ted) Heath with over 70 million working days lost 
was over, the treatment of the trade unions under Labour could best be termed 
“appeasement.”12 The worst coach accident in British history killed 32 people on Dibbles 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
9 Sam Roberts, “Infamous ‘Drop Dead’ Was Never Said by Ford,” The New York Times, December 28, 
2006, sec. New York Region, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/nyregion/28veto.html. 
 
10 For an excellent overview of this era in Britain, see Alwyn W. Turner, Crisis? What Crisis?: Britain in 
the 1970s (London: Aurum, 2008). Andy Beckett, When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies 
(Faber and Faber, 2009). Francis Wheen, Strange Days Indeed: The 1970s: The Golden Days of Paranoia, 
1st ed. (PublicAffairs, 2010).  
11 Peter Wright, Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York, N.Y: 
Viking, 1987) is the account of the British intelligence officer that accuses Wilson of being a Soviet spy as 
well as detailing the MI5-CIA plotting against him.  Wilson’s justified suspicions, innocence, and the 
controversy are well covered in Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson, New edition (HarperCollins, 1993).  
  
12 P. F Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990, Penguin History of Britain 9 (London: Allen Lane, The 




Bridge in North Yorkshire.  Peter Sutcliffe a.k.a. “The Yorkshire Ripper” killed the first 
of his 13 victims.  Wilson’s Labour government spent £2.4bn to bail out Leyland Motors 
to save a million jobs,13  and the consumer price index rate of inflation (CPI) was 
24.9%.14  On the bright side, “Fawlty Towers” aired on BBC2.15 
Despite the persistence of the Anglo-American alliance after the Second World 
War, there had always been tensions.  The primary source of tension between the two 
powers before the 1970s was the Third World.  The United States had for most of its 
existence been hostile to European imperialism, and the shift in global power during the 
Second World War marked not just the ascent of the United States but the use of its 
diplomatic and economic power to begin to end the formal British Empire while 
expanding its own informal one.16  While the Cold War dimmed the United States’ 
enthusiasm for the rapid dissolution of the British Empire, it was in the Third World 
where the alliance had their most dangerous disagreements.  The end of the Palestinian 
Mandate and the creation of the State of Israel was a clear display of the power of the 
United States to overcome the opinions in the British Foreign Office.17  Suez was 
                                                           
13 Brian Wheeler, “The politics of building cars” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4294709.stm , 
Accessed 27 July 2012.   
 
14 http://www.global-rates.com/economic-indicators/inflation/1975.aspx , Accessed 27 July 2012.  For the 
US in the same year, it was 6.9%.   
 
15 Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun, 95–96. Sandbrook points out that Basil’s bad innkeeping would not be so 
funny if it were not for Britain’s reputation for poor customer service.   
 
16 A good summary of how American imperialism differed only in conception and self-regard from the 
European variant in the late 19th and early 20th century, see Thomas Bender, Rethinking American History 
in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 182–245.  The classic work on how the 
State Department dealt with the colonial question during World War II is William Roger Louis, 
Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
 
17 William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United 
States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford UniversityPress, 1984); 
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shattering to the British as President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles sided with 
the Soviet Union over Anthony Eden’s attempt to wrest control of the Suez Canal from 
Gamal Abdel Nasser.18  The furor over Vietnam and Britain’s refusal to send troops 
despite Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk’s impassioned requests weakened the “Special 
Relationship”, as did Harold Wilson’s decision to devalue the pound and end British 
military commitments east of Suez.19  The years of Nixon and Heath were the years of 
Great Power diplomacy in pursuit of détente for the United States and a move toward 
Europe for Britain.20  However, while the Anglo-American relationship never truly 
regained the closeness of the Second World War even onto the present day, it was clearly 
stronger at the close of the 1970s than it had been at the beginning.21  What made James 
Callaghan and Anthony Crosland able to work so well with two distinctly non-socialist 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, 1st American ed (New York [N.Y.]: Norton, 
1983). 
 
18 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003). 
19 Jonathan Colman, A “Special Relationship”?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American 
Relations “at the Summit”, 1964-8 (Manchester University Press, 2005) , Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, 
and the Vietnam War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), P Pham, Ending “East of Suez” the British 
Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010).  Despite their comparative skills in winning elections and seeking to improve the lives of their 
citizens, Wilson and Johnson also did not have the best relationship.  Wilson was polite and committed 
both to supporting the United States diplomatically and seeking a negotiated end to the Vietnam War.  
Johnson publicly called Wilson “Shakespeare.”  William Roger Louis, “The Dissolution of the British 
Empire in the Era of Vietnam,” in Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and 
Decolonization (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 559. 
 
20 Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977 (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008); Alan P Dobson, Anglo-American relations in the twentieth century of friendship, conflict, and 
the rise and decline of superpowers (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 140–143.  Dobson’s term for 
the Anglo-American relationship in the Heath years is “barren”. 
 
21 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship : Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After 
(Basingstoke Macmillan, 2001) is good on this point.  For all the perception of the strength of the 
relationship during the Reagan-Thatcher years, the newest scholarship points out there were still significant 
tensions between the two countries and their leaders.  See Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher : The 
Difficult Relationship (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012).  For a more optimistic appraisal, see 





politicians, Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford?  Why was the alliance stronger in 1979 
when Margaret Thatcher (Conservative) was able to work quite closely with James E. 
“Jimmy” Carter (Democrat) when the governments of two men of the left in the 1960s 
and two men of the center-right in the early 1970s had seen the nadir of the relationship 
in the 20th century?22   
What was it that restored the “Special Relationship” in these years?  It was in part 
the challenge of the Third World.  The Third World went from being the site of the 
United States’ and Britain’s quarrels to the arena where they chose to work together.  
Partly out of the necessity of the changing global balance of power and partly out of a 
changed understanding of what mattered in the world, the years of Ford, Kissinger, 
Callaghan, Crosland, Andrew Young, David Owen, and Peter (Lord) Carrington were the 
“Years of Renewal” of the old alliance in the place where it had traditionally foundered.  
What Kissinger, Crosland, and Callaghan began in the aftermath of Vietnam in foreign 
policy, Carter, Owen, and Young continued. One of the places where this cooperation 
manifested itself after Vietnam and the era of decolonization and during the decline of 
détente was the public forum, as opposed to the institution, of the United Nations.  
Why the Third World?  If inflation and domestic discord were the lot of two 
powerful Western countries, the lot of the new nations of the world in the 1970s was not 
that much better.  The Oil Crisis of 1973 created an excess of “petrodollars” that went 
into loans for the countries that sought to finance their post-independence economy.  This 
spending would lead to massive debts when interest rates rose later in the decade. The 
                                                           




countries that had emerged from decolonization had sought to leap forward into 
modernity through socialism, centralized planning, and costly infrastructure 
construction.23  Having numbers but not money, these countries sought a greater share of 
the goods and capital of the global economy by protesting what they saw as predatory 
practices and neocolonialism by the West.  At the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement 
challenged the United States and the British not just for their history of imperialism but 
also for their responsibility for the unequal nature of the global economy with calls for a 
New International Economic Order that would right the balance between the developed 
and developing worlds and redistribute global wealth.24   
What allowed the United States and the United Kingdom to work to improve 
relations with each other while seeking to improve their relations and the material lot of 
the Third World?  The alliance of the United States of America and Great Britain faced a 
growing number of the global challenges in the 1970s.  The socialist world was growing 
at the expense of the democratic.  Communism was triumphant in Southeast Asia, 
advancing in Africa, and now secure in Eastern Europe.  In Angola, a Soviet and Cuban 
                                                           
23 Robert H Jackson, Quasi-states : sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 82–138.  Jackson stresses both the contested nature of decolonization 
that eventually occurred well before the colonial powers thought their colonies were ready, and the fact that 
these new countries were economically weak from the start and used that weakness to make a moral 
demand for aid free of constraints.   
 
24 The explicitly redistributionist calls of the NIEO were one of the key elements that Daniel Moynihan saw 
as the link between the developing world of the 1970s and the Labour Party doctrines of the 1930s.  See 
Daniel P. Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition,” Commentary, March 1975. For contemporary 
studies of the NIEO, see Jagdish N Bhagwati, The New International Economic Order : The North-South 
Debate (Boston: MIT Press, 1977); William R Cline and Overseas Development Council, Policy 
Alternatives for a New International Economic Order : An Economic Analysis (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1979); Ervin Laszlo, The Objectives of the New International Economic Order (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1978); Robert K Olson, US Foreign Policy and the New International Economic Order: 
Negotiating Global Problems, 1974-1981 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); Edwin Pierce Reubens, The 
Challenge of the New International Economic Order (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); Robert L Rothstein, 
Global Bargaining : UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order (Princeton: 




sponsored proxy army defeated the various forces backed by China, South Africa, and the 
United States.25  The United States, Soviets, and countries of Europe codified détente at 
Helsinki in 1975, but to Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership the agreement had little 
bearing on how the Soviets should behave in the rest of the world.26 “Eurocommunism” 
was a possibility in Western Europe.  Portugal’s junta had fallen and a series of 
increasingly left-wing governments were coming to power.27 India in 1975 was under a 
domestic “State of Emergency” that suspended democracy after political and judicial 
criticism of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi grew during the summer.28 
While the contention that the Cold War was made in the Third World was an 
important correction to the historical consensus, the argument about the centrality of the 
Third World as the defining arena of the Cold War suffers from the focus on Europe and 
arms control by both the United States and the Soviets in the 1980s.29  The 1960s and 
1970s, on the other hand, were the peak of this reality. The challenge of the Third World 
was not one that occurred only in back rooms or in traditional negotiations, but also in 
                                                           
25 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, Envisioning Cuba 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
 
26 V. M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, The New 
Cold War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 248–254. Zubok stresses that 
the Soviets tended to intervene overseas for reasons of power and prestige rather than ideology.  For how 
the “Brezhnev Doctrine” worked in Europe, see Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy, The New Cold War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2003).  
 
27 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York  NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 626–634. 
 
28 Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, Reprint 
(Harper Perennial, 2008). 
 
29 Westad, The Global Cold War, 2005.  Certainly, Third World issues mattered in the 1980s as well.  For 
the United States, the pall of Vietnam hung over foreign policy particularly relating to Central and South 
America.  For the Soviet Union, they were concerned about Afghanistan.  These actions, however, did not 
replace the fact the US and Soviets were far more worried about each other than what was happening 




speeches and public demands.   It therefore would require public diplomacy to manage 
and confront in turn.  As a place where the new majority of nations had a voice in the 
General Assembly, the UN emerged as a focal point of these debates.  As the old and new 
faces of global power, and as allies, the British and the United States would face the brunt 
of the criticism.  The United States in particular had taken the place of Britain as the main 
enemy both in the rhetoric of the Soviets and their allies as well as those that saw 
injustice and inequality of resources as the major threat the world faced.30  Because the 
UN mattered to the Third World, it had to matter to the Americans and the British.   
The United Nations was to some the long-awaited realization of a “Congress of 
Nations” that would institutionalize peace and the ad hoc conference diplomacy that had 
emerged at the ends of other wars.31 This hope carried with it the idea that the sufferings 
and upheavals of war could lead to a better peace, and embodied to President Truman the 
                                                           
30 William Roger Louis, “Public Enemy Number One: Britain and the United Nations,” in Ends of British 
Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (New York: I.B. Tauris ; Distributed in 
the U.S.A. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 689–724.  One possible reason for the passing of this burden was 
the perception among Africans and a trans-Atlantic network of young and influential activists that the 
United States had changed since World War II from a reluctant anti-colonial power to a supporter of South 
African apartheid.     
 
31 Important works on the founding of the United Nations are Stephen C Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The 
Founding of the United Nations: A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and 
Their Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2003); Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New 
Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2005).  Borgwardt’s work in particular stresses the links between Roosevelt’s domestic 
policies of the 1930s and his design for a better world with American-led international organizations and 
norms.  Studies of the United Nations relevant to this project are Jussi M Hanhimäki, The United Nations : 
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Seymour Finger, American 
Ambassadors at the UN : People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy (New York: Holmes 
& Meier, 1988); David L Bosco, Five to Rule Them All : The UN Security Council and the Making of the 
Modern World (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).  For a good sense of how the United 
Nations sees itself, see  Thomas George Weiss, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey, 
United Nations Intellectual History Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Roger 
Normand, Human Rights at the UN : the Political History of Universal Justice (Bloomington: Indiana 




words of Tennyson’s "Locksley Hall".32  The Congress of Vienna had allowed the 
conservative statesmen of Europe to rebuild the international order after the devastation 
of the Napoleonic Wars.  The peace they designed lasted at best until 1848.33  The Paris 
Peace Conference promised to make the sacrifices of the First World War worthwhile, 
but the conference bogged down in details and the results pleased almost no one.34 
From the beginning, the changing nature of its membership changed the 
practices and purposes of the United Nations.  Its founders originally conceived 
the United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, not just as an instrument 
of the peace or for the preservation of a certain notion of human rights, but as a 
tool of the preservation of the world order of 1945.  In other words, they aimed to 
preserve empire. Despite this intent of its primarily Anglo-American founders, the 
United Nations quickly became a forum that helped bring about the end of the 
overseas empires of Western Europe.35  The new countries formed out of the end 
of these empires also joined the United Nations, changing the composition of the 
                                                           
32 Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man : The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations, 1st ed. 
(New York: Random House, 2006).  Truman carried a copy of Tennyson’s poem in his wallet.   
 
33 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 1st Touchstone ed (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 78–92. 
 
34 The best recent book on Versailles is Stefan A Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-
Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 
35 Susan Pedersen, “Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations,” in Settler Colonialism in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2005), 113–114.  This essay draws the conclusion that although 
the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations was formed as an attempt to maintain 
Western European empires through idea of trusteeship, it ultimately played a role in undermining it through 
exposing colonialism to outside scrutiny.  For the connections between the League and the United Nations, 
particularly within the thinking of the Jan Smuts and Alfred Zimmern, see Mark Mazower, No Enchanted 
Palace : the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). Mazower assigns Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, the credit for 
starting the process of the transformation of the United Nations from an imperialist to an anti-imperialist 




organization from the victors of the Second World War to an increasingly diverse 
group of newly formed and diversely governed nation-states.36  
As the Cold War began to dominate the international arena, the United 
Nations lost any ability to act quickly to shape the superpower confrontation due 
to the veto powers of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the Security 
Council.  Because of this stalemate, the United Nations lost its leading role in the 
relationship between the two dominant powers of the era.37  It did, however, 
retain its importance as a location where the emerging Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) could raise issues relating to decolonization, development, and global 
inequality.  The United Nations was a critical forum for the newly emerging 
NAM, who formed a numeric majority in the General Assembly.  This ability to 
control the General Assembly, as opposed to the Security Council, led to the 
passage of such acts as 1960’s General Assembly Resolution 1514 (xv)  
(Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples).38   Despite this shift in the behavior and composition of the United 
Nations in the years after 1945 as well as their domestic difficulties, both the 
United States and Britain maintained their memberships in the United Nations 
                                                           
36 The United Nations had 51 member states at its founding.  By 1960, there were 99 members.  By 1975, 
there were 144.  Membership “is open to all peace-loving States that accept the obligations contained in the 
United Nations Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able to carry out these obligations”.  
United Nations Charter, Chapter II, Article IV.  http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml.  
Accessed 23 August 2011. 
37 William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History.  The major exception to this trend was the 
approval of the UN Security Council to use military force to repel the invasion of South Korea.  This 
resolution was only passed due to the boycott of the Security Council by the Soviet Union.  For the text of 
the resolution, see UNSC Resolution #83, 27 June 1950, 
http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm, Accessed 23 August 2011. 




General Assembly, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and as 
members of many other bodies of the United Nations.39  In the early 1960s, the 
United Nations Security Council still mattered as a public forum for Cold War 
confrontations. The most dramatic use of this was the confrontation between 
Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin over the Soviet refusal to admit there were 
nuclear weapons in Cuba in October 1962.40  The British had been coming under 
increasing scrutiny at the United Nations in the aftermath of decolonization, but 
the first Wilson government and the UN worked together to put pressure on 
Southern Rhodesia after its Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.41 
 The NIEO took its members and objectives in general for the Non-Aligned 
Movement.  While the primary focus of the NAM in general was to steer a middle way 
through the Cold War – although particular members adhered fiercely to one side or 
another – the NIEO was the result of the G-77 and NAM working inside the United 
Nations to fix the problems of “globalization” that transcended the Cold War.   
The first formal call for a NIEO was in 1974 at the United Nations in the Sixth 
Special Session.  Emboldened by the economic power that OPEC had shown over the 
powers of Europe and the United States in 1973, the Algerians led a NAM and G-77 call 
                                                           
39 For the best study of the United States’ ambassadors to the United Nations, see Finger, American 
Ambassadors at the UN.   
40 For more on Stevenson’s time at the UN, see John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World : The 
Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977). A good example of the combination of 
faith and cynicism about the UN within the US at this time is the appointment of Arthur Goldberg by 
Lyndon Johnson to replace Stevenson.  Goldberg gave up a lifetime seat on the Supreme Court to try to de-
escalate the crisis over Vietnam, and Johnson got to attempt to put a political ally on the bench and quiet 
domestic criticism of the war in Vietnam.    
 
41 Harold Wilson, A Personal Record: The Labour Government, 1964-1970, 1st American ed. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1971).  Wilson refused to consider military action against Rhodesia, something some UN 




for a NIEO based on twenty principles.42 The United States opposed most of these 
measures, but the Algerians led the way in passing UNGA Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.43   These demands set the stage for the 
confrontations between the Third World and the United States in Turtle Bay in 1975. 
The violence and disorder of the era were symptomatic of larger issues in 
governability at home and management (to say nothing of leadership) of the international 
order.44  There emerged on both sides of the Atlantic a belief that the present disorders, 
particularly in Britain, were either terminal or required a fundamental change in British 
society.   In the United States as well a growing movement decreed that the institutions of 
mainstream state-centric liberalism, so powerful in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, had ceased to work as they should.  While this argument had its origins in the 
convulsions of the 1960s and the Vietnam War, a group of former liberals who had been 
“mugged by reality” emerged in the 1970s and became the most influential spokesman 
for a cause of reforming the welfare state while restoring the United States’ international 
influence.  These so-called neoconservatives were also tentatively finding common 
                                                           
42 Olson, US Foreign Policy and the New International Economic Order, 12.  These twenty principles were 
“sovereign equality, cooperation of all states in overcoming economic disparities, special attention to 
development problems, self-determination in choosing economic systems, full national control over 
resources, rights of restitution for exploitation, regulation of transnational corporations, national liberation 
wherever appropriate, just prices for developing country exports, aid without strings, reform of the 
international monetary system, nonreciprocal trade preference, and access to achievements of science and 
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43 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly “3281 (XXIX). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States” http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm, Accessed 14 October 2012. 
44 Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the 
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 
1975).  For studies that were particular for Britain, see Cornell University, Is Britain Dying?: Perspectives 
on the Current Crisis (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1979); Stephen Haseler, The Death of British 
Democracy: A Study of Britain’s Political Present and Future (London: P. Elek, 1976). Robert Moss, 




ground with traditional conservatives.45 However, outside of a small segment of the right 
and the left, what solutions there were to the problems of inflation, industrial unrest, 
rising oil prices, unemployment, declining industry, and increasing social disorder were 
unclear.   
What had held the “Special Relationship” together? The idea that democracies are 
natural allies has its origins as far back as the First Article of Section II of Immanuel 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace.46  Preserved as a military and diplomatic alliance in the early 
years of the Cold War, the Special Relationship was always more important to the British 
than the Americans, something the British forgot at their peril.47  Much of the dynamic of 
the Special Relationship can be explained by the differences between the United States 
and Britain in the aftermath of the Second World War.   The United States emerged from 
the Second World War at the pinnacle of its economic, military, and diplomatic power 
and influence relative to its allies and enemies.  Britain, however, had bankrupted itself 
over the course of two world wars but still sought to act as an imperial power even as the 
center of the empire moved from India to Africa and the Middle East.48   Unlike the US-
Soviet alliance that fractured quickly after 1945, the relatively close relationship between 
                                                           
45 Irving Kristol, “An Autobiographical Memoir,” in The Neoconservative Persuasion (New York: Basic 
Books, 2011), 316–49. 
 
46 The most common discussion of the theory that democracies are natural allies comes from the 
international relations theory of Democratic Peace.  For a good description of this theory, see Bruce Russett 
et al., “The Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 4 (April 1, 1995): 164–184.  
47 William Roger Louis, “American Anti-Colonialism, Suez, and the Special Relationship,” in Ends of 
British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (New York: I.B. Tauris ; 
Distributed in the U.S.A. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 589–608. In Louis’ analysis, if forced to choose 
between “the ‘special relationship’, ‘anti-colonialism’, and ‘anti-communism’, the last always prevails. 
48 Two major works on this transition are Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, 1st 
American ed. (New York [N.Y.]: Norton, 1983)and William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle 
East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford : New York: 
Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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the US and Britain endured.  This was in spite of the differences in relative power and 
influence each country enjoyed during the Cold War.  While there were significant 
moments of tension and disagreement, most notably during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 
the choice of the Wilson government not to provide military support to the US-led war in 
Vietnam, there was still a great deal of cooperation for the three decades after the end of 
the Second World War through diplomatic, military, and intelligence channels. 49  
Despite this cooperation, the United States and the United Kingdom pursued different 
foreign policy paths during this time.  
The foreign policy of the United States after 1945 followed a particular path.  
From the beginning of the Cold War the United States’ overarching foreign policy 
objective was the containment of the Soviet Union.50   One major area of importance to 
the United States’ foreign policy was its ability to work with its allies, both bi-laterally 
with allies such as the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom and through multi-lateral institutions like NATO 51.    
                                                           
49 Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 124–146.  One major breaking point in the relationship in the early 
1960s was the US rejection of the Skybolt aircraft despite the major cost to the British.  For the classic 
study, see Richard E Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). 
50 The literature on the Cold War and containment is vast.  Early scholarship stressed the behavior of the 
Soviets for the outbreak of the Cold War, while the revisionists beginning with William A. Williams 
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the material to their analysis that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union.  For the best post-revisionist 
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revisionists, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War.   For a fundamental rethinking of the Cold War the shifts the focus of 
the conflict to the Third World, see Westad, The Global Cold War, 2005. For the idea of containment being 
the overall driving factor in the foreign policies of the US government during the Cold War, see John Lewis 
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. 
(2nd ed.)  Gaddis discusses the shifts in the means of US strategy as switching between symmetrical (such 
as the Korean War) and asymmetrical (Eisenhower’s New Look) methods.   
 
51 One of the most interesting examinations of the formation and limitations of these alliances is Geir 
Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952.” Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 263-277.  Lundestad makes it clear that the supremacy over its 
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After Suez, the relationship regained some of its former closeness under 
Macmillan, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, but declined as the pound weakened and the US 
grew more involved in the Vietnam War to the distress of the ruling Labour party under 
Harold Wilson.52  It stagnated as Nixon turned toward the wider world and Heath turned 
to Europe.53  By 1975, however, Nixon and Heath were both gone and the relationship 
was becoming more important again, but the focus of it had changed.  Instead of being 
bound by Anglo-Saxon culture or a common enemy, it was the economic disorder and 
increasingly complex international system where these two countries were forced to 
focus their efforts.  The military parts of the alliance did not fall away, but détente had 
reduced the possibility of war in Europe.  Under the umbrella of the Nixon Doctrine, 
Nixon and Kissinger sought regional allies that would enforce regional security while the 
United States played China and the Soviet Union off each other.54  Now, it seemed that 
regional allies were not effective in meeting the growing efforts of the call within the 
NAM for a NIEO or for dealing with the crises in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.   
Emerging from an era where Britain under the Conservatives had turned its 
attention to Europe and the United States under Nixon and Kissinger had played Great 
                                                                                                                                                                             
allies that the US enjoyed in the immediate post-WWII era was clearly gone by the mid-1960s.  For an 
examination of how these European powers attempted to meet exercise their sovereignty in their own 
national interest while under US hegemony, see William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War 
Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954.  Overall, the United States first sought to 
contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and communism through political and economic means in areas 
of vital interest.   After 1950 with the loss of mainland China, the explosion of a Soviet atom bomb, and the 
invasion of South Korea, the US began to take a more global and militaristic approach to containment.   
52 Pimlott, Harold Wilson. 
 
53 For an excellent summary of Nixon’s foreign policy efforts, see  Nixon in the World.   
54 Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, “Introduction: The Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” 
in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations 1969-177, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston 




Power politics, the challenges and crises the Alliance would face for the next five years 
would mostly occur in the Third World. The principle architects of the renewal and 
refocusing of this alliance were a mixed group of men.  James Callaghan55, Henry 
Kissinger56, Anthony Crosland57, Jimmy Cater58, Andrew Young59, Ivor Richard, and 
Peter Carrington60 were a diverse array of men with radically different backgrounds.  
With the United States defeated in Vietnam and Empire gone, and détente providing 
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Oxford University Press, 2004). Henry Kissinger, A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the 
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57 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland London: J. Cape, 1982. 
 
58 The starting place for an analysis of the course of foreign policy during the Carter administration is the 
writing of its principle actors. The conflict between Vance and Brzezinski is detailed in Cyrus Vance, Hard 
Choices : Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) and 
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2003); Bartlett C. Jones, Flawed Triumphs: Andy Young at the United Nations (Lanham, Md: University 
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some stabilization in Europe, they were united in the years after 1975 in determining how 
the alliance could solve the problems of the 1970s in the Third World.   
Generally, the Special Relationship enjoyed bipartisan support on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  Heath was the rare Prime Minister who was more attuned to Europe than 
the Atlantic, and political anti-Americanism was strongest on the Tory right in figures 
like Enoch Powell and the Labour left in figures like Tony Benn, neither of whom held 
the balance of power in these years.61  Across the Atlantic, it was a different story.  The 
Anglo-American alliance was widely accepted, but the United Nations was coming under 
increased criticism in the United States, particularly from the political right.62  Both the 
Anglo-American alliance and the United Nations had their critics, and chief among the 
critics in these years was the combative Harvard sociologist Daniel Patrick (Pat) 
Moynihan who was at the center of an argument in 1975 as the United States and Britain 
clashed at the United Nations over what seems merely to be a matter of style but revealed 
a more fundamental disagreement about the best way to meet the challenges of the Third 
World.63   Moynihan’s criticism of both Britain and the UN in these years was 
                                                           
61 For the anti-American views of the “High” Tory right, see Simon Heffer, Like the Roman : The Life of 
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representative of a stream of neoconservative thought that analyzed the problems of the 
welfare state and the ending of the post-war social consensus.  In their journals, Britain 
was a prime example of the problems of the welfare state.64  This group of public 
intellectuals such as Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz were “breaking ranks” with 
their youthful radicalism and searching for a way to solve the United States’ problems 
both at home and abroad.65  For their part, British writers and thinkers also agreed 
something was wrong, but struggled to determine what it was and more importantly, what 
then was to be done?  This search for answers prompted an outpouring of literature.66  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Moynihan is his own powerful writings, a selection of which has been published as Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary, ed. Steven R. Weisman.  
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Punishment in England,” Public Interest, no. 43 (Spring 1976). An early example of questions about the 
survival of the welfare state can be  found in Timothy Raison, “The British Debate the Welfare State,” 
Public Interest 1, no. Autumn 1965 (n.d.): 110–18..  
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Despite the temptation to see the Reagan administration and Thatcher government as the 
logical outcomes of this ideological search, their elections were contingent on many 
factors including events in the Third World.  These problems of internal discontent in 
each country and a diplomatic approach that was increasingly focused on the Third 
World through the United Nations is the intersection that will illuminate the nature of 
both. 
The larger aim of this project, beyond an analysis of the dealings of the Anglo-
American governments with the Third World in the late 1970s, is to reexamine the 
importance of the 1970s in the United States and Britain.   The 1970s were more than just 
a bridge between the disorder of the 1960s and the conservative surge of the 1980s.   The 
1970s matter because they represent the end of the post-WWII era and the search for a 
way ahead.  What historian Eric Hobsbawm called the Golden Age that began in 1945 
came to a sudden close with the Oil Crash of 1973.67  The 1970s offered a glimpse of 
what a post Cold War world might look like.  The challenges of growing global 
inequality, a concern over the future relationship between human beings and the natural 
world, balancing competing claims of liberty and justice, and rising ethnic tensions were 
issues that transcended the East-West confrontation and would remain controversial even 
after the Cold War.  Their genesis, as well as some of the West’s first concerted attempts 
to deal with them in an international way, was located in this moment of transition.   For 
the British, it was also a decade of domestic concerns such as inflation and labour unrest.  
                                                           





For the Americans, it was a “post” era:  Post-Nixon, post-Watergate, post-Vietnam, post-
consensus.  What was to come next was a mystery.68    
The best way to explore how the British and United States understood the 
workings and limits of the Special Relationship in confronting the crises in the Third 
World through the post-Vietnam 1970s is to look carefully at a variety of different crises.  
These “case studies” are an examination of how the British and Americans viewed each 
other’s troubles in the late 1970s, the conflicts that marked Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 
time as the United States’ ambassador to the UN, the small boat refugee crisis in 
Southeast Asia, Henry Kissinger and Anthony Crosland’s attempt in 1976 to end white 
minority rule in Rhodesia, and the search for resolutions of the twin crises of Southern 
Rhodesia and Iran in 1979-1980.  Taken together, these events detail the struggle of the 
United States and Britain to work together in a world where their economic power and 
diplomatic influence were on the decline. 
Moynihan’s tenure at the UN was a stormy one in large part because he 
confronted both the British and the Third World.  His selection to represent the US at the 
UN was the result of an article in Commentary that blamed Britain’s Labour intellectuals 
for spreading socialist and anti-American ideals to the Commonwealth which in turn 
made these ideas into the majority opinion at the UN.  The beau ideal of his argument 
was the famous British liberal Marxist (contra Stalinist) Harold Laski whose goal for 
Labour was a “revolution by Consent.”69  Laski had a great number of friends among the 
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Vietnam” is worth exploring given that as late as 2004 a US Presidential election turned in no small part on 
a comparison of the two candidate’s service records during the war. 
 
69 Moynihan’s indictment of Laski was ironic given their shared affiliation with the LSE.  Laski was a 
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political elite of the Democratic Party of his era (including FDR), but he was from the 
start the center of criticism from the political right for his hostility to the peculiar form of 
American capitalist democracy.70  As Moynihan was a hawkish Democrat who had 
served in both Democratic and Republican administrations, his views won him the notice 
of President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger as an instrument for the United States’ 
attempt to recover its international standing after Vietnam.  Moynihan sought to place the 
“United States in Opposition” to the world for nine months at the United Nations.   
Moynihan’s tenure at the United Nations saw the passage of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3379 “Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination” more commonly 
known as the “Zionism is Racism” resolution.71  This display of the voting power of the 
Third World seemed to mark the low point of US influence in the world.  Moynihan was 
seen by some as provoking this Resolution with his rhetoric, and it led to a row between 
himself and the British Ambassador Ivor Richard that strained the relationship between 
the two countries at the United Nations as well as between Kissinger and Moynihan.72   
In the end, Moynihan resigned and returned to Harvard, but the public nature of their 
dispute was evidence to some in Washington of Kissinger’s declining power and 
influence.  Moynihan’s attempt at diplomacy had failed, and despite the attempts of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Fulbright Scholar in the 1950s.  Their times at the school did not overlap.  When Moynihan arrived, Laski 
had been replaced by the conservative Michael Oakenshott.  See Chapter 3 for more details.   
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United States to deal with the demands of the Third World through improved trade 
agreements and increased aid, the combativeness of Moynihan had weakened the United 
States by loosening its bonds with its allies.  In 1976, Kissinger and the British would 
work together to find a way forward in the Third World.  The place they selected for their 
attempt was Africa. 
The next case study is the “small boat” refugee crisis that saw thousands of 
Vietnamese fleeing the Communist takeover of Southeast Asia during and after the end 
of the Vietnam War.  This aspect of the wider refugee crisis in the area drew together 
Britain, the United States, and the United Nations in ways that were rare in the post-
WWII era.   The refugees who fled by sea often arrived in places either under British 
control (Hong Kong) or in countries where Britain had a defense relationship (Brunei, 
Singapore).  For the United States, this crisis forced them to continue confronting the war 
that so many wished to put behind them.73  For the British, it was a challenge to reconcile 
their last remaining pieces of empire and influence in the Far East, their traditional 
commitment to humanitarianism, their alliance with the United States, their official 
reluctance to admit newcomers, and their desire to solve this problem by working with 
the UN High Commissioner on Refugees.74  British ships were among those picking up 
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the refugees, and the excess cost for the firms of caring for these refugees while on board 
cut into the shippers’ already thin profit margins.  Both Callaghan’s and Thatcher’s 
governments did not want to create economic difficulties for British firms, but they also 
demanded that British masters abide by the rules of the sea.  This struggle for the British 
involved not just the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) but also the concerns of the Home Office of where these refugees were to 
live if they came to Britain and the ever-present question of how the Exchequer would 
fund these efforts. Examining how these issues interacted is a way of seeing the “Special 
Relationship” as it relates to the Third World in a new light. 
The third case is the turn to Africa by Henry Kissinger in 1976.  After Kissinger 
and Ford rejected Moynihan’s more confrontational approach to the international 
community, the United States along with Britain turned to Africa in search of a 
diplomatic success.  This search had started with the failed covert mission to stop Cuba 
from seizing control of Angola in 1975, but Kissinger saw that there was still a chance to 
improve the United States’ standing in Africa by bringing closure to the problem of 
continued white minority rule in Rhodesia.  For Kissinger, the reality of the rising 
importance of the calls for a NIEO, the deadlock in the Middle East, the relative stability 
of Europe, and the weakening of the US position in Asia forced him to look for new 
places to practice foreign policy.  With the help of James Callaghan and Anthony 
Crosland he would seek to solve the problem of white majority rule in Southern Rhodesia 
and perhaps eventually South Africa.75  For the British, working with Kissinger was a 
way of resolving the last hanging bit of empire that proved a problem at every 
                                                           




Commonwealth meeting.  Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(UDI) in 1965 had bedeviled the first Wilson government, and the continued failure to 
resolve it was a nuisance to Britain at home and at the UN.76 When Ford lost to Carter, 
this initiative did not abate.  It was instead redoubled by David Owen at the Foreign 
Office and Andrew Young at the United Nations.  Both Young and Owen were men who 
inspired strong opinions and who were committed to improving relations with the Third 
World.77  They served similar purposes in the foreign policy apparatuses of their 
governments.  Callaghan, Carter, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance focused on defense 
issues and Europe while Young and Owen dealt with the Third World.  For a time it 
seemed to work.  Although the regime of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front was nothing if not 
consistently truculent, it was losing both the guerilla war and the economic war at home 
and was slowly moving closer to accepting some form of majority rule.  The United 
States’ relations with the Front Line States in Southern Africa were improving thanks to 
the efforts of Young and Owen.  Both men, however, had their critics. Neoconservatives 
in the United States did not like Young, and many in Labour did not like Owen.78  Some 
in Britain as well were concerned about Young’s criticism of their country as well as his 
informal style of diplomacy.  The issue of Israel, so central to the controversy of 
Moynihan’s tenure at the United Nations, returned to the center stage when knowledge of 
Andrew Young’s forbidden dealing with the PLO became public and he was forced to 
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resign.79  His departure worsened a growing split in the Democratic Party between 
African-Americans and Jews that had emerged in the 1960s.80  His removal was also 
roughly coincidental with the arrival in power of Mrs. Thatcher and the marked shift in 
Carter’s foreign policy to a more confrontational approach. 
The beginning of Mrs. Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister and the end of Carter’s 
term saw a remilitarization of the United States’ approach to both the Cold War in 
Europe and relations with the Third World.  The invasion of Afghanistan was the death 
knell of détente.  For Britain, these first years saw Mrs. Thatcher and her allies struggle to 
gain control over the British government and wrap up the last remnants of the British 
Empire in Africa.  The twin crises in Iran and Zimbabwe exposed the limits of the Anglo-
American alliance.  Margaret Thatcher’s support from the Commonwealth and the skill 
of Lord Carrington mattered more than the actions of Cyrus Vance or Jimmy Carter in 
ending minority rule in Southern Rhodesia.81  There was little Britain could do given the 
determination and stubbornness of the new Iranian regime to free the diplomats the  
“Students Following the Line of the Imam” had taken hostage.82  Despite these limits, 
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when the Iran Hostage Crisis and the neo-conservative defections from the Democratic 
Party proved fatal to the Carter administration the Anglo-American relationship was 
much stronger than it had been just five years previously.  However, the 1980s would 
mark a return to the era when the Third World would again divide Britain and the United 
States. 
If the problems of the Third World and the Anglo-American Special Relationship 
outlasted the Cold War, then the study of what the British and United States did together 
in the Third World between Vietnam and the end of the Iranian Hostage Crisis  is worth 
examining in detail. The alignment between the two governments in the following years 
rested on the base rebuilt by the administrations and governments that had preceded it.83  
This odd moment is revealing to what governments can accomplish together even in the 
age of limits.
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Chapter 2: The Dialogue of Decline: American and British Perceptions of Decline Across 
the Atlantic in the 1970s 
 
Looking for hope in the face of dire warnings about a future Third World War, the 
American anti-totalitarian journal’s Dissent editor Irving Howe offered up “England” and 
its decolonization as proof that “the ‘imperialist temptation’ of the capitalist countries” 
was on the wane in 1959.  Harold Macmillan’s prosperous Britain, it seemed to Howe, 
had learned the correct lessons about the perils of intervention at Suez.1  Britain had 
progressed peacefully down the road toward socialism in the 1940s, and now was losing 
its taste for empire without any major internal discord.  These trends could only have 
heartened a democratic socialist about the future of Britain.  Others on the anti-
totalitarian left were less sanguine.   Daniel Bell, like Howe a product of City College and 
then a Professor of Sociology at Columbia, wrote in The End of Ideology a year later that  
“in England today, in Kingsley Amis's Lucky Jim or John 
Osborne's Look Back in Anger, we have the flowering of what Christopher 
Sykes has called "redbrickism, provincialism, and all this belly-aching"--
meaning a revolt against the cultural inbreeding of Oxford and Cambridge, 
and the grayness of the Welfare State.”   
 Even if Bell saw trouble ahead, it was of a mild nature.  Both of these 
assessments rested not just on a hope for the future but on an understanding of the 
past rooted in a belief in Britain’s ability to endure.  Britain’s political 
commitment to democracy when others had faltered, its liberal notions of empire 
–however imperfectly applied over a century of practice, and now its dual 
commitments to growth and welfare state socialism by the leaders of both major 
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parties had made Britain into both a valued partner of the United States and a 
shining example of the post-war golden age.2 
Macmillan had indeed learned from Suez, and as he wound down the British 
Empire he attempted to tie Britain more closely to the United States to repair the damage 
done in 1956. For a while, it seemed that Macmillan had succeeded simultaneously in 
restoring relations with Britain’s key ally, winding down Empire, and reversing the 
austerity of the post-war years.3 However by 1975, the mild revolts that Amis and Bell 
had foreseen out of the discontents of the bourgeois 1950s had blossomed into something 
far more malign.  Britain’s attempt to modernize under Harold Wilson had foundered, as 
had Edward Heath’s attempt to tame an increasingly militant and decentralized trade 
union movement.  The international linkage that had given Macmillan much of his 
credibility, that of a close relationship first with the United States and then with Europe, 
had foundered first on the intransigence of Charles De Gaulle and then the half-hearted 
escalations of Lyndon B. Johnson.  Heath’s European focus further widened the Atlantic 
gap.  But what happened to this relationship was not all the fault of one only side. 
Bell had a warning for the United States as well in The End of Ideology.4  He went 
on to state, that despite his somewhat-Marxist claim about the withering away of 
ideology “what will happen in the United States is difficult to foresee, for all expressions 
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of revolt, whether it be Zen, or abstract expressionism, or Jungianism, or progressive 
jazz, quickly become modish and fiat.”5  The tumult of the next decade swept away this 
vision of a future where the passion of ideology had faded away.  Indeed, as Bell warned 
in his conclusion, “And when… beliefs are suffused by apocalyptic fervor, ideas become 
weapons, and with dreadful results.”6  This passage might mark better than any the fate of 
what befell the United States from 1961-1975.   
By the 1970s the fruits of victory from World War II seemed to have spoiled on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  The dreams of a post-war “American century” or of a “New 
Jerusalem” of full employment had foundered on inflation, disorder, and discord.  Britain 
nominally stood alongside the United States as the architect in the international 
institutions that would shape the post-war era, but these institutions both cemented 
American primacy and did much to undermine Britain’s independent role in the world.7  
The wider western world seemed in danger of falling behind an apparently resurgent 
Soviet Union and the newly assertive “Third World” that followed socialist models of 
government and development.8  Despite Nixon and Kissinger’s work at building détente 
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and the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, a sense of normalcy that would replace 
the tensions of the Cold War failed to develop.  The end of Lend Lease in 1945 and Suez 
a decade later brutally revealed the continued British economic dependence on American 
support for sterling.9   The demands of the Johnson administration over Vietnam, 
devaluation of the pound, and the withdrawal from “East of Suez” had further strained 
the relationship between the two countries in the 1960s.10   The end of empire had limited 
Britain’s overseas commitment down from East of Suez to the maintenance of a small 
nuclear deterrent, supporting NATO’s efforts to keep the Atlantic open in time of war, 
the defense of the northern German plains as part of NATO, and defending a few small 
overseas outposts.11  This external retrenchment of Britain’s role in the world did not help 
the situation at home, where inflation and industrial discord were making Britain into the 
“sick man of Europe” along with Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Of these countries, only 
Britain had sustained its democracy.  With the fall of Ted Heath’s government to trade 
union unrest in 1974 and an increasingly tense situation inside Harold Wilson’s cabinet, 
even this pillar of British life was possibly in danger.  
With trouble came a search for a diagnosis. This concern about decline on both 
sides of the Atlantic was most evident in the new intellectual movement within the 
United States known as neoconservatism, but civil servants, politicians, academics, and 
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other observers shared these same concerns about decline and how to arrest or perhaps 
even reverse it.   
In addition to this dialogue about British decline, there was the continued 
diplomatic effort of the British government to assess the current and potential future 
policies of the United States.  Although Macmillan and others believed that Britain could 
exercise influence on the United States through advice and consultation, this had not been 
the pattern since 1945.12   The doings of the United States were not the only concern of 
British foreign policy after the Second World War. Britain’s foreign policy in the years 
after the war was triangular, with Britain attempting to maintain links to the United 
States, the Commonwealth, and Europe.13  For the British after the Second World War, 
their relationship with the United States, along with Europe and the Commonwealth, gave 
them an influence which belied their growing relative weakness.  Conservative Prime 
Minister Edward Heath’s European orientation (an outlier among British Prime Ministers 
of the post-war period) along with Nixon and Kissinger’s focus on superpower détente 
had allowed the relationship to further atrophy.14  Heath’s defeat in the General Election 
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of 1974 restored Labour under Harold Wilson to power.15  The Atlantic orientation of 
Wilson and especially his Foreign Secretary James Callaghan meant that the United 
States assumed a greater importance in the foreign policy of Britain than it had during the 
preceding decade.   In general Britain was looking at the United States to see what 
changes the tumultuous events around the Vietnam War would bring to how the United 
States dealt with the rest of the world, and critics of Britain both internally and from the 
United States wondered about the future of Britain specifically and social democracy in 
general.    
Why were the concerns about British decline and American weakness both 
intensified and internationalized in the 1970s?   What shape did this criticism of Britain 
and the United States take?  What criticisms did Britain have of the United States?  Who 
were the defenders of Britain, both at home and abroad?  How did this dynamic play out 
against the backdrop of an increasingly powerful Third World and an externally confident 
and militarily powerful Soviet Union?  The diversity of opinions about Britain, the 
United States, and the threat of decline often meant that the diagnosis was more revealing 
about the perspective of the author than of a logical way forward for either country.   
With these caveats in mind, an analysis of this dialogue will clarify the outlines of the 
Anglo-American relationship in the 1970s and its relation to the wider world.     
The Question of “British Decline” 
What was wrong with Britain and the various solutions proposed to solve its 
problems were a microcosm of general problems that afflicted the First World in the 
                                                           




1970s.  The central idea that the critics and observers of Britain grappled with was that of 
“decline”.  Britain’s slide from an island of social stability, political continuity, and 
democratic socialism into un-governability, violence, and poverty was perhaps a portent 
for the United States.  Had the creation of their welfare state doomed the British? The 
future of each country had a direct impact on the future of the other.  More broadly, what 
did these trends portend for the future of the western alliance?   
Britons had been worried about national decline long before the 1970s.  The 
creation of a united and industrially powerful Germany in 1871 prompted Benjamin 
Disraeli to remark that “the balance of power has been entirely destroyed, and the country 
which suffers most, and feels the effects of this great change most, is England.”16  This 
shift in the global balance of power predicated by a rising Germany prompted a late 
Victorian call for a “Greater Britain” to maintain British power in a world of rising 
competitors that included not just Germany but also the United States.17  The pre-war 
years were later described as being the “Death of Liberal England”, a view that owed as 
much to the politics of the mid-1930s as it did the conduct of the Asquith government.18  
Imperial Germany’s rise forced the British to abandon “Splendid Isolation” in favor of 
diplomatic understandings with Japan, France, and Czarist Russia.19 
  These understandings, along with Britain’s commitment to Belgium’s 
independence, would pull Britain into World War I.  The war killed a vast number of 
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Britain’s young men, drained the Treasury, and weakened the Empire.20  It also brought 
forth on the world stage two men with powerful anti-imperial voices.  Woodrow Wilson 
and Vladimir Lenin’s ideas were quite different, but both of their programs seemed to 
auger the end of European supremacy in the world’s affairs.21  The interwar years had 
their share of domestic strife and a shared belief among intellectuals about decline based 
on overpopulation of the wrong sort of people, the death of capitalism, and the 
destructive potential of future war.22 
The Second World War, so long thought of as Britain’s “finest hour”, also 
became the turning point in British history in the movement toward a particular form of 
collectivism.  Generally, studies of the period point to the Beveridge Report of 1942 and 
the spirit of wartime collectivism as guideposts along the way to the “New Jerusalem” of 
the post-1945 Labour Government that featured a National Health Service and a cradle-
to-grave welfare state.23   
In the post-war years, Britain was one of the most stable societies in Europe and 
one whose political consensus and impartial but skilled bureaucracy had made it an oasis 
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of politeness and continuity. The crisis of Suez provoked only a constitutional change of 
Prime Ministers, while the Algerian War ended the French Forth Republic.   After a 
difficult period in the post-war years, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan could assert that 
"most of our people have never had it so good".24   However, Britain had been overtaken 
in power and influence in the world by both the United States and the Soviet Union.  
When Labour came into office in 1964, Harold Wilson’s promise to use the “White Heat” 
of technology to power the British economy foundered on inflation and a balance of 
payments weakness.25  
By 1975, with its colonies mostly gone and neither party able to control the 
nation’s destiny, Britain seemed to be on the road to become what Orwell had predicted it 
would be with India gone, a “cold and unimportant little island where we should all have 
to work very hard and live mainly on herrings and potatoes.”26  Perhaps part of the reason 
for the focus on British decline is that the British for a time in their history did seem to 
control the balance of power in Europe and in some ways the wider world.  Not only had 
Britain risen so high, it had fallen so far.  
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Britain’s decline was a complex phenomena involving such economic questions 
as the relative efficiency of British industry dating back to the beginnings of the 
Industrial Revolution all the way into the post-Second World War era, the strength of 
sterling as a currency versus the dollar, and whether or not the British Empire had an 
overall positive or negative effect on the British economy.  Finding a satisfactory set of 
reasons for British decline was a difficult task.  As one Nobel Prize winning economist 
wrote in 1970, ““Every discussion among economists of the relatively slow growth of the 
British economy compared with the Continental economies ends up in a blaze of amateur 
sociology.”27 
In Britain, the idea of decline intertwines scholarship with advocacy and politics.   
John Maynard Keynes is associated with the death of laissez-faire and the ideas of central 
planning and demand management as much as for his service to the British government 
over two world wars.  The Austrian School approach of F.A. Hayek and the monetarist 
theories of Milton Freidman are the rubrics by which many judge conduct of the Thatcher 
government.28  
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Declinists often look for a moment in time when decline began.  Martin Wiener’s 
English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 asserts that a 19th 
century aristocratic preference for wealth from land rather than industry influenced the 
middle classes to give up business as soon as they could and this preference remained 
part of British society. Alternately, Cornelli Barnett in a series of books blamed Victorian 
morality for destroying the hard headed profit seeking motives of the British people in the 
18th century and replacing it with a concern for fair play and good.  This lack of 
ruthlessness made Britain concerned with alliances rather than victory and exposed it to 
the vagaries of the power of the United States and Soviet Union.  Although it won the 
Second World War, Britain’s allies took from it the Empire.  Military victory also hid the 
inefficiencies of British industry and allowed the war’s difficulties to transform into a 
pleasant nostalgia.29   
Structural decline is linked to the model of imperial overstretch most famously 
formulated by Paul Kennedy.  Under this model, the inherently escalating military 
commitments of empire ultimately lead to domestic economic decline.  Kennedy applied 
this description of decline to Britain in The Decline and Fall of Naval Mastery and then 
more generally to the empires of the west in the post-1500 era in The Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers.30 Domestically, other historians posit British post-war decline was a result 
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of domestic inefficiencies brought about by the pursuit of full employment and the power 
of trade unions to retard the “creative destruction” that is essential for a market or even 
mixed economy to work.31  Another structural theory of British decline was that of 
“crowding out”, where the rising public expenditures of the 1960s and 1970s crippled 
Britain’s private sector.32  P. J Cain and A. G Hopkins's argue in British Imperialism that 
‘gentlemanly capitalism” was at the financial heart of the British Empire, and that much 
of Britain’s industrial and imperial weakness in the early part of the 20th century was 
hidden thanks to the financial power of the City.33  However, critics of the idea of decline 
cite Britain’s consensus politics and its robust Civil Service that managed decolonization 
with a skill that avoided the disruptions that plagued the French Fourth Republic as proof 
Britain in these years was not as far gone as it seemed.34    
A British History of the United States’ “Malaise”  
For all of these different assessments of decline, Britain still had to attempt to 
function in the world as a member of NATO, a new entrant to the EEC, and a member of 
the Commonwealth.  These roles put them into contact with other major western powers 
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also undergoing to the “shock” of the 1970s with the end of the effectiveness of demand 
management and the sharp rise in oil prices.   
With Britain’s nuclear deterrent, fiscal stability, and diplomatic initiatives 
dependant on American understanding and support, Wilson and Callaghan needed 
reliable information and reporting on the goings on not just in Washington DC but in the 
United States generally.  Although Cabinet ministers and other Labour politicians were 
frequent visitors to the United States, the most reliable and regular conduit of information 
about the United States back to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was the British 
embassy in Washington DC.  The embassy’s yearly reports furnished an outsider’s view 
of the United States that was vital in determining how British civil servants and 
politicians should shape their policies.  The narrative of these reports is in one of the 
United States struggling to manage in the chaotic era between Vietnam and the Iran 
hostage crisis that included the decline of New York City, the bicentennial, the election 
of 1977, and the confusion surrounding the Carter administration’s internal battles. These 
reports for the second half of the 1970s, even for the bicentennial year of 1976, generally 
reflect a pessimistic view of the political and economic performance of the United States.   
Across the Atlantic, the challenge of determining what the British government 
knows (and how its civil service and politicians think) is an enduring challenge to 
understanding British history.  Unlike the American government, where a multitude of 
opinions flourish in multiple branches and bodies in and out of government, the British 
government’s foreign policy making apparatus is traditionally embodied in the Foreign 
Secretary working in concert with the Prime Minister.  A Civil Service bureaucracy 
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provides expertise that supplies both continuity and wisdom to these elected officials. 35  
One term for this collective wisdom embodied in the British government is the “Official 
Mind.” 
The concept of the British ‘Official Mind” comes from Ronald Robinson and 
John Gallagher with Alice Denny’s study of the British Empire in Africa and the 
Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent.   The Official Mind, in 
Robinson and Gallagher’s study, was the mindset that imperial officials took with them 
from London in the late 19th century that gave them a common frame of reference that 
allowed them to seek security for Britain’s imperial holdings in South Africa and Egypt 
without extensive consultations back to London.36  In that era, the Official Mind prized 
economy, continuity, and security.37   That which was the province of empire was by the 
1970s the province of bureaucracy.  As the British government was by tradition and 
structure more reliant than the American government on the civil service to provide 
guidance to politicians (who would come and go while the civil servants stayed on), 
reading their responses alongside the reports of the diplomats in the field makes for a 
clearer picture of what the “British government” (or more precisely the sections of the 
Foreign Office that dealt with the issues relating to the internal politics of the United 
States and communicated to their elected masters) thought.38  Of Britain’s three 
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ambassadors to the United States in these years, two were professional diplomats and one 
was a journalist trying his hand at diplomacy.   
The British ambassador to the United States in 1975 was Peter Ramsbotham. 
Ramsbotham had joined the Foreign Service after his wartime experience as a counter-
intelligence officer in Germany, and had started out working in the economic office 
coordinating “dollar-sterling” issues with the United States relating to international oil 
companies.39  Even in the early 1950s, Ramsbotham recalled Britain’s four overseas 
objectives were to maintain the cohesion of the British Commonwealth and Empire, [to] 
keep the sterling area together …, stay close partners with the United States, [and] 
maintain the balance of payments.”  Ramsbotham had an understanding of the role and 
importance of the United Nations as well, having served there as a diplomat before and 
during the Suez crisis.  Prior to his appointment as Ambassador to the United States, 
Ramsbotham had served as Ambassador to Tehran and High Commissioner to Cyprus.40  
Ramsbotham’s Annual Report at the end of 1975 emphasized the weak 
performance of President Gerald Ford due to his conflicts with Congress and the public 
discontent that remained due to his pardon of Nixon.   Kissinger received credit for 
continuing to pursue détente, but despite the success of the Helsinki Conference it 
appeared that improvements in East-West relations had stalled.  Any progress made in 
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Europe had been undone by the Soviet-backed offensive in Angola.41  At the United 
Nations, Ramsbotham felt that Kissinger’s speech dealing with the Third World during 
the Seventh Special Session had actually resulted in an improved performance over 1974, 
but that  
“[AMB Daniel P.] Moynihan’s confrontational style … has aroused predictable 
resentment among many third world governments and has been largely counter-
productive [but] is manifestly popular in the country.”42 
This desire to fight back against the demands and defamations of the Third World 
was a symptom of the United States’ defeat in Vietnam and would only serve to 
complicate relations in the UN.  Ramsbotham also noted that the US had experienced its 
worst post-war recession over the past year, but that the British economic recovery had 
done a great deal to restore the confidence in Britain within the United States which had 
been undermined by reporting in the American press on “our future credit-worthiness and 
our prospects as a united and democratic kingdom.”43  The report ended by stressing the 
importance of the Anglo-American relationship.  
This was not the only account the British received of the United States in decline 
as the Vietnam War ended.  Harold Wilson visited Washington and New York at the end 
of January 1975.  He spent time with President Ford, gave a press conference at the 
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National Press Club, and visited New York.  At the National Press Club, Wilson stressed 
his close relationship with Ford, stated that Britain’s new North Sea Oil would strengthen 
its Atlantic ties, and denied the claim that “the Arabs” had recently bid on the Tower of 
London.44  The next month, Wilson followed this visit to the United States with one to 
the Soviet Union where he met Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev who was 
recovering from surgery.45   
In February 1975, Anthony Crosland, the Secretary of State for Energy, visited 
the United States.  Crosland was an influential member of the Labour Party whose 1956 
The Future of Socialism moved the Labour Party away from nationalization and toward a 
less bureaucratic and more humane version of socialism.46  He visited San Francisco, 
Washington, New York, and Boston.   He approved of the public transportation in San 
Francisco and the AMTRAK line between Washington and New York.47  He spoke with 
Senator Udall about the conflict on the American left between unemployment, 
infrastructure, energy, and environmentalism.48 He spoke to Senator Stevenson (D, IL) 
about the concern in Britain over employment versus the concern in the United States 
with inflation and about how the major challenge to the United States in 1975 was a lack 
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of faith in its institutions and how “he [Stevenson] could not see the solutions to the 
country’s various problems forthcoming”.49 Senator McGovern made it clear that 
Congress would not approve any additional funding for continued US military efforts in 
South Vietnam as well as again emphasizing the difference in concern over inflation 
versus unemployment.50  In New York, Crosland noted the seeming waste of the recent 
efforts to renovate Roosevelt Island. The conditions in the South Bronx shocked him.  “It 
was horrifying … frequent buildings gutted by fire and abandoned … I have seen nothing 
comparable in the UK.”51  The Labour left stalwart Tony Benn, then Secretary of State 
for Energy, had much the same opinion a year later when he visited New York.  He saw 
the city as depressing with rubbish in the streets.52 
In Boston, Crosland had dinner with a group of friends at Daniel Bell’s house.  
Bell and Crosland had maintained a trans-Atlantic fraternal socialist dialogue, and the 
year prior Crosland had sent Bell a copy of his new book Socialism, Now.  Bell wrote 
back to Crosland that he liked the book and Crosland was perhaps the “last sensible and 
moderate man left (and certainly on the ‘left’)”.53 Among the guests were Anthony Lewis 
of the New York Times, British historian Samuel Beer, and Daniel P. Moynihan.  
Moynihan’s record of the dinner indicates that it was common for Harvard to fete visiting 
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members of the British Cabinet, and Crosland was in Moynihan’s opinion “about the best 
the British arrangement produces any longer”.  Moynihan contrasted Crosland to Wilson 
and Callaghan, men “[weak] of heart and mind”, who had kept Crosland away from the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  The guests wanted to talk about the upcoming 
referendum on the Common Market, but Crosland was more worried at least in 
Moynihan’s reckoning about the rising ethnic nationalism in Britain.54  Moynihan’s grasp 
of foreign policy, rooted at least in part in his understanding of ethnicity, allowed him to 
further grasp the extent of Britain’s troubles.  This was in the same year as Moynihan was 
formulating his critique of Britain’s influence on the post-war world, and Crosland’s 
pessimism was more fuel for the fire.  If Britain’s leading public intellectuals and 
politicians were concerned about the very existence of the United Kingdom, then 
Britain’s future was truly in jeopardy.55 
  Some of the critics of Britain looked abroad for solutions.   Ted Heath had at 
least partially had this in mind when he hoped to adopt for Britain the labour-
management model of shared responsibility more common in Europe.56  Books on the 
decline of Britain and how to reverse it were common at this time, including by 
politicians.  One example of this genre was The Death of British Democracy. Stephen 
Haseler, who was a member of the Labour Right (he referred to himself as a Gaitskellite 
who was attracted to Labour as the “warm, human, idealistic, and radical” party) and who 
would go on to help found the Social Democratic Party in 1981, surveyed Britain in the 
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mid-1970s and saw the alternate to the decline of Britain’s democratic spirit embodied in 
Roosevelt’s New Deal.  If Britain did not reform along the lines of Roosevelt’s efforts to 
save capitalism Britain was condemned to either a “totalitarian” or “authoritarian” future.  
Which party was nominally in control would matter far less than the reality of what 
would be lost.57  The part of the New Deal that Haseler found the most appealing was the 
alliance of the people and the intellectuals to combat the power of business.  In Britain in 
the 1970s, any similar alliance had to rest on a willingness of the trade unions to live 
under Conservative governments and intellectuals to begin to support a more American 
approach to politics and economics.  If these factors were in place, then a “Popular Social 
Democracy” could emerge that is at once respectful of individuals and populist without 
being redistributionist.  Haseler also shared the belief with Cornelli Barnett that the roots 
of Britain’s decline emerged from the Second World War.  The cost of victory and the 
reforms of the post-war era meant Britons had a sense of complacency about their 
achievements that left them unable to compete in the 1970s.58   
This preference for American style reform as the salvation of British politics was 
not universal.  In one of the major pro-British studies coming out of the United States 
(specifically, from a conference at Cornell), Ira Katznelson argued that it was the 
infiltration of American-style politics into British life that was the cause of some of the 
British dysfunction.  Katznelson saw in the growing militancy of the trade unions a 
weakness in class identity amidst a more fragmented working class.  This fragmented 
British working class increasingly possessed the same general lack of working class 
consciousness as did most workers in the United States. American style politics had 
                                                           





frayed the links between the working class and the Labour Party.  Katznelson foresaw 
that this weakness would mean electoral gains for parties on the political right and the 
return of a “more laissez-faire capitalism.”59   
Haseler believed that a failure to reform would mean the transformation of Britain 
into an authoritarian state.  With an American president forced from office and Harold 
Wilson under suspicion by his own intelligence service, this fear of losing democracy did 
not seem so radical at the time.60  To many Britons, the specter of dictatorship in the mid-
1970s tended to evoke the spirit of Chile and the fall of the Allende government in 1973.  
For many British leftists, Chile in the early 1970s was what Spain had been in the 1930s: 
the focus of the struggle of socialism and collectivism against fascism.   Chile had 
transformed from a 19th century oligarchy into a fairly stable modern state, but the 
Allende government’s social democratic reforms turned the country into a proxy Cold 
War battleground that ended with Allende’s suicide and the installation of an 
authoritarian right-wing government. If force could reverse the gains of socialism 
overseas, then Labour might suffer the same fate if things got too bad.61 
Many public intellectuals of the era were skeptical about Britain’s future.  
Intellectuals on both the left and right looked at Britain as a test bed of social democracy 
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and a window into the future of the United States.62    However, neoconservatives took 
the most interest in Britain as a negative model. The future neoconservatives had begun 
studying Britain from the beginning of their careers.  Irving Kristol had lived in Britain 
twice and written about British culture and politics in Encounter and The New Leader.   
In the 1950s, Kristol had a more optimistic view of Britain.  He rejected Richard 
Crossman’s socialist warning that individual liberty in Britain was under threat from the 
“various malpractices in British Civil Service, or British trade unions, or British 
industry”.63  A few years later, however, the beginnings of a sustained critique of the 
“welfare state” began to show in Kristol’s thinking.  In 1960 in Commentary, he referred 
to F.A. Hayek as the “last surviving Whig” while decrying Hayek’s blindness to the 
concrete “inequities (and iniquities) of the world”.  However, Kristol ended his review of 
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty with the observation that “his book encourages us to take 
another look at our welfare state, which—lacking any general idea of “welfare”—is 
coming more and more to resemble a monstrous pork-barrel.”64  In an echo of Bell’s 
observations three years prior, Kristol’s Commentary review in 1963 of three books 
bemoaning the state of Britain and urging it to align more closely with Europe is notable 
for its praise of British institutions and expresses worry only that Britain will become 
boring.  This Swedenization of Britain would result in a more just land, according to 
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Kristol, but also one that was of no inspiration or even interest to the rest of the world.65  
The first issue of Public Interest, a journal founded by Kristol and Daniel Bell in 1965 to 
examine the problems of the dominant liberalism of the era, featured an article that 
examined the problems with the British welfare state and how critics on the right and left 
were trying to improve it.66  James Q. Wilson used Public Interest a decade later to 
demonstrate the increase in both relative and real crime rates in Britain, particularly in 
terms of crimes against property.67   
The ur-text of the neoconservative critique and the most virulent denunciation of 
Britain in these years from a neoconservative organ was “Anglocommunism” by Robert 
Moss in the February 1977 issue of Commentary.  Moss believed that Britain under 
Callaghan met at least 6 of the 10 conditions for a communist state laid out by Marx and 
Engels in the Communist Manifesto.  Moss believed that the left of the British Labour 
Party was growing closer to the Soviet Union, and the British trade union movement was 
increasingly leftist.  Moss, an early defense advisor to Margaret Thatcher as well as a 
writer for The Economist, called Britain a Third World country whose next trip into a 
State of Emergency under either a Conservative or National government would bring 
about an authoritarian government.68    
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Perhaps the best known of the criticisms of the British from the neoconservative 
camp in the 1970s was from a fellow traveler.  Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1975 missive 
“The United States in Opposition” essentially blamed the British left for the difficulties 
the United States faced with the socialist Third World in 1975.  That article, however, 
was less about Britain’s past and more about the future of the United States’ foreign 
policy.  Moynihan saved his hottest fire for the British for his later memoir of his time at 
the United Nations.69 
For Kristol, equally at home in London and New York, the contemporary issues 
New York faced were a parallel manifestation to those faced in Britain.  New York’s 
fiscal and cultural troubles of the 1970s were not the product of public sector union 
dominance or an excessively large welfare state, but of an idea that “all social policies are 
justifiable only to the degree that they benefit the poor and help them become more 
equal.” He went on to state that this ideology and the policies that flowed from it were a 
“disaster”.  This growing hostility to a bureaucratic version of the welfare state was in 
line with the general thrust of Kristol’s analysis of the time, but it made clear he was 
more bullish on the United States with its more robust capitalist culture than on the 
consensus politics of Britain.70 To aid in this fight, the United States had a new 
generation of thinkers that could defend an anti-intellectual (in terms of praising 
efficiency before correctness) business culture from the assault of the intellectuals and 
politicians of the left.71 
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In 1976 – the year Britain was forced to accept a bailout from the International  
Monetary Fund - Kristol framed British decline in terms of the global problems of 
socialism when he offered “Socialism: An Obituary for An Idea.”  Kristol, steeped as few 
others were in the vagaries of socialist thought, noticed a paradox.  While at least three-
quarters of the earth was governed by nations that in some way or another declared 
themselves to be socialist, orthodox socialists in mostly non-socialist countries judged 
that the self-declared socialist nations were not truly socialist.  Kristol further noted that 
most of the thinking about socialism took place in non-socialist countries.  For him, 
however, “socialism is as socialism does.”  Socialist thinkers could not ignore the 
negative consequences of their ideas, and Britain’s adoption of socialism had left it the 
“sick man of Europe.”  Kristol, however, was hopeful about Britain’s future due to its 
love of liberty and was sure that it would re-embrace capitalism after the excesses of 
socialism.72 
For his part for 1976, Ramsbotham presented a picture of a United States to some 
extent restored by the celebration of the Bicentennial.  He also presented a country that 
was no longer dealing with the major international issues of 1975, but instead was 
focusing on domestic issues in deciding between two Presidential candidates.  Both of 
these candidates were acceptable, but the election of Jimmy Carter marked a change in 
foreign policy from the exhausted realism of Kissinger.   Kissinger had “marked time” at 
best, and the achievement of forcing Ian Smith to eventually accept the principle of 
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majority rule in Southern Rhodesia had been the major achievement of the year.73  
Ramsbotham noted, however, that the weakness of Kissinger’s approach included the fact 
he had no other areas where the US could make foreign policy progress.  Arms control 
and reduction negotiations had stalled, as had the shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East.  
Kissinger focused on Africa because that is where the crises were, and he still saw affairs 
there within the lens of superpower confrontation.   Additionally, he failed to understand 
the “extent to which his own credibility had suffered as a result of his association with 
Mr. Nixon.”74 In foreign affairs, Ford had banned the word détente during his ultimately 
failed re-election campaign.  He faced an international environment where the United 
States was seen as a supporter of “repressive regimes and unwilling to recognize the 
legitimate aspirations of the developing” world.  However, the United States did enjoy 
the advantage of having ideas to contribute.  The leadership role that America desired for 
itself contrasted with the Soviets, who for all their aggression and renewed economic 
vigor, had run out of ideas.   
Within the United States, the Bicentennial had helped to re-establish a sense of 
confidence and pride in Americans in their country despite “wastefulness of resources 
and [being] destructive of the environment”. America also had to find ways to deal with 
its crises in “energy, agriculture, crime, the cities and welfare.”  Ramsbotham was full of 
restrained praise for Ford and how he had steadied the ship of state, but also was 
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“encouraged” by the appointments President –Elect Carter was making.  Cyrus Vance at 
State, Mike Blumenthal at the Treasury, and Harold Brown at Defense were all known 
quantities within the Democratic Party and the traditions of the American elite and their 
appointment by the relatively unknown Carter was reassuring to America’s allies.  Carter 
came into office without the majority of the white vote, but he had won the majority of 
the “blacks, the labour unions and the ethnic minorities.”75 
 In terms of the Anglo-American relations, the visit of the Royal couple had been a 
success, as had the first landing of the Concorde, but the UK still needed to improve its 
economic performance to restore the confidence of the United States.  Ramsbotham 
described the United States as still perceiving itself as the “linchpin” of the West and 
ready to resume its place as the “driving force” of the western alliance.76   Despite the 
calming effect of the IMF loan, the subsequent relative stability of the pound, and the 
close relationship between Ford and Callaghan, Ramsbotham reported that Americans 
were still skeptical of Britain’s future.  1976 had been the bicentennial not just of the 
Declaration of Independence, but of another critical document in the political and 
economic history of these two powers, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.  Smith’s 
anti-mercantilist masterpiece had exalted capitalism and free trade, and its modern 
apostle Milton Friedman “command[ed] a wide audience.”  Friedman and his followers 
saw “Britain’s decline” and its mixed economy “as a lesson for America.”  Friedman was 
perhaps the most virulent critic of Britain, but Kristol focused more on culture than 
Friedman’s economic critique.  In this same year, Freidman argued in Encounter that 







““the odds are at least 50-50 that within the next five years British freedom and 
democracy, as we have seen it, will be destroyed .”  He also stated that “Britain is on the 
verge of collapse” on Meet the Press.77   For Ramsbotham, however, Britain need to 
show the United States it was “not just a diminished power dealing with the loss of 
empire, but … an influential part of a wider community.”  When Britain was seen to be 
“putting our house in order”, the United States and the American people would “quickly 
and favorably” respond.78 
The same Establishment that was uneasy about Carter but pleased with his 
Cabinet choices was equally concerned about the global upheavals of the era.  Centered 
on the power corridor of Washington, New York, and Cambridge, members of the 
establishment were of both parties.79  Membership in this elite club had once been the 
province of the white Protestant elite, but that model was cracking thanks to powerful 
newcomers like Kissinger and National Security Advisor-designate Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
The classic “Establishment” statement of the problems of the 1970s was the 1975 
Trilateral Commission Report The Crisis of Democracy.80  Political scientist Samuel 
Huntington of Harvard, French sociologist Michel Crozier, and Japanese social scientist 
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Joji Watanuki prepared the report.  David Rockefeller founded and Zbigniew Brzezinski 
organized the Trilateral Commission in 1973 to foster understanding between the major 
industrialized democratic powers in North America, Asia, and Europe.  Founded in the 
era of the oil shock, the foreign policy elites of these three regions sought solutions 
through cooperation and discussion.81  
 According to the Trilateral Commission Report, part of the problem was the 
bureaucracies that had proven unequal to the challenges of an increasingly democratic 
society marked by the breakdown of trust in traditional structures of authority: 
government, church, and unions.82  Inflation was destructive to all parts of society 
because it punished work and savings.  In Europe, the disorders threatened societies built 
around “freedom from” and in the United States they threatened a polity built around 
“freedom to”. 83  “Overload” meant that despite the increase in state power since the 19th 
century, entrenched bureaucracies full of educated decision makers could not deal with 
the increasing complexity of problems in a polity where every person expected their 
voice to count.  Economic weakness also threatened the stability brought about by post-
World War II social democracy.  Rising standards of living and growth within Europe 
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had tamed the potentially radical working class, but inflation and stagnation threatened 
the stable lives and consumer comforts of the post-war era.84 
For the United States, the report warned that the decline in its economic and 
military power made it vulnerable to a future defeat that might weaken its commitment to 
democracy.85  Across western Europe and the emerging economies of eastern Asia, the 
shift from industry to service economies, the rise of nearly universal higher education and 
the subsequent increase in the power of intellectuals who were disdainful of the 
inefficiencies and contradictions of the voting public, and the fact the economy was 
leaving large segments of the working class behind all presented the kind of environment 
similar to the decline of democracy in the 1930s.86 
Lastly, the authors stressed that they were hopeful about the future of democracy.  
It aimed not just to diagnose but to offer suggestions for a better future.  Even this report, 
however, could not disguise the reality that Britain was having serious problems.  The 
introduction offered an opinion by a “senior British official” that Britain was in danger of 
falling into a “dictatorship”.87  Britain, according to the authors, had suffered the steepest 
fall and was the “least able to manage the challenges of modern times”.88   
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 The air of uncertainty of the 1970s hung over the next year’s report from 
Washington, this time by Peter Jay. Jay had replaced Ramsbotham, and as he was James 
Callaghan’s son-in-law and not a diplomat there were charges of nepotism in his 
selection.  Jay had previously served as a reporter with The Times covering economic 
issues.  Jay is a man of complex ideological views.  He helped write Callaghan’s speech 
in 1976 that seemed to mark the abandonment of Keynesian economics with the right of 
the Labour Party, but his later economic writing indicated that he still believed in the 
Keynesian philosophy.  However, Jay also believed that the promise of technological 
advances at the turn of the millennium might be able to overcome Keynes’ insights.89  Jay 
had a tumultuous time in Washington, and he and his wife both engaged in messy public 
affairs that led to their later divorce.90 
The change in ambassadors and the difference in their backgrounds are clear from 
the change in tone of the report.  Where Ramsbotham was restrained in his writing, Jay is 
caustic.  Where Ramsbottom seems to genuinely understand and convey the realities and 
rhythm of small town America in his reporting on the celebrations of the Bicentennial, 
Jay is condescending about the “18th century constitution” that has finally begun to 
provide “social and ethnic minorities” their “political and civil rights.”  These same 
minorities according to Jay, along with farmers struggling with dropping commodity 
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prices, have 19th century economic and social grievances but live in a land where politics 
is “innocent of 20th century collectivist ideas” that might point the way to a better life.91 
Jay noted that America was at peace, output was rising, inflation was dropping, 
and unemployment was decreasing.  Jay, however, believed the United States was still 
dealing with the aftermath of the years of disaster from 1963 (the Kennedy assassination) 
to 1975 (Vietnam and the energy crisis).  From Jay’s point of view, the election of Carter 
had proved that the United States wanted a “fresh start”, but the nearly equally strong 
support for Ford proved that there was “widespread longing for the eternal verities of the 
Republic, in which God and the American pocket-book march naturally hand in hand if 
only meddling politicians and malign foreigners are kept under control.”92   
In foreign affairs, Carter had negotiated the end of US control over the Panama 
Canal despite considerable domestic criticism.  The American preference for “a bold 
crusade, a visible enemy and a fast horse” was running into a multi-lateral world of the 
energy crisis (which he claimed showed the American desire to be bold and self-
sufficient did not extend to making sacrifices to achieve energy self-sufficiency), Third 
World demands, and disarmament. 
Jay’s fundamental assessment of America in 1977 was that it had structural 
limitations that inhibited bold executive leadership.  These limitations were rooted in the 
18th century pedigree of the Constitution and a nation’s 19th century sense of expansion.  
The limits of the federal government’s actions were enhanced by the ethnic diversity of 
                                                           






the US that has not been fused into a “homogenous citizen.”  The existence of pressure 
groups along with the pure regional and economic diversity of the country did not allow 
for “Burkean deliberation.”93 Carter lacked Franklin Roosevelt’s and Lyndon Johnson’s 
ability to pass legislation through Congress because of the weakening of trust in 
institutions by a skeptical population, the growth of Congressional power thanks to 
Watergate and Vietnam, and Carter’s outsider status. Jay contrasted this gridlock to the 
British system where the ability to pass legislation is the center of any government’s 
claim to the right to govern. Jay later remembered that Carter “regarded politics as a low, 
disreputable activity with which he wished to have nothing whatever to do.”94 
Jay’s report for 1978 repeated many of the same themes, but emphasized Carter’s 
growing skill at governing a country that did not fully appreciate either him or the 
changing dynamics of the global political and economic scenes.95  Jay’s report was not as 
concerned about the systemic issues that limited Carter’s effectiveness in governing that 
he had highlighted in 1977.  Instead, he focused on Carter’s personal political skill and 
his statesmanship.  The first he found wanting.  The second he found adequate.   
Carter, Jay noted, had not yet won the confidence of Congress or his fellow world 
leaders.  The American people, in his judgment, had accepted Carter’s presidency and 
enjoyed the fact they didn’t have to think about him very much.  Carter in this way shared 
the  
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“reflexes of the typical citizen, who wants his government 
to keep off his back, to be honest and efficient at home, to 
be moral and strong abroad, to stand up to the Russians, to 
avoid foreign adventures, to keep America prosperous and 
the dollar strong, to resist all special interests but his own 
and to keep a modest profile.”96 
 
This apathy toward politics and impulse toward isolationism among the American 
people was inadequate when it came to the growing sense of crisis around the world.  
From the troubles of the Shah in the “Islamic Crescent” to the various regional crises the 
United States faced, the Administration (in the persons of Carter and Brzezinski, Vance is 
oddly absent from this section of the report) might be ready but the American people 
would not be.  The crises of the world or even of the American economy would force the 
American tax-payer to get involved.  Carter did have a number of signature successes 
such as Camp David and the formal recognition of mainland China, but crises in the 
“Islamic Crescent” increasingly overshadowed these events. 
The most ironic part of Jay’s report comes when he criticizes Carter for his 
attempts to build an energy policy and fight inflation at the same time.    In Jay’s words:   
“the Government of the United States is, indeed, as far as 
ever and even further than most other Western governments 
from having found the key to high employment with stable 
prices and continues to veer between the converging horns 
of that dilemma.”97 
This analysis is striking because at the time Jay was writing it Britain was dealing with 
the Winter of Discontent with massive public and private sector strikes, inflation, and the 







unburied dead in Liverpool.98  Carter’s victories had not done much to secure his 
electoral base, and Jay was not sure they would not abandon him if the going got rough.  
His chances for reelection seemed to rest on his ability to get the economy going again.99 
 Even if Jay was extremely forthright in his judgments about President Carter and 
the United States as his background as a journalist for the BBC might have trained him to 
be, the Civil Servants in the FCO were concerned about what might happen if his 
judgments were made public.  The point of greatest concern to the FCO’s North 
American Department was Jay’s rather brief comments about the ongoing negotiations 
over SALT II.  The experts in the FCO believed that any British comment on the treaty 
might harm its chances of ratification in the United States Senate. The North American 
Department was also worried that Jay’s harsh judgments about Carter’s leadership, 
coming so soon after the Guadalupe Summit, would only hurt Carter and might harm the 
Prime Minister as well.  For that reason, they recommended that the report remain 
secret.100     
After the electoral victories of the Conservatives in 1979, Jay’s replacement in 
Washington was Nicholas Henderson.101  Henderson was a career diplomat who had 
ended his career in Paris just before the General Election if 1979.  His final dispatch to 
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David Owen from Paris before he retired (Thatcher recalled him after Heath refused the 
post of ambassador in Washington) was leaked and reprinted in the Economist.102   
Henderson’s article was the cri du couer of an anguished British diplomat who 
saw Britain slipping behind France and Germany.  Where once Britain stood apart from 
the Continent and its slowly integrating economy by the choices strength allowed, now it 
lagged behind.  Henderson’s analysis of the problems of the British economy focused on 
problems of both capital and labor.  British elites were uneager to become managers and 
engineers, and British workers belonged to a bewildering number of trade unions that 
enjoyed virtual legal immunity and had extraordinary levels of shop floor control.  These 
problems dated from an era long before the 1970s as Britain’s economy had been in 
relative decline as compared to Europe’s (including and especially Germany) from the 
1860s.103  Henderson’s article stressed that even the traditional underpinning of British 
society such politeness, muddling through, and a preference for leisure over work would 
not survive in this era of decline. That a civil servant would speak out in such a dramatic 
way was some of the best evidence that Britain truly was in a crisis.104  
Henderson’s first report as ambassador to Washington came at the end of 1979.  
Writing near the beginning of the Iran Hostage crisis, Henderson noted that the situation 
in the United States had changed radically since the taking of hostages in Iran and the 
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Soviet occupation of Kabul.   The crisis dealt Senator Edward Kennedy’s intra-party 
challenge a serious blow, and the United States had been forced to simultaneously expand 
its defense budget and capabilities while seeking to work more closely with its allies.  
Henderson made the mistake of claiming that Carter spoke about “malaise” in his famous 
Oval Office speech of that year (his speech did not contain that phrase, it was simply the 
concept that his speechwriter articulated to the press that was the unifying theme of the 
speech), and noted that the Constitution as much as Carter’s own style of leadership 
limited Carter’s ability to exercise the powers of Presidency.105  In contrast to Jay, who 
questioned these limits, Henderson accepted them as a part of the American political 
system. 
Henderson credited Carter with achievements in foreign policy in creating a 
Rapid Deployment Force to enforce the Carter Doctrine in the Middle East, in getting 
NATO to accept tactical nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe, and increasing defense 
spending.106  However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan damaged détente and the 
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chances for the passage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in the Senate.  
Congress served as a check on Carter’s energy plan and his attempts to use conservation 
and domestic supplies to reduce the United States’ dependence on OPEC.  Henderson’s 
summary indicated that the crisis in Iran had made the United States more sensitive about 
a need to work with its allies, and that Britain’s assistance related to the hostage crisis in 
the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly under Chapter VII 
complemented the American assistance in securing the Lancaster House agreement.107  In 
Henderson’s summary, “we end the year on the best of terms.”108 
Henderson filed two reports at the end of the Carter administration.  The first was 
the mandated annual report on 1980 and the second was his analysis of the entirety of the 
Carter administration.  Henderson’s first report indicated that Carter’s bad luck and 
indecision in an election year doomed his chances for re-election, but that the scale of the 
Democrat’s defeat was a surprise to almost everyone. The public viewed Carter as weak, 
and even his demonstrations of resolve such as boycotting the Olympic Games and 
creating a Rapid Deployment Force to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East were seen 
as insufficient.109  Despite these displays, Americans in Henderson’s judgment were 
worried about their safety and concerned that West Germany and France were not doing 
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enough to stand up to the Soviets.  The chaos of the past year had brought arms control 
negotiations to a standstill, and that standstill was making “Europeans” nervous about the 
deployment of TNF.  Henderson judged Anglo-American relations to be strong thanks to 
an increase in tourism brought about by the “UK/US Air Services Agreement” and an 
increase in British exports to the United States.110  British foreign policy, in contrast to 
the other members of NATO, was “forthright and helpful”, and the Reagan 
administration was seen as likely to pursue a continued close relationship with Britain.111 
In Henderson’s final report on the Carter administration, delivered on the day of 
Reagan’s inauguration and the freeing of the American hostages, he sought to look 
beyond the immediate reality of Carter’s political failure (which he attributed to a failure 
to communicate) to what was praiseworthy about the preceding four years.  Carter had 
sought economic improvement through deregulation, but was committed to improving 
the “quality of this world within which we live” by questioning the need for nuclear 
power and empowering the Environmental Protection Agency.112 
Carter’s sincere Christian morality underlay his commitment to human rights and 
his attempts to lessen the tensions between East and West.  “This public piety”, according 
to Henderson, was a net gain for the United States in Africa and Latin America, and 
although “Andy Youngism was a nuisance to the UK”, it was an asset for dealing with 
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the Third World.113  The work of Camp David and Carter’s measured and detailed 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were to his credit, but the twin facts of the 
persistence of the Iranian hostage crisis and Carter’s willingness to politicize it did great 
damage to his reputation.114   
Henderson wrote damningly about Carter’s failures as a politician.  He had been 
elected because he was “not a racist, nor a war-monger and not a crook.” He rejected the 
Washington establishment, was unable to balance the advice of those closest to him, 
preferred the personal to the professional, and was incapable of being both “informal and 
dignified.”  Henderson closed with the judgment that “history will be kinder to him than 
the present.”115   
Conclusion 
The bottom-line fear of decline for Americans writing about Britain in the zero-
sum Cold War world was not just that Britain’s fall into Pincohet-ism, Eurocommunism, 
or simply irrelevance would cost the United States a critical ally.  If a relatively small, 
traditionally well-governed society could not survive inflation and unrest, there might not 
be hope for the United States.  Today, the interplay of declinists of both varieties and 
anti-declinists appears to be nearing a synthesis.  Much of the debate over decline 
reached the peak of its vitriol in the 1970s and the 1980s and seemed to fade in the era of 
Blair and “Cool Britannia”.  The downturn in 2008 has provoked debates not over British 
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decline specifically, but more over the legacy of neo-liberalism generally and the relative 
merits of Keynes in an era of globalized capital.116 
There were still in this era signs of hope that in retrospect appear far more 
prominent than they did at the time.  The basic architecture of the world built in 1945 by 
the victorious allies was unchanged, and one of those post-war institutions would prove 
to be Britain’s savior in 1976.  These factors, despite their clarity in hindsight, were of 
little comfort in the face of communist triumphs in Angola, Vietnam, and the wide-spread 
adoption of socialist planning models in the Third World.117 
Britain looked at the United States and saw hope in the conduct of its elections 
and the willingness of the American people and their elected officials to select good 
people.  Most in the United States and Britain looked at Britain and saw hope in its 
traditions and its past.  Both of these streams of analysis were clear-eyed to the 
weaknesses of the other country.  The citizens of both countries knew that the truculence 
of the trade unions had brought down at least one government and thrown the country 
into darkness and chaos in the winter of 1978-79, and that a President resigned his office 
at the cost of the faith of the American people in their institutions.  
Despite these problems, there was still a faith in solutions.  The British diplomats 
saw hope for the United States in its traditions and elections, while its politicians on the 
left saw hope if the United States became a little more like Britain.  For the political 
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scientists at the Trilateral Commission, the problems of the 1970s were solvable if 
countries returned to listening to the advice of the traditional elite. The declinists saw 
economic or psychological reforms as the key to recovery for Britain.  
So why did these mutual understandings matter in the 1970s?  They mattered 
because they point to the fact that each side had an incentive to work with the other in its 
difficult time.  With the British at their weakest, they could choose to try to go it alone or 
they could look to the United States or Europe for help.  For the United States, they 
needed allies more than ever.  Even if there were troubles within each country, there was 
still an increasingly assertive Third World full of problems.  Those on either side who 
tried to solve them alone were likely doomed to failure.
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Chapter 3: “If You Want an Audience, Start a Fight”1: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the 
United Nations, and the Limits of Public Diplomacy 
 
At the low point of the United States’ fortunes at the United Nations in 1975 
when Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s campaign against the General Assembly 
Resolution branding Zionism a form of racism was on the verge of failure, Moynihan 
turned to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for advice.  Kissinger had little to offer for 
what to do, but did tell Moynihan that the former Governor of Texas John Connolly had 
informed Kissinger that if Connolly were to offer a piece of advice to a young politician 
who wanted to succeed, that advice would be to be an anti-Semite.2   The Resolution 
passed, and Moynihan’s tactics in confronting it and other issues involving the Third 
World increased the friction not just between the United States and the Resolution’s 
Third World sponsors but also exposed a rift between the United States’ and Britain’s 
approaches to the United Nations.   
This unexpected test of the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” in the mid-
1970s occurred when Moynihan developed a critique of how the United States 
approached the UN by appeasing the Third World on economic issues and not 
confronting them about basic human rights and political liberty.  Moynihan developed 
this critique near the end of his time as the United States Ambassador to India. At the 
heart of this critique was a linkage between the problems the United States encountered 
in dealing with the Third Word in the United Nations in 1975 and the 1930s era doctrines 
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of the British Left that were passed on to the future elite of the Third World through 
schools such as the London School of Economics and teachers such as Harold Laski.  
Moynihan published his critique in Commentary, one of the main voices of the emerging 
neoconservative movement.  His missive, which appeared nearly simultaneously with the 
destruction of South Vietnam, led to his appointment by Gerald Ford and Henry 
Kissinger to the UN where he did his best to both test the critique and place the cure he 
recommended of placing the United States into the “Opposition” into practice.3  His time 
at the UN brought him into close contact not only with the representatives from the newly 
decolonized states that now had a numerical majority at the United Nations, but also the 
British Ambassador Ivor Richard who took exception to Moynihan’s approach while in 
the main admiring his meaning.  Moynihan lasted less than a year at the UN before 
returning to Harvard and then winning a seat in the Senate, but his impassioned speeches 
and performance served as a rallying point for the emerging neoconservative critique of 
both détente with the Soviet Union and the growing worry that the Third World version 
of socialism was trending toward both the tyrannical and the ascendant while the United 
States lacked the strength to oppose them.  
Two major arguments will dominate this chapter.  The first is that Moynihan’s 
approach to the United Nations was the product of his exposure to British intellectuals 
and institutions throughout his career.  This exposure was not unique to Moynihan, but 
instead his reaction paralleled a similar trend in thought of the leading members of the 
neoconservative intellectuals based on their exposure to Britain during the previous 
decades.  This intersection between Moynihan and the neoconservative’s assessment of 
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the British left’s political ideas and the international political struggles of the United 
States in the 1970s was the dominant reason for Moynihan’s short tenure at the United 
Nations. 
The second and more general argument is that the kind of public diplomacy 
Moynihan advocated was more advantageous in advancing the interests of Third World 
countries individually and collectively in the United Nations than similar efforts by the 
United States and United Kingdom.  For as much as Moynihan and Richard sought public 
forums to advance their agendas, their sometimes complimentary efforts often came up 
short in winning votes or in strengthening the alliance between the United States and 
Britain.  Even working together, the rhetorical and intellectual power of these men could 
not overcome the Third World’s demands for increased aid or the campaign to 
delegitimize Israel.  Only the Third World’s internal squabbling could accomplish that.4   
New York Intellectuals in Post-War Britain 
Daniel Patrick (Pat to his friends) Moynihan was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 
1927 but moved with his family to New York at the age of 6.  He spent time as a 
longshoreman and a student at City College after graduating Benjamin Franklin High 
School in East Harlem.  Moynihan’s exposure to New York’s labor movement had more 
of an impact on him than his time at City College which did so much to shape the later 
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neoconservative movement.5  When the United States entered the Second World War, 
Moynihan served in the Naval Reserve from 1944-1947 on, among other ships, the USS 
Quirinus (ARL-39) an Achelous-class landing craft repair ship. It was this shared naval 
service which, among other things, so endeared President Kennedy to Moynihan.  
Moynihan would later serve with many other young men of a similar background in 
Kennedy’s “Junior Officers” administration from 1961-1963.6  
After the war, Moynihan completed a BA and MA at Tufts, and then moved to 
Britain to attend the London School of Economics as a Fulbright Fellow.  This was a 
relatively new program, proposed by Senator Fulbright in 1945 and signed into law by 
President Truman in 1946.  Moynihan chose to attend the London School of Economics 
(LSE) in order to write his dissertation on the relationship between the International 
Labor Organization and the foreign policy of the United States. 
Moynihan attended LSE just after the departure of Harold Laski when Michael 
Oakenshott took up the position as professor of political science.  Laski (about whom 
more will be said later) had been an avowed “democratic socialist” and frequent critical 
friend of the United States.7  Oakenshott was a traditionalist and conservative in his 
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political philosophy.8  Moynihan spent one year studying, reading, drinking, and arguing 
about ideas courtesy of the Fulbright, and then another two years working on a nearby 
American airbase that financed his continued stay.  During his time, he made friends with 
intellectuals, working class trade union members, and journalists.  He adopted some 
British mannerisms but never, at least by his own accounting, wore a monocle.9  Some of 
Oakenshott’s preference for tradition and suspicion of utopian political orders rubbed off 
on Moynihan because he “left Britain dismayed by socialism and devoted to socialists.”10 
Moynihan was not the only young New York intellectual of the time to spend 
time in England.   Several of the major figures of what was to become the 
neoconservative movements spent time in Europe during these years.  Perhaps the two 
most recognizable figures of the first generation of neoconservatives, Norman Podhoretz 
and Irving Kristol both spent time in post-war England. Irving Kristol had been a 
Trotskyist (anti-Stalinist) at City College in the late 1930s and later fought in France and 
Germany as an infantryman with the 12th Armored Division.  His Division would help 
destroy German resistance in the Vosges Mountains and would liberate several of 
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Dachau’s satellite concentration camps.11 After the fighting ended, Kristol spent a year in 
Marseilles assigned to an Army headquarters unit where he avoided work so he could 
read French journals and philosophy.  From 1946 to 1947 he lived in and around 
Cambridge where he supported his wife Bea (Gertrude Himmelfarb) as she researched 
and wrote her doctoral dissertation on Lord Acton.12  Kristol and Himmelfarb came to 
Britain at the height of post-war austerity and endured a winter so cold they “slept in 
…overcoats.”  Their room had a “toilet upstairs and a sink in the backyard.” Since 
rationing was still in place, they lived on “fish and chips or cheese sandwiches.”13  Even 
for self-admitted provincial young adults from the socially working class, politically 
socialist, and ethnically Jewish Brooklyn of the 1930s, these conditions were a bit 
shocking.   
Kristol returned to Britain in early 1953 after a stint at Commentary which had 
plunged him into the vicious infighting on the left of the American political spectrum 
regarding Senator Joseph McCarthy and more broadly the place of Communism and its 
“fellow travelers” in the “progressive” movement.   Liberalism was at the time, according 
to Columbia University Professor of English and prominent liberal public intellectual 
Lionel Trilling, “not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition... there are 
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no conservative or reactionary ideas in circulation.”14  Looking at these battles, it is clear 
that Kristol and those he did battle with gave almost no thought to those on the political 
right who were opposed to communism.  Those who opposed communism for the wrong 
reasons had no place in intellectual battle.  This intellectual and social aversion was 
perhaps the dominant factor in keeping the future neoconservatives away from the 
Republican Party and more traditional conservatives such as William F. Buckley and his 
cohort at National Review for another generation.15   
Kristol in Commentary placed himself on the side of the anti-communists and 
against both McCarthy, whom he regarded as a “vulgar demagogue”, and the fellow 
travelers of Communism.  His robust anti-communism and denunciation of those he 
regarded as dupes (including Henry Steele Commanger, Alan Barth, and Francis Biddle) 
while still demanding the right to dissent unleashed a “storm”.16 
Returning to Europe after life at Commentary and a short stint the American 
Committee for Cultural Freedom, Kristol helped found the British magazine Encounter 
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along with Stephen Spender.  Encounter was an antidote to the prevailing “anti-American 
and often Communist fellow-traveling magazines” and would be “English language-
cultural-intellectual-political” in format.17   
The magazine began publishing in 1953 and Kristol served as its editor until 
1958.  These five years in England were a key part of Kristol’s intellectual and political 
development.  Encounter in those early years featured essays from Isaiah Berlin, Nancy 
Mitford, and W.H. Auden.  Kristol introduced Lionel Trilling to Labour politician Denis 
Healey.  Trilling was “transfixed” by Healey’s “knowledge of contemporary literature”, 
and Kristol had to explain later than not all British politicians were like Healey.18  
Kristol’s circle included Woodrow Wyatt and Anthony Crosland, as well as figures on 
the political right like Oakenshott and Malcom Muggeridge.   
Here Kristol met intelligent, intellectually interesting conservatives and socialists 
like Crosland who “tried to redefine socialism in terms of simple social and economic 
equality”.19  These were not simply the greedy businessmen of the Taft-era Republican 
Party, but people willing to argue ideas and culture with all the verve and skill of the 
young men back in Alcove 1 in the 1930s.  Despite his Francophila (his son Bill went to a 
lycee rather than a public school in London despite his wife’s equally fervent 
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Anglophila), he found their company refreshing.  Kristol’s anti-communism had not 
dimmed, and he regarded it as the wise course to choose in the Cold War while seeing 
(perhaps in retrospect) the “liberal sentiments and thinking that went into the formation 
of the United Nations” as “deplorable.”20 
The most controversial aspect of Kristol’s time at Encounter was the revelation in 
the late 1960s in the New Left publication Ramparts that the CIA had provided the 
funding for the CCF through the Ford Foundation.  Kristol has always denied that he was 
aware of the funding (as was Muggeridge) and claimed that his radical credentials would 
have disqualified his presence from CIA approval.21 
Kristol’s time in Britain at Encounter was simultaneous with Norman Podhoretz’s 
time at Cambridge.  Podhoretz was the protégé at the time of Lionel Trilling at Columbia, 
and having made a name for himself in New York he sought to expand his skills as a 
literary critic by training in Britain.  Like Moynihan, Podhoretz attended school on the 
Fulbright scholarship.  He also won the Euretta J. Kellett Fellowship at Columbia.  While 
at Cambridge, Podhoretz earned both his BA and MA. He also, for a self-conscious 
Jewish young man who when he thought of his own identity perceived it terms of the 
ethnic sub-cultures of Brooklyn, began to feel  “patriotic” at his exposure to British 
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intellectual snobbery and distaste for American culture and the Cold War.  While 
working on his dissertation Noel Annan, a contemporary and friend of the “Cambridge 
Five”, supervised him.22  Podhoretz returned to the United States, served in the Army, 
and joined Commentary where he offered cultural and social commentary that was in line 
with the magazine’s primarily leftist political perspective.23 
One other common thread connects Kristol, Podhoeretz, and Moynihan and their 
encounters with post-war Britain: ethnicity.  Moynihan was of Irish descent, and Kristol 
and Podhoretz were Jewish.  Neither ethnic group had a traditionally positive relationship 
with Britain.  Irish sentiment in the United States had worked to keep the United States 
out of the First World War on the side of the Entente, and Moynihan himself would 
examine the persistence of the influence of the Irish ethnicity on urban politics in Beyond 
the Melting Pot.24  Britain had accepted some Jewish refugees from the pogroms of late 
Czarist Russia, but anti-Semitism remained strong among large sections of the upper 
classes.25  Both the Conservatives with their 1939 White Paper limiting Jewish 
immigration to the Mandate of Palestine and Labour with its attempt to balance Arab and 
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Jewish interests in post-war Palestine were viewed by Zionists as anti-Jewish.26  These 
attitudes contrasted with the United States and its relatively more welcoming stance 
toward Irish and Jewish immigrants.  While there is no discernable evidence of 
discrimination against either of these men in their time overseas, their backgrounds could 
not help but color their opinions. 
Moynihan, Kristol, and Podhoretz were all marked by their time in the United 
Kingdom.  Here these New Yorkers saw what a democratic socialist government looked 
like in practice.  To some extent they balanced their roles as outsiders in the United States 
and as Americans in the eyes of the rest of the world.  They remained liberals while being 
exposed to politicians on the left and intellectuals on the right.  These men, part of ethnic 
groups that had no great love for the British, saw in some ways the best and worst of 
British life and made important friends and contacts.  They saw the suffering of austerity 
and the reality of socialism, thrived in the combative realm of ideas, and returned to the 
liberal politics of the United States at the moment of its greatest ascendancy.  
Formulating a Critique 
 Moynihan’s career after his time in Britain is well-known. 27 He joined the 
campaign of Averrell Harriman in 1954 and served four years in the New York State 
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government where he met his wife Elizabeth (Liz).  He was a Kennedy delegate in 1960 
and won a job at the Department of Labor thanks to his intellect.  Moynihan, although not 
a “Whiz Kid” with a faith in numbers and modeling, was representative of the bright 
young men that Kennedy brought to Washington.  He stayed after the “world broke his 
heart” in 1963, and it was in the Johnson administration he first came to widespread 
public attention.  His work on the “Negro Family” shaped Johnson’s seminal civil rights 
address at Howard in 1965, but the rioting in Watts that summer and a backlash from 
civil rights leaders forced him out.28  
 He returned to Washington in 1969 as a member of the Nixon administration, 
where he sought to make Nixon an “American Disraeli” by promoting a policy of a 
guaranteed income.  The effort failed, and Moynihan again achieved near-pariah status 
when a memo he wrote recommending a “benign neglect” of racial politics surfaced.   
Concurrently, Nixon’s ordering of the bombing of North Vietnamese forces inside 
Cambodia caused Moynihan to want to resign.  He stayed on a few months longer at the 
President’s urging, and Nixon thought about nominating him to the United Nations as 
Ambassador.  The nomination instead went to George H.W. Bush, in part because 
Charles Yost, the current ambassador and a career diplomat who had spent years at the 
United Nations objected to Moynihan’s nomination.29 Moynihan also claimed that he felt 
Kissinger would ignore him and that he lacked the financial resources for the job.30  
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Moynihan returned to Harvard, but spent part of 1971 as a “public member” of the US 
delegation.  Moynihan got his first taste of the so-called “softer” side of diplomacy as he 
dealt with cultural, social, and economic issues and came away with a palpable distaste 
for the hypocrisy he found.31 
 Nixon, however, called on Moynihan at the beginning of 1973 and asked him to 
become his ambassador to India.  Two years prior, Moynihan, at the urging of Nathan 
Glazer’s wife and because of his own preference for democracies, sided with India over 
Pakistan in the 1971 War.  Moynihan went to India as Ambassador with the mission to 
deal with India’s debt and to try to restore balance in the United States’ relationships in 
South Asia.32  Moynihan was able to alleviate the debt crisis, but his years in India 
sharpened his criticisms of how the Third World put socialism into practice.33 
In parallel with the troubled years of the United States after the assassination of 
President Kennedy, the Third World had sprung into existence as a problem for the 
United States and as an arena for superpower competition.  While the rise of the Third 
World did not seem to harm the Soviet Union, who viewed the creation of a mass of 
socialist states without objection, those states took on an increasingly hostile stance 
toward the First World.  Part of the issue was economic as the states struggled to survive 
independently.  While Third World power had been an increasing issue for the First 
World since Bandung in 1955, in 1975 neither the United States nor Britain, both faced 
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with economic weakness and internal divisions, possessed the political or economic 
power that they had enjoyed in 1945 or even 1960.34  
Taking advantage of this numerical advantage and the disorders of the West, the 
newly powerful Third World began to press for advantages in international institutions.  
The delegates of newly independent countries routinely assailed the British (and as the 
fighting in Vietnam escalated, the United States) in the Committee of 24 at the United 
Nations.  The oil crisis of 1973 gave the Third World a major boost, and the Algerians 
led the call at the United Nations for a New International Economic Order in the Sixth 
Special Session in 1974.35 
Throughout this time in India, Moynihan’s particular relationship with the British 
and the products of their institutions continued.  British institutions raised his hackles: 
while the Indian Parliament refused to buy American wheat in 1973 and India was falling 
into famine, Moynihan recorded that the “Etonians in the cabinet are traipsing around the 
Soviet bloc clucking class solidarity”.36 When Moynihan was warned by the Egyptian 
ambassador about a possible PLO plot against his life, he recorded in his journal that the 
man was “the very model of a British ambassador” who offered him either a martini or a 
bloody mary before passing along the warning courtesy of President Sadat.37  In his 
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assessments of Prime Minister Gandhi, he is even more explicit in linking the problems 
of India to the ideas of British socialism in the 1930s. 
“Mrs. Gandhi’s dinner for Brezhnev was in its own way a 
sincere, even touching event.  They are both of them hard, 
survivalist politicians.  Yet that is not all … they are 
socialists… She is, intellectually, more than any one thing a 
product of upper class England during the Popular Front 
days of the late 1930s.   To read Orwell’s papers is to 
simply know what she thinks about such abstractions as the 
Soviet Union, capitalism, imperialism – peripherally on the 
very edge of things the United States … “.38 
 In this same passage, Moynihan remarked that it was American aid that financed 
Indian public sector socialism in the 1960s, but Gandhi only paid attention to the 
inefficient Soviet-financed Bokharo steel plant. 
 Despite this disdain for the effects of British socialism, Moynihan retained his 
friendships and attachments to Britain.  He was visiting British historian J.H. Plumb in 
his rectory in Suffolk when word came from the American embassy that India had 
detonated its first nuclear bomb.  Moynihan reacted, both then and later, with a calm that 
mirrored that of the rest of the world’s reaction (Pakistan excepted) and spent the day 
riding in Plumb’s Jaguar around Westhorpe and drinking at least four pints of beer.39  He 
kept up his domestic correspondence as well; informing Norman Podhoretz that the 
Indian papers reported Mrs. Gandhi looked radiant when she threw 20,000 “trade union 
leaders in prison” as part of the crisis that led to the suspension of democracy known as 
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the “Emergency”. He told Podhoretz at Commentary to burn the letter, something he 
himself decided not to do.40 
 As his time in India ended, Moynihan wrote two pieces for Commentary that 
would push him from the embassy in New Delhi to the mission in New York.  The first 
was “Was Woodrow Wilson Right?” and the second was “The United States in 
Opposition.”  Both articles looked to the past to assess the future, and each saw the 
United States as a leader in a changing world.  Their prescriptions, although arrived at by 
different paths, were similar as well. 
 The first article was written and delivered in 1974.  Originally a speech delivered 
to the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Moynihan sought to assess the 
legacy of Wilson 50 years after his death.41  Wilson was perhaps the most influential 
American of the 20th century and his ideas and influence were still the dominant theme of 
foreign policy and as a useful guide for the future.  While Wilson’s albeit limited vision 
of self-determination came to fruition over a wider space than Wilson himself might have 
ever imagined, it had not brought with it a similar rise in the democratic nature of those 
states.42  The continued lack of personal liberty in the world, married with the existence 
of the United States as an increasingly multi-ethnic society with citizens who had roots 
all over the world meant that the future of the foreign policy of the United States had to 
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be one of increasing liberty abroad everywhere to prevent conflict abroad because of the 
persistence of ethnic conflict. 
There were several problems with this argument. Not all immigrants were likely 
to be as numerous or vocal in pushing for actions regarding the “Old Country” as the 
Irish did.  There were limits to the United States’ ability to intervene.  Another 
underlying problem was Moynihan’s assumption about the undying or at least 
unchanging nature of ethnicity.  Rather than looking back to the countries of origin, new 
immigrants or their children might instead choose to ignore them.43   
Regardless of the realties of American foreign policy in an increasingly multi-
ethnic era or the relative wisdom of Wilson’s vision for American foreign policy at the 
end of the era of Kissinger, Moynihan made it clear in his speech and subsequent article 
that although America remained a place where many wanted to come and many more 
wanted to lead, the “political elites of the world are poisonously anti-American, and will 
remain so while the spell of Marxism and the British universities … persists.”44  This 
view of Third World anti-Americanism would collide with the Third World view of 
international institutions that would have under-girded Wilson’s order in Moynihan’s 
next article.   The world was on its second iteration of that institution, and it had 
seemingly become a home not of liberty but of the rawest kind of anti-Americanism.   
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 The second and more famous of the articles appeared at the tail end of 
Moynihan’s tenure in India.  Paul Seabury, a prize winning historian and social scientist 
at the University of California, Berkeley wrote to Norman Podhoretz in late 1974 and 
encouraged him to get Moynihan to write an article on the “so-called Afro-Arab-Asian-
Communist bloc” and how it was using various international crises to target the west 
through the United Nations.45 The article was “The United States in Opposition.”46 
In his article, Moynihan began by decrying the “tyranny of the majority” that had 
emerged during the 1974 General Assembly.47  John Scali, Ford’s then ambassador to the 
UN, had warned of that very thing a few months prior.  He noted that the world was an 
interdependent place, and there was an emerging international society but Americans of 
all political stripes were unaware of its true form.   For Moynihan, there had been a 
“British revolution” when Britain’s colonies internationalized the British General 
Election of 1945.  
The Empire, so reviled by the Labour left, had been repressive but had also 
become a mechanism for the transmittal of ideas.  These ideas were not the Anglo-Saxon 
unity or “imperial preference” that various theorists and practitioners of empire had 
proposed, but instead the ideas were redistributive in nature.  What Hobson had said of 
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the domestic British economy during the Boer War about the concentration of capital and 
underinvestment was now writ large in the world in the aftermath of decolonization.48   
If there was a unifying figure in Moynihan’s assessment of a British revolution, it 
was Harold Laski.  Laski was a prominent British socialist thinker and political actor 
from the First World War until the early Cold War.  He was also a close observer of the 
United States, and spent a significant amount of time there writing and meeting the 
famous.  While he had a strong tendency to exaggerate, Laski was on intimate terms with 
Felix Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and even Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.  Laski was a critic of American conservatism and even despaired that the New 
Deal saved capitalism rather than paved the way for a socialist future via “revolution by 
consent.”  Laski was active in Labour politics, and was one of the major figures in the 
election of 1945.49 
Laski was one of the reasons that the LSE had a leftist, international orientation in 
the 1930s despite the presence of Hayek and other economic laissez-faire advocates.50  
Laski was indeed popular with many students from the Empire.  There were many 
theories of the sources of Laski’s popularity with foreign students, especially Indians.  
One notion, held by Isaiah Berlin, was that his popularity was a product of the Indians’ 
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inability to see through Laski because they were not English.  Others thought it was his 
ability to remember their names.  Laski’s biographers, however, state the most likely 
source of his popularity was his students’ appreciation of his socialist doctrines.  It wasn’t 
just students from the Empire who admired and learned from Laski.  Among his students 
in the 1930s that were inspired by him was Joe Kennedy, much to the consternation of his 
father.51 
Laski had always attracted a fair amount of negative attention from the political 
right in the United States.  Laski’s part in the Boston Police strike and his conflict with 
Calvin Coolidge in 1919 made him unpopular among conservatives in the United States.  
Worry about Laski’s influence was one of the factors that seemed to have driven James 
Forrestal to madness and suicide.  Ayn Rand made him the model for the villain 
Ellsworth Toohey in The Fountainhead.  In the years since his death, however, Laski had 
seemingly faded from memory.52   
What was the linkage between a nearly-forgotten socialist thinker of the 1930s 
and 1940s and the world situation in 1975?  In Moynihan’s mind, the link came through 
the ideas that Laski preached that had been absorbed by the young colonial elites at the 
LSE.  This was no illusion, for one man who had taken Laski’s socialist doctrines to heart 
was Jawaharlal Nehru.  Nehru and P.N. Haksar (and the Congress Party in general) had 
                                                           
51 Ibid., 333. 
 
52 Ibid., 573, 585. 
 
 90
ignored Gandhi’s economic ideas of village-level self-reliance and instead sought to build 
a newly independent India along socialist economic lines.53 
Moynihan admitted that the British Revolution was not as well known as the 
American or the French (liberal) and the Russian or the Chinese (communist) 
Revolutions. He also noted that there was little for the United States to fear from Soviet 
communism in terms of its intellectual or moral appeal, but it had the same problem with 
global socialism in 1975 that it had from Lenin and his apostles in 1917.  In the place of 
the traditional communist threat, Moynihan instead proposed a Hegelian synthesis of 
1917 and 1776: Minimal State and Total State would form the Welfare State with 
hostility to capitalism and multiparty democracy in the former British colonies that now 
compromised the majority of the United Nations.  
In some ways, this analysis is even more pessimistic than those that would 
propose that communism was essentially a unitary bloc.  If Moynihan’s analysis proved 
correct, then the United States was in a far worse place. Instead of a monolithic threat, it 
faced not just a resurgent Soviet Union but a hostile Third World that would abet the 
Soviet Union’s aggression while weakening the West with its own independent but 
ideologically socialist demands. 
Since 1964, the nations of the Third World that inspire the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development believed that the fundamental world problem was 
                                                           
53 Judith M Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).Brown points out 
that at the moment of his death, almost all of Gandhi’s visions for what a post-colonial India would look 
like had been thwarted.  For more on Haksar’s views and how they were influenced by the LSE, see Guha, 




one of unequal distribution of goods and capital.54  Profit and the “invisible hand” of 
Adam Smith was no longer the dominant mode of economic practice.  Instead, a future 
built by planning would inaugurate the socialist world.  The disdain was personal (at least 
in the case of India and Nehru, who brought a personal dislike of the United States begun 
at Harrow to his socialist planning) and institutional.  It was the civil service and the LSE 
that had been the instruments of this indoctrination.  The creed that the Third World elites 
had absorbed was moral in its British way in that it preferred “reparations” to “revenge”.  
This means that the profits of the world, like the profits of the British capitalists in the era 
of the two world wars, needed to be redistributed.  A.J.P Taylor argued in 1953 that 
Laski’s “influence operated in the junior ranks of the Labour movement and in India, 
Burma, and West Africa.”55 
If the American and the Russian revolutions were no longer lodestars for future 
nations, what was left for the US was the management of a world where the Non Aligned 
Movement and the G-77 were ascendant at the United Nations.   Why had the United 
States failed so far to win the argument for the future?  One reason was an intellectual 
failure to understand the forces that confronted them.  By letting the Communists and 
then the Third World define the terms of the debate (“stability” or “social justice”) the 
United States was playing a losing game from the start.  Any degradation of the United 
States would make the Third World look better given the poor state of their economies.  
Excessive deference by the State Department to the wishes of the Third World in the 
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rhetoric of conferences, where every document has to begin with the appropriate 
denunciations of the evils of the world, had emboldened the G77 to demand more and 
more.  This worry about “world government” was one of the major points that Irving 
Kristol later identified as a central part of the “Neoconservative Persuasion.”56 
The call for a New International Economic Order by, among others, President 
Ceausescu of Romania, manifested itself in Third World assaults on US policies on 
commodity prices, energy prices, and family planning.   By feeding its cattle grain that 
could be given to the Third World, the United States earned the name “cannibal” from 
Professor René Dumont of France.  Dumont coined this phrase not a piece of throwaway 
rhetoric, but as the title of an article in a UN journal. 57   The US faced a rhetorical assault 
at every turn and in every speech.  What then was to be done? 
The first step Moynihan proposed was to welcome these calls for a new order as 
an antidote to the spread of the Soviet Union’s influence.   The second was to be 
reassured that the countries that had been doing the best economically were those 
straying from the socialist path.  However, the only realistic path for the United States 
was to meet a British revolution with a British method.  The United States would meet 
rhetorical assaults with demands to know why formerly revolutionaries such as Ahmed 
Ben Bella who helped free Algeria from its European oppressors sat in jail.  They must 
point to objective economic data on what creates growth and what does not.  They must 
not be afraid to encounter dislike in international forums.  Tell the truth, no matter who it 
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offends.  Vote and be heard.  It would be hard, but it would be far better than the 
appeasement of the past decade.58 
Moynihan recalls in his memoirs that Kissinger approved of the article and 
recommended it to the members of the State Department at the highest levels.  McGeorge 
Bundy disliked the article’s idea that liberty would achieve equality rather than the 
reverse (Moynihan credited this dislike to Bundy’s practiced rapid dismissal  of any 
argument and his lack of people skills), but Bundy’s brother William from his position as 
editor of Foreign Affairs sent Moynihan a laudatory editorial from the Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin.59  Samuel Beer of Harvard wrote to agree with Moynihan’s analysis 
and noted a 1942 piece from Labour Party’s Committee on Post War Policy (most likely 
written by Laski) called “The Old World and the New Society” that blamed appeasement 
on “unregulated operation of our economic system” where the “failure at home” to 
understand the causes of poverty caused a lack of faith in democracy which led to 
weakness abroad.60 
Despite Bundy’s at least minimal appreciation for the article, Foreign Affairs that 
year published an article by Tom Farer entitled “A Basis for Accommodation” that 
Moynihan took as the representative view within the United States foreign policy 
establishment that opposed his approach.61  Farer treated the need for greater aid to the 
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Third World as unavoidable based on the power of the idea of self-determination and the 
continued need of the West to access their raw materials.  He also criticized Moynihan 
and others for opposing the increased aid due to their belief that decolonization was 
somehow a result of the West and not the efforts of the Third World itself.62   Moynihan 
thought this pure defeatism. He was more troubled by the criticisms of W. Scott 
Thompson from the Fletcher School who stated that Fabianism and American 
indifference were realities, and that no amount of American aid or leadership could make 
a difference in preventing the authoritarian governance and socialist economic stagnation 
in the Third World.  If Thompson’s raw pessimism was correct, then the despair of the 
1970s was non-recoverable.  Moynihan would proceed to the UN despite these doubts.63 
Moynihan’s article did not pass without criticism from his intellectual allies.  
Kristol remarked in a letter that Moynihan’s analysis seemed certainly to apply to India 
and increasingly to Britain itself, but that Burma as well as France and Portugal’s former 
colonies and Latin America did not follow this model.  Kristol’s own analysis was that 
the governance of the “so called Third World is a compound of British socialism, 
continental Marxian socialism, neo fascism, and extreme nationalism.”  To Kristol mind, 
“if it weren’t so open to misinterpretation, I think the term ‘national socialism’ would be 
a fair description.”64  Michael Novak’s brother James responded to Moynihan with an 
essay of his own which echoed many of Moynihan’s points, but argued that Fabianism 
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was only the public face of Third World intellectuals and their real concern was with 
power.65  
Moynihan was not the only figure within the emerging neoconservative 
movement to be critical of Britain and the legacies of the intellectual heritage of the 
Labour Party.  There were other rumblings of dissent within the British left as well as 
from the Social Democrats, USA.  This group, a product of the split that occurred in the 
Socialist Party earlier that decade, led to one faction headed by Michael Harrington that 
was farther left, and the more rightist Social Democrats.  Michael Kerper, a member of 
the Young People’s Socialist League and an American graduate student in Germany in 
1975 attended the Labour Party Conference in 1975.  Disturbed by the presence of the 
representatives of labour groups from “totalitarian” countries, Kerper penned a letter to 
Ian Mikardo, a Labour MP from the Bevanite wing of the party that he also sent to Carl 
Gersham, Executive Director of the Social Democrats.  In the letter, Kerper wondered 
why these “single party” Socialists were invited to a socialist party conference at all.  
Since the Labour Party, and socialist parties in general, were to be the “tabernacle of [the] 
most precious political ideals”, it sullied them to mix with groups who were not true 
socialists.66  Gersham passed the letter on to Moynihan and praised him for his 
willingness to combat the Soviets in the realm of ideas.67   
Kerper and Gersham’s judgement about British Labour were echoed in 
Moynihan’s own assessments.  Both the Social Democrats and Labour were members of 
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the Socialist Internationale, but while the Social Democrats threw parties in New York 
Richard and the members of the British mission did not attend.  Moynihan, in his 
accounting of his time at the UN, noted Wilson and Callaghan received Boris 
Ponomorov, a veteran of the purges of the 1930s and the “head of the International 
Department of the Communist Party of the USSR” just a month prior.68 
Moynihan certainly was ecumenical in his friendships, and he was equally 
comfortable in his correspondence to conservative figures such as William F. Buckley as 
to Social Democrats like Gersham.  In his own mind and in the struggle at the UN, 
Moynihan took comfort in the intellectual support of these differently minded people.  In 
his judgment, “these were the people …whose good opinion  ... really mattered.”69   
American critics were not the only ones to respond to Moynihan’s critique.  In her 
letter to Moynihan as he was leaving India, Prime Minister Gandhi told him that she did 
not know “to what extent he [Nehru] was influenced by the British approach and that 
Nehru “had the greatest admiration for the vision that guided America’s founding 
fathers.” 70 
As he left India, T.N. Kaul, India’s Ambassador to the United States wrote to 
Moynihan that although he was not allowed to bring home duty-free whiskey the 
experience of living in the Waldorf would make up for it.  He also pledged to continue 
dialogue with Moynihan to see if something was to be gained by listening to the Third 
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World or whether they were just unreasonable.  It seemed a just warning for what was to 
come.71 
From Dehli to New York 
 Perhaps the most important reader of Moynihan’s essay was Henry Kissinger.  
Gerald Ford had assumed the Presidency the year prior, and Kissinger still exercised a 
great deal of control over the conduct and substance of the United States’ foreign policy.  
He read Moynihan’s article and offered his highest praise to Moynihan: that he wished he 
had written it himself.  Given the article’s confrontational approach, this seems unlikely 
but it did give Kissinger an opening.  Kissinger was facing a bevy of problems in the 
spring of 1975, and many of them dealt with the Third World.72  He needed a 
representative at the UN who was not afraid to be confrontational if necessary but who 
could carry out the reconciliation that Kissinger and Ford were planning.  The origins of 
the American reconciliation began the year prior with Ford’s pledges of increased food 
supplies.73   Kissinger’s staff had been working on the reconciliation plan for the 1975 
General Assembly session for several months, and Moynihan would be the one to 
negotiate it during the Seventh Special Session focusing on the calls for a New 
International Economic Order.  Given Moynihan’s leading role in resolving India’s debt 
in his last assignment, as well as his clear articulation of desiring dialogue with the Third 
World on terms that both recognized their numbers and the importance of liberal values, 
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Moynihan could allow Kissinger to continue to focus on diplomacy with China and the 
USSR while making sure the United States was well represented at these negotiations 
with the Third World. 
 This renewed emphasis on the UN marked a shift in American foreign policy.  
Richard Nixon had pursued what one American diplomat has called a policy of benign 
neglect toward the United Nations.  The same diplomat, Seymour Finger – who was also 
a major critic of Moynihan’s - believed that Secretary of State William Rogers was so 
disinterested in the speeches at the General Assembly that he would turn the “earpiece 
upside down” and “think about other problems while appearing to listen.”74  Kissinger 
had helped to engineer détente, open China, and extract the combat forces of the United 
States from the Vietnam War, but his influence was waning and the power of the USSR 
was seemingly on the rise.  Something had to be done, and attempting reconciliation with 
the Third World seemed the best way to do it. 
Despite the early pleas of accord between the two men, Moynihan and Kissinger 
were almost certainly bound to clash.  Moynihan was the epitome of the public diplomat, 
and Kissinger at this moment was seemingly at the height of his stature in terms of 
influence over US foreign policy.75 Moynihan’s analysis in his memoir of Kissinger is 
remarkable in two respects.  The first is that Moynihan saw Kissinger primarily as a 
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defeatist who was simply playing for time against a hostile world.  Kissinger was told the 
truth, in this analysis, but had given up (exactly when is not clear) and was fighting the 
rear-guard fight as best he could.76  The second was that Kissinger was an expert and 
near-instinctive triangulator, who would adopt the position of whoever he was talking to 
and make it clear that he was the only thing that stood between the triumph of your 
enemies and you.  In this way, civilian academics could be persuaded that a slow 
withdrawal from Vietnam was the only way to prevent a military coup at home, and the 
Armed Forces might be persuaded that letting North Vietnam win was preferable to the 
extreme left seizing power in Washington.77   
Kissinger turned to the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff to provide the 
background and gather the information from the other parts of the government that would 
be necessary to implement any plan that emerged from the Special Session.  Moynihan in 
his memoirs credits himself with helping to steer the US as it prepared, but there were 
many other hands as well.  Tom Enders, a 6’8’’ legend within the State Department, took 
the lead in getting Kissinger’s speech written for the US in preparation for the Seventh 
Special Session.   Kissinger was a hard man to write for.  Winston Lord, the head of the 
Policy Planning Staff, recalled that Kissinger mostly worked on speeches on the 
weekends and would demand multiple drafts before he was satisfied.78  Kissinger himself 
noted that his staff which was still working on the Middle East Sinai agreement was also 
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contributing to the report at the cost of a lack of sleep.79  Winston Lord, then the head of 
the Policy Planning Staff at State, later recalled that Kissinger used speeches “to build 
domestic public opinion and Congressional support for policy, explaining and articulating 
that policy. Also, he wanted to explain our policies to other countries around the 
world.”80  In this case, Kissinger used a speech in Milwaukee, Wisconsin that summer to 
lay the groundwork for the US approach to these negotiations.  Kissinger’s speech 
outlined the proposals for dealing with the Third World’s demands while justifying his 
own foreign policy achievements in triangular diplomacy and praising the United 
Nations.81 
While Kissinger prepared the American public for the upcoming negotiations, 
Moynihan arrived in New York and met his staff at the United States’ Mission.  The first 
meeting did not go smoothly, and Moynihan thereafter sidelined his regular staff in favor 
of the like-minded individuals he had brought to New York.82  Moynihan had recruited 
these men and women to assist him because he suspected that the normal staff assigned to 
the US Mission would not be up to his exacting standards.  His hand-picked staff 
members included Suzanne Weaver from Yale to help with research, former Nixon 
administration lawyer Leonard Garment to sit on the Third Committee, and Clarence 
Mitchell to serve as his deputy.   Garment in the Third Committee would be the 
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American who would do the initial fighting against the attempt to pass a General 
Assembly Resolution that linked Zionism and racism.83 
The regular staff at the Mission recognized that the United States was losing votes 
to a united Third World in those years, but felt that international cooperation in the small 
areas was worth the battering the US took over symbolic issues.  Ambassador Tap 
Bennett, a veteran of the Foreign Service who had been at the United Nations off and on 
since the San Francisco conference of 1945, felt that the attempt to track countries’ votes 
in order to see how supportive they were of the United States (and thus be worthy of aid 
and support themselves) was misplaced as even the US’s allies such as Canada 
occasionally voted the “wrong” way.84   
Preparing for the Special Session, Moynihan asked several members of his staff to 
consider the questions about aid, international poverty, and the State Department as an 
“ideological organization” that had been raised by Irving Kristol in the Wall Street 
Journal.  Kristol argued that the Third World’s quest for a New International Economic 
Order was at root a hostile response to “liberal capitalism” and not wealth per se, and that 
an approach emphasizing accommodations would hurt the United States’ standing in the 
world not just politically but also eventually “economically.”  The reason behind State’s 
acquiescence, Krisol further argued, was that the State Department was a “non-
ideological” organization. What Kristol meant was not that State did not subscribe to a 
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set of ideas (namely, the utility of diplomacy and discussion), but that as an institution 
State did not inherently favor democracies.85   Moynihan in his memoirs dismissed the 
work of the staff, but an examination of the responses he received is a useful way of 
determining how the State Department actually saw the UN.   Barbara White, who that 
summer had been at the UN Conference on Women in Mexico City, came under 
particular criticism from Moynihan for her commitment to working with all types of 
governments.86  White’s paper makes it clear she valued discussion and a certain 
pragmatism over “ideology”, but conceded that the State Department did not pay enough 
attention to rhetoric and the staff in New York faced a United Nations where the system 
was held “hostage to the Arabs’ hostility to Israel.”87 This division, between the 
traditional diplomat who despite being rebuffed in her pursuit of global solidarity based 
on gender would continue a commitment to diplomacy, and a public intellectual whose 
ideas compelled him to fight back against what he felt was slander, was almost 
unbridgeable.    
Moynihan’s staff, despite their rebuff from the Ambassador, remained committed 
to successfully concluding the Special Session.  As the staff prepared for the conference, 
Charles Robinson reminded Moynihan in a memo that the world the U.S. faced is one of 
declining colonialism and regional blocs as well as increased frustration of the 
developing world and that confrontation will assure a loss for all.  Robinson stressed the 
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way ahead was consensus based on principles of sovereign equality and mutual respect.88  
Moynihan, for all his combative instincts, seemed to follow Robinson’s advice.  The US 
also benefited from winning a small victory in the United Nations’ Decolonization 
Committee when Kissinger, pressured by Moynihan, communicated that voting for a 
Cuban-sponsored resolution in Puerto Rican independence would be an unfriendly” act, 
and the vote went against the Cubans.89  
The United States was not alone in planning for this Special Session.  Meeting 
just before the conference, the Non-Aligned Nations met in Lima to plan their approach.  
Previous conferences during 1974 and 1975 had proven to the United States that it would 
not be possible to split the OPEC countries from the other Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs).  The combination of oil wealth and resource concerns forced the West for the 
first time to truly deal with the Third World on its own terms.90   Despite this show of 
strength, the Lima Conference adopted a massive final communiqué that detailed the 
West’s failings.  The text criticized the US’ presence in Puerto Rico, the government of 
Israel, and demanded more power within the UN.  Moynihan called the language 
“totalitarian”.91 However, the Algerian diplomat Fonmin Bouteflika, one of the most 
influential non-aligned diplomats, struck a conciliatory tone when he stated the Non-
Aligned Movmement wanted “a frank and constructive dialogue aimed at resolving the 
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world’s pressing political and economic problems.”92  The Commonwealth nations had 
met that summer as well, and had echoed the call for a New International Economic 
Order in a report that stressed the desire for better terms of trade and increased power and 
control in international financial institutions.93 
. The US plan was to open with a speech delivered by Kissinger (in the end 
because of the Middle East shuttle diplomacy it was given by Moynihan) that outlined the 
US policy goals.  This early statement of principles was meant to give the US some 
advantage in the negotiations by not allowing the Third World to set the terms.  The plan 
had five major points 1) economic security, 2) accelerated growth, 3) access to trade, 4) 
improved access to food, and 5) aid for the “poorest” countries.94  The speech, delivered 
on September 1 at the beginning of the Special Session, was very long, even by the 
standards of the United Nations, and ran nearly two hours.   It was, however, seemingly a 
success both in terms of content and in terms of setting a positive tone for the 
negotiations.  A leftist Paris journal called it “a ‘new deal’ for the world.”95  The US 
speech received favorable reviews, in contrast to the Chinese who preached “self-help” 
and the Soviets who simply used the opportunity to criticize the United States.96 
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Moynihan’s account of the negotiations stands as one of the primary records of 
the conference.97  Moynihan criticized James Callaghan as part of the British delegation 
for his ineffectiveness, but saw the intervention of a US Congressional Delegation led by 
Senator Javits (D, NY) as very useful in proving to the Third World diplomats that the 
US was negotiating in good faith.  The original proposal by the Third World was along 
the lines of what had been developed in Lima, but in response Moynihan put an 
American draft on the table that was a rewrite of the Non-Aligned Conference’s version 
with many of the substantive points the same but the language behind their meaning 
changed to emphasize international cooperation over conflict.  Garment and Moynihan 
made the changes over the weekend, and by Tuesday the draft had been approved by the 
State Department.  The major sticking point was a .7% pledge of aid tied to GNP, and 
eventually it was achieved.  By 7AM on Sunday 14 September, the Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) approved the draft.  When word later that morning leaked that the 
Algerians would oppose the draft and wreck the progress made so far, Moynihan used his 
appearance on Meet the Press to blame Bouteflika for wrecking the conference.  The 
LDCs censured Moynihan, but at the last minute on Tuesday morning the LDCs 
approved UN Resolution 3362 (S VII) . 
The results of the Session were astounding.98  The developed countries of the 
world established a development assistance goal of 0.7% of GNP and promised to work 
to improve market structures of raw material export to fight inflation through financing 
long-term contracts and stabilized revenue processing of raw materials in developing 
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countries while letting lesser developed countries sell their own goods.  The developed 
world agreed to work to prevent a “brain drain” and increase agricultural assistance, 
provide supplies to grow food, and distribute 10,000,000 tons of grain for the next year 
and a world food reserve of 500,000 tons.  Developing countries were promised both 
participation and a voice in global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
Enders and Moynihan gave a press conference the next day. Enders told the press 
that Kissinger would work with Congress to make sure these measures were accepted and 
stated this session was more successful because it was a negotiation rather than simply a 
dictation by the majority, and represented not an American order but simply an 
international order.99 
The Soviets and the Chinese had little to no influence over the negotiations at the 
session.  They used the conference mostly as an opportunity to volley back and forth at 
each other.  The Soviets used the final plenary session of the Conference to complain 
about the false “North-South” dichotomy of the agreement and to accuse the Chinese of 
acting as a “monarch superpower.”  The Chinese, in response, claimed the Soviets (along 
with the US) had tried to “sabotage” the treaty.100 
Moynihan did try to play up the divisions between China and the USSR using 
their own rhetoric, but he had problems.  The Chinese delegation was relatively new at 
the UN and was still finding its way.  Moynihan had provided the Chinese Permanent 
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Rep with ginseng from Delaware as a gesture of goodwill.101 The Chinese would often 
abstain in the votes in the Security Council.  There was little love lost between 
Ambassador Malik of the USSR and the Chinese delegation.  Both Richard and 
Moynihan saw clearly that Malik was an “unreconstructed Bolshevik” with whom no 
genuine dialogue was possible.102  Moynihan, noting that the phrase “capitulationism” 
had recently emerged as a favorite epithet of Mao’s toward his enemies, used the phrase 
to describe the Soviet Union in a Security Council debate over the ability of the PLO to 
speak in front of the Security Council.  The vote went against the United States and the 
PLO representative spoke. Afterward the Chinese delegate informed Moynihan he had 
misused the term.  It seemed even a man as versed in intellectual debate and the 
intricacies of socialism as Moynihan was at a loss in the vicious game of interpreting the 
wisdom of Mao.103    
Elements on the political left on both sides of the Atlantic had been skeptical 
about the outcome of the negotiations, especially with Moynihan’s previous commentary.  
An editorial in the Manchester Guardian on 20 September credited the United States’. 
actions with placing the USSR on the defensive within the UN.  With the United States 
still closely tied to its Allies in Europe, China making advances in Southeast Asia, and 
the USSR still excluded from Middle East, the United States had started to recover its 
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standing in the world.  In The Nation, Anne Tuckerman noted that all sides in 
negotiations had acted pragmatically.  The Resolution was both as a way forward and as a 
turning point.  She had been worried that Moynihan’s rhetoric would derail the agreement 
but those fears were unfounded.104 With the passage of this resolution, the General 
Assembly could begin in a spirit of cooperation.  It would not last. 
Zionism and Conflict 
For the comity and seeming success of the Seventh Special Session, the accord 
between the West and the rest did not last long.  The reason for the conflict was long 
standing, but had acquired a new dimension in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War of 
1973.  It was, simply put, the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish state in control of 
a Palestinian population. From the time the UN took over the issue of the future of the 
Palestinian Mandate from the British, the Arab world had refused to make peace with 
Israel and used the issue of the Palestinians to rally their populations.105  Condemning 
Israel had become de rigueur at these gatherings, and now the Arab states, flush with oil 
money, were in position to continue a campaign that failed militarily with a diplomatic 
offensive.  The Conference on the International Year of the Woman that had taken place 
in Mexico City that summer had witnessed the condemnation of Israel (along with South 
Africa and Chile).106 The Soviet Union also had no great love for Zionism, and was in the 
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middle of a dispute with the United States over Jewish immigration. If they could link the 
idea of the unacceptability of racism that had done so much to isolate South Africa to the 
state of Israel, the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations (as had been done to South 
Africa in 1974) and the transformation of Israel into a pariah state would be real 
possibilities.  The American delegation chose to publicly fight back against this trend 
rather than simply voting or vetoing the resolutions as they had in the past.  The 
powerfully symbolic nature of the Arab effort to use the institution that had a major role 
in the creation of Israel to condemn Israel and Moynihan’s determination to use his pulpit 
to fight it with explicitly pro-liberty rhetoric was sure to cause a confrontation.  The 
question was, would this public diplomacy be enough? 
The calm after the Seventh Special Session was initially broken by a speech 
presented by President for Life Field Marshall Idi Amin of Uganda and read by Uganda’s 
Permanent Representative Kinine.  Amin through his proxy spoke before the General 
Assembly on 2 October in both his role as Uganda’s President and the current head of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
 Amin began his speech in Swahili, and then sat down bedecked in his gaudy 
braided uniform as his Permanent Representative spoke.  As the head of the OAU, he 
called for an exclusively African solution to Angola (the Beylorussian Representative had 
the same day criticized the Chinese for “slandering” them for accusing the USSR of 
being involved in Angola)107 but generally praised the general direction of the decline of 
colonialism in Africa.  Amin had positive things to say about the United States’ proposals 
                                                           
107 US Mission USUN New York to SECSTATE, “GA Plenary – General Debate, Credentials, President 




during the Special Session, but said the United States needed to change its relations with 
Panama to grant it greater independence.  He also classified Japan, China, and both 
Koreas as part of the Third World and called on them to be part of an organization that 
would work to build cooperation in Asia based on the model of the Helsinki Accords.   
 Switching to his role as Ugandan President, Amin’s address swung wildly in tone.  
He offered up Uganda as a “breadbasket” that was attractive for foreign investment.    He 
knew investors may be reluctant to invest in Uganda because of all the lies that been told 
by fascists, Zionists, and imperialists in the media.  Amin urged the United States to free 
itself from Zionist influence and called for the “expulsion of Israel from the UN and the 
extinction of Israel as a state”.  He called on “Black Americans” to unite and gain greater 
political power.   After this, he reiterated his call for foreign investment in Uganda.108   
 Amin’s remarks about Israel were echoed that same day in the General Assembly 
during the presentation of credentials and in the Third Committee.  Numerous countries 
in both forums condemned Israel and called for its expulsion.  The criticisms of Israel, 
which had receded during the previous month, had begun to rise.   
 The definitive origins of this increased anti-Israel rhetoric were obscure at the 
time.  Moynihan and his staff (especially Suzanne Weaver) debated the source of the rise, 
and were unable to determine if it was the Soviet Union or the newly powerful Arab oil 
states that were primarily responsible.  Weaver in her research noted that Pravda and 
other Soviet journals had been condemning Zionism since 1971 by blaming the events of 
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Czechoslovakia in 1968 on the Zionists.109  For all their bluster, the Soviets had very little 
direct leverage in the Third World outside of arms exports.  In the post-WWII era, the 
Soviets had sent very little development aid overseas.  The Soviets at this time 
contributed .15% of their GNP to development aid, but they did sell weapons and offer 
advisors without concern for a country’s human rights record.110  It was more likely the 
Soviets would simply acquiesce to the Third World’s demand to punish Israel publicly.  
It cost them nothing and any criticisms of their language by the United States would 
endanger détente.  At the center of the Arab world’s claim was the plight of the 
Palestinians and Israel’s continued victories.  As long as the Palestinians did not have a 
homeland, the fighting would continue. 
Regardless of the reasons for the rise in anti-Israel rhetoric, Moynihan felt 
compelled to respond.  He did so a day later in San Francisco. Speaking before the 
AFL/CIO Constitutional Convention in San Francisco, he spoke positively about the 
American labor movement’s commitment to democracy, and the corresponding assault 
on democracy throughout the world including Prime Minister Gandhi’s assault on the 
trade union movement.  He pointed out the paucity of democracies at the UN (around two 
dozen) and assailed Amin as a “racist murderer”.  Echoing his earlier argument about the 
impact of President Wilson, Moynihan remarked the UN had done a great deal of good, 
but had not proven a useful instrument for the expansion of democracy.  The median age 
of the countries of the UN was 11 years, and many of those countries sensed democracy 
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weakening.  For all the demands of the Third World the United States would participate 
not out of guilt but out of choice, and would demand that political rights stand with 
economic ones including the rights of independent trade unions.111 
Moynihan’s rhetorical counter-offensive provoked an odd alignment of opinion 
between the political left and right on the pages of the New York Times.  On 8 October, 
former Nixon speechwriter and conservative William Safire supported Moynihan for 
standing up in the UN to “double standards”112  He opined that “diplomats are to be held 
responsible for what they say in public” and castigated Amin as an enemy of Israel.   On 
the same page from the political left, Anthony Lewis remarked that Moynihan calling 
Amin a “racist murderer” was “inspiring”.  Lewis stressed the universality of human 
rights and the importance of the United States supporting them if though “we aren’t 
perfect”.113  This convergence amused Moynihan, and he noted in a letter to Senator 
Howard Baker soon after that although his actions had created a unity of opinion between 
Anthony Lewis and William Safire, one or the other would eventually turn on him.114  
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) fought back with a volley of its own 
rhetoric.  It released a press release that attacked Moynihan for his verbal assault on 
Amin, claimed that the attack on him was an attack on African unity itself, and blamed 
the “influence of Zionism on the American mass media and especially the New York 
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press”.  The press release claimed the OAU was always ready to oppose violations of 
human rights, whether they occurred in Franco’s Spain, Israel, or South Africa.115  
This confrontation marked the beginning of the final stage of the campaign to 
secure the passage of a General Assembly Resolution that declared “Zionism is a form of 
racism and racial discrimination.”  After it became clear this campaign would consume 
the next few weeks Moynihan and his staff began to prepare for the coming Third 
Committee and General Assembly votes.  Their preparation took two tracks, the 
intellectual and the diplomatic.  The first was a success.  The second was not. 
As the American representative on the Third Committee, Leonard Garment would 
lead the initial fight against the Resolution.  Moynihan and Garment fought the upcoming 
resolution with wit, with erudition, and with flair.  Moynihan, however, did not (or 
perhaps could not, given the resources and mentality of his enemies) lobby the votes 
necessary to defeat the proposition.  As before, like in The Report on the Negro Family in 
1965, “benign neglect”, or the attempt to work with Nixon to attain a Guaranteed Income, 
being consistent with his liberal principles was no guarantee of winning.116 
Their academic preparation focused, interestingly enough, not so much on the 
question of Zionism as that of racism.  The US diplomatic efforts focused on Africa and 
those nations who they believed were paid to support this resolution.  These intellectual 
and diplomatic efforts were meant to complement each other.  If they showed that linking 
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racism with Zionism would weaken the strength of the charge of racism, the African 
countries opposed to genuinely racist states such as South Africa and Rhodesia might 
break with the Arab states in their own interest.  Despite their efforts, Moynihan and his 
staff could not gather enough votes.  Mexico and Brazil also voted for the resolution, 
despite the almost complete lack of ethnic or financial reasons to do so.117   
In the midst of this turmoil, while Garment and Moynihan prepared for the worst 
along the East River, Lionel Trilling passed away.  The juxtaposition of the perceived 
assault on the values of liberalism in a citadel of liberal hope and the death of the great 
champion of liberalism seemed to import a greater significance to both.  Trilling was not 
a neoconservative, but his connection to the intellectuals who were supporting 
Moynihan’s efforts and their belief in the power of opposition and criticism was strong.  
His ascension to tenure in the English Department at Columbia was first for a Jew, and 
his place as a literary critic was at the forefront of American arts and letters in the middle 
part of the century.  His expertise was in Britain, specifically in the life and writings of 
Matthew Arnold.  His most direct connection to the neoconservative moment and 
Commentary was through his student and sometime-protégé Norman Podhoretz.118  His 
death seemed to capture the irony of the failure of the skilled intellectuals of the 
neoconservative movement to use their powerful arguments to sway politicians away 
from a fundamentally illiberal act. 
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Goronwy Rees witnessed the final vote at the United Nations General Assembly 
and then wrote in Encounter about the juxtaposition of Trilling’s death and the 
Resolution.  Rees was a Welshman with an Oxford education who had been a Soviet spy 
and contemporary of the Cambridge spy ring.  He later turned to the right and wrote a 
monthly column in Encounter.119 Rees witnessed a New York that was rapidly running 
out of money and “mingled horror and incredulity” at the coming resolution.  What Rees 
saw was not a rational discussion, but rhetoric straight out of Der Stürmer.  He praised 
Leonard Garment for his strong words against the Resolution in the Third Committee, but 
noted that the need to appease the Saudis in this moment of Britain’s economic weakness 
might inhibit Britain’s ability to act similarly.120 
A similar response to the Resolution appeared in New Statesman.  Paul Johnson 
wrote an essay entitled “The Resources of Civilisation”.  Johnson, an erstwhile Marxist 
who was moving to the right politically, sought to understand the present disorder.  For 
Johnson, Gladstone’s campaign to oppose political violence in Ireland where the Grand 
Old Man invoked “the Resources of Civilisation” during a speech in Leeds in 1881 was 
the model for modern day politicians who must stand up to the IRA or other overseas 
terrorist groups.  He offered up the Zionism Resolution as an example of the West’s 
passivity in the growing face of the Soviet Union’s growing repression and the spread of 
explicitly anti-Western leaders like Amin or Ghaddifi.  These were countries of the 
“fascist left”, and they now led the campaign against the “nearest approach to a free 
socialist state in the world.”  Only leadership from Prime Minister Wilson on his own 
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accord or with encouragement of Margaret Thatcher could make Britain a part of the 
struggle to save the west.121 
The common link between these British perspectives is a sense of British 
weakness brought about by financial, political, or perhaps even a moral exhaustion.    
Garment and Moynihan were worthy of praise for their courage and embodiment of the 
best sentiments of those liberals they admired, be they of the 19th or 20th century.  Britain 
would vote against the resolution, but these men sensed there might be a difference 
between an America that was still capable of recovery and a Britain that might not be.  
This split in confidence would echo in the next few months as an Anglo-American 
misunderstanding erupted. 
The resolution passed in the Third Committee on 17 October.  Garment and 
Chaim Herzog spoke eloquently against it.  Garment called the vote a “massive attack on 
the moral realities of the world” and an “obscene act.”122 Both he and Herzog claimed 
that this was not only an assault on Israel, but also an assault on the values of the United 
Nations.   The vote was ultimately 70-29-27 with 16 absent.   
At a luncheon soon after the Third Committee vote, George Ball remarked that it 
was improbable that this vote would cause domestic political problems because recent 
campaign finance reforms had weakened Jewish political power.123  Dispirited, Moynihan 
sought advice from Kissinger.  It was at this moment when Kissinger told Moynihan that 
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a former Texas governor had advised him about being “an anti-semite” as a way to get 
ahead in politics.124   
It became clear that the General Assembly would follow the lead of the Third 
Committee.  Moynihan prepared Congress, but he knew that his preparation would have 
to be for the speech he would deliver in the aftermath of the vote.  His attempts to show 
that Zionism was not racism (Zionism and Judaism are in essence beliefs that anyone can 
hold) or that the UN had no real definition of racism produced little in the way of votes.  
When the Kuwaiti ambassador challenged him on this, he was briefly at a loss but soon 
realized the Ambassador did not distinguish between “racial discrimination” and 
“racism”.125   His public appearances, both in speeches and on television, had no effect in 
swaying the vote.  
When the General Assembly voted on the resolution, the result was even more 
lopsided that the Third Committee vote.  All that remained for the United States was 
condemnation.  Moynihan’s speech (written with the help of Norman Podhoretz) does not 
rate even a mention in Kissinger’s 1079 page memoir of this time, but it is remarkable as 
a piece of rhetoric and his most memorable act of public diplomacy.  Moynihan was 
honoring the parliamentary conventions of the United Nations when he started his speech 
with the phrase “The United States rises ...”, but could easily be read as one man’s 
attempt to use a global forum to prove that the United States could still exercise power, 
influence, and leadership in the international arena, even in a cause it was almost certain 
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to lose.126  Since one of the missing pieces of the “Opposition” article in Commentary 
was a discussion of the broader Western alliance, Moynihan saw the United States (or 
himself, or the people that really mattered) as doing the right thing which was in fact the 
only thing they could do.  Moynihan’s tactics had admirers including Daniel Boorstein at 
the Library of Congress.127  Chaim Weizman, the Israeli Ambassador, also condemned 
the resolution and ripped it in half. 
Moynihan and his allies were not just denouncing a particularly morally odious 
resolution.  They were simply fighting on behalf of those that (in their minds) lacked the 
intellectual or moral courage to see they needed to fight for themselves.  They were using 
rhetoric to rescue the United States (and more broadly, the “West”) from circumstance.  
This stand cost nothing but popularity which was low anyway.   
The aftermath of the Resolution, however, did spark another incident where 
Moynihan tangled with British socialists.  In a speech before the United Nations 
Association of the United States, Ivor Richard seemed to attack Moynihan by implication 
if not by name.  He stated that “Europe”, at least nine liberal states in Western Europe, 
had reacted less emotionally and ideologically to the events of the recent months of the 
UN such as the Amin speech and the Zionism resolution.  Like Moynihan’s own 
declarations about the role of the UN, he claimed “Britain sees the United Nations as a 
major instrument of its foreign policy. We regard it as a place in which and from which 
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we can extend British influence and defend British interests.”  It was not, however, a 
“confrontational arena”. 
The speech’s most famous line was Richard’s own assessment of the nature of the 
UN and his ambassadorship. “Whatever else the place is it is not the OK Corral and I’m 
hardly Wyatt Earp.”  Given the fact that the North-South debate was just beginning to 
become more important, it was not wise to provoke the “bitterness” that Moynihan’s 
tactics had created.  Many of the poorest countries are the most prideful, and 
confrontation about their very legitimacy itself would poison any of the progress made in 
the Seventh Special Session. Furthermore, to complain about the institution when you 
lose votes is to destroy faith in that institution itself.128  This assault on the idea of the 
United Nations itself was what seemed to worry Richard (and many of the people 
opposed to Moynihan’s tactics).  As Richard later put it, the UN acted much like the 
Church of England in that the “world would be a more wicked place if it did not exist.”129 
Moynihan was initially dismissive of the speech which he learned about from 
Godfrey Hodgson of Sunday Times (who would eventually become Moynihan’s 
biographer in his twilight years in the Senate), but he became more concerned when he 
learned that it was not an off-the-cuff remark by Richard but instead represented official 
British policy.  Moynihan, writing later in his memoirs, reserves some of his choicest 
criticisms of the British for the days after this incident.   Remarking on Richard’s 
enjoying his time serving at the UN, he wrote a few years later that “Fun was about all 
there was left for a Briton at this point: a certain jollity about being good losers.” 
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Moynihan then recounted Callaghan’s trip to Uganda to ask for the life of a British 
citizen and being subjected to all the humiliations that entailed. 130  Moynihan may have 
moved on later in life, but he was not given to charity at the time.  At its most extreme, an 
unsigned note found in Moynihan’s papers dated 21 January 1976 stated “ivor Richard 
would have been happy in his nonideological way that the Jews had gone giggling to the 
gas chambers”.131  Eamonn Kennedy, the Permanent Representative from Eire indulged 
in a bit of British bashing in a letter to Moynihan.  He remarked “You sure corralled 
those redcoats okay.  They never learn. “132  Moynihan wrote back “ Here’s to more 
ambushes.”133 
Moynihan’s allies on both sides of the Atlantic voiced their unhappiness with 
Richard’s speech.  The New Statesman’s “London Diary” compared Ivor Richard’s attack 
on Moynihan to poor performance of British diplomats in Germany in 1930.  The author 
suspected that Richard thought he was doing Kissinger’s work.134   
The real culprit behind the attack, at least initially in Moynihan’s mind, was not 
Richard, Harold Wilson, or James Callaghan.  It was Kissinger.  Moynihan, encouraged 
by reporting from the New York Times and columnists like William Safire, saw a plot 
where Kissinger (who was currently in Rambouillet) encouraged the attack on Moynihan 
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in order to restore his own place as the sole spokesman for American foreign policy.135  
Moynihan now suspected Kissinger was using him to build a “decent interval” for the 
West so the West could survive as long as possible.  He felt that like Kennedy had lied to 
Stevenson, Kissinger (but not Ford) lied to him.136  Moynihan later realized that this 
attack was not a grand plot by Kissinger, but did indicate a lack of support from the State 
Department.  When it became clear to Moynihan that Kissinger had at least not supported 
him after the British attack, he sought to resign.  Ford, Kissinger, and Richard Cheney 
talked him out of it, but the damage was done.137  This lack of a defense from Kissinger 
was the breaking point for Moynihan, and the lack of support from Kissinger coupled 
with Moynihan’s failures marked the beginning of the end of Moynihan’s time at the 
United Nations.  Moynihan had not swung the Third World with his embrace of the role 
of the “loyal opposition”, and now he had alienated many of the United States’ traditional 
allies.  This was likely the more serious offense. 
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From this distance, it does appear slightly absurd that Kissinger would take time 
out of his meetings in Ramboulliet to encourage Callaghan to use his UN Ambassador to 
attack an American diplomat, that Callaghan would go along with it, or that all the parties 
involved would lie about it for decades after the incident.138  The failure to defeat the 
Resolution exposed the tensions that Moynihan’s rhetoric and vigorous actions had 
exacerbated.   
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 In the midst of these clashes, Richard echoed his points about the UN on the 
“Robert MacNeil Report” on 15 December.139  Richard reminded the American viewers 
that Britain was the U.N.’s bete noir for 30 years, but still maintained a faith that 
constructive dialogue was possible.140  In terms of western unity, the developed countries 
of the world produced an acceptable and workable framework for international economic 
development.  In a tweak to his American critics, Richard compared problems of big and 
small countries to the Philadelphia convention of 1782 and how the delegates there 
wrestled with the problem of proportional representation in the Congress. 
The UN had a poor record only because it faced the most difficult problems, but 
the UN would become less concerned with political matters and more involved in 
economic matters in years to come. Thanks to UN peacekeepers, the Middle East was a 
safer place.    Lastly, echoing an argument Moynihan would make as he was leaving the 
UN, Richard claimed bloc voting was decreasing.  He cited items such as Angola, East 
Timor, the Spanish Sahara, and the attack on Zionism as issues where there was a 
diversity of votes between Asia and Africa and the Middle East.  
That both Moynihan and Richard could argue that the Third World was coming 
apart politically was a remarkable fact.  Kissinger had not just gone before the world 
simply to improve it, but at least Moynihan understood that part of this plan was to “keep 
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[the] industrial nations together and split the third world.”141  With this conflict, 
Moynihan had failed to keep up his end of the bargain.  
Richard’s report back to James Callaghan at the Foreign Office at the close of the 
year was pessimistic.142  Richard claimed that although Britain had done well for itself on 
issues like Rhodesia, Belize, and Iceland, the damage that Moynihan had done had 
several unforeseen consequences.  The first was to push Britain closer to the 
Commonwealth and its other western allies.  Moynihan had seemingly encouraged the 
growing American political discontent that had endangered the American ability to lead 
within the UN, even among its allies.  Moynihan had used the UN as a “forum” in much 
the same way that the non aligned countries seemingly did, but his tactics only served to 
divide the United States from the rest of the world.  It made the unity within the non 
aligned world that had before seemingly only held for economic issues easier to maintain 
for the controversial symbolic issues such as the Zionism resolution.  
Moynihan’s failure at the General Assembly over the Zionism Resolution and his 
scuffle with Ivor Richard was not the end of his time at the United Nations.  He had one 
more incident before his time at the UN ended, and that was a call for a global amnesty 
for political prisoners.  Moynihan proposed the amnesty in the Third Committee two days 
after the Zionism vote in the General Assembly.  He framed it as part of the quest for 
human rights that had been his chosen theme that year, but the resolution received almost 
no support from western allies and quickly gathered anti-western amendments.  
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Moynihan and Garment withdrew it a week later, burned by their failure.  Moynihan had 
sought support from Roy Hattersley, then in the Foreign Office, but it came to nothing.143  
During this time of wrestling with the shadows of Kissinger’s influence, seeking a 
global amnesty, and infighting with the British, Moynihan gave perhaps his most 
thoughtful speech to the Pacem in Teris Convention in Washington DC.   Moynihan drew 
the conclusion that what had been possible in 1960 when meeting the communist threat in 
Congo was unavailable to the United States to meet the communist threat in Angola.  
Given the ability of communism to induce guilt in democracies, the only thing 
communists would fear is military power.  Moynihan drew much of his information about 
the weakness of the United States at this time from the analysis of Leo Strauss, and was 
warmed when George Kennan argued in agreement with Moynihan after he left the stage.  
Kennan had approved of Moynihan’s approach in an earlier interview that summer, 
stating that he approved of ending aid to the countries that were voting against the United 
States.  Kennan in that earlier interview had urged a general withdrawal from others’ 
affairs, and then increased relations again after a period of time.144  Moynihan would not 
agree with this idea of withdrawal, but it is a measure of the United States’ isolation at 
the time that both of these men would consider the US almost alone in its conduct of 
foreign affairs.145  
As the critics grew louder and more influential, Moynihan’s defenders at Harvard 
and in the press did what they could for him.  David Landes, a respected Harvard 
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economist, wrote to Kissinger to protest Moynihan’s resignation and told him that the 
“boys in striped pants trembled” and dislike this “oversized leprechaun”.  He urged 
Kissinger to pay more attention to the UN now that Moynihan was gone and worried that 
campaigns to delegitimize Israel (and by extension the United States) would undermine 
US morally and would negate United States’ material strength.   In his spirited defense of 
these two countries, Moynihan was raising American spirits as much as countering the 
Third World.146  His efforts were, however, attracting a lot of attention, and Kissinger felt 
he could not have a competitor for influence in foreign policy so his campaign to push 
Moynihan out continued.  Part of the reason was Kissinger felt he could lose no more 
ground in terms of influence on the foreign policy process was that he had lost his 
position as National Security Advisor earlier in the fall and was considering resigning 
himself.147 
Neither Kissinger nor Moynihan is clear on the reason for Moynihan’s departure.  
Moynihan, both in his memoir and in his letter of resignation to Gerald Ford, stated that 
he must return to Harvard.  Kissinger’s memoirs on the subject are silent, but he did send 
along a very complimentary note a month or so after Moynihan left.  Richard Cheney, 
then at the Ford White House, recalls that it was one last argument between the men at 
the end of January that triggered the resignation.148  Moynihan did go back to Harvard to 
teach in the spring semester, and after that semester where he mixed teaching with 
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campaigning for Scoop Jackson he decided to run for Senate from New York.  He did so 
and won, and continued his campaign for liberty from Washington.  He would continue 
to keep a close eye on the workings of the United Nations, often to the chagrin of the 
Carter administration.149  Kissinger sent two messages to Moynihan thanking him for his 
service, the second of which (a telegram) relayed Kissinger’s belief that “there is only 
one Pat Moynihan” and that Kissinger appreciated his “creativity, dynamism, humanity, 
and wit.”150 
So why, ultimately, did the Moynihan moment at the United Nations matter to the 
Anglo-American dealing with the Third World?  It mattered because it was an odd 
exception in the period.  Britain and the United States would go on to work together in 
international forums and bilaterally on Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  Their 
rhetorical split and personality clashes belied a very similar voting record and a 
concurrent concern with the way the world seemed to be forming against them.  Richard 
preached unity and faith, Moynihan defiance and rightness.  Their dispute played out in 
letters and speeches, and both found defenders.  But for all his fire, Moynihan had in 
practical terms failed.  He had lost the United States votes at a moment when it was 
already short of allies and successes.  He had, perhaps inadvertently, weakened the 
British faith in their ally at a time when the two countries most needed one another. 
Moynihan’s tactics made him very popular.  An Opinion Research Corporation 
Survey from 12 January 1976 reported that 70% of respondents thought that Moynihan 
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should “continue to speak frankly and forthrightly” while only 16% thought he should 
“be more diplomatic and tactful.”  Among the positive results, the results broke down as 
61% GOP, 71% Democrat, 80% Independents, 72% liberals, and 76% conservatives.151  
Moynihan always had more defenders than he supposed (at least outside the 
government). 
  Ultimately, the more traditional politician William Scranton replaced Moynihan. 
Scranton was as conventional as Moynihan was outrageous, and the staff at the Mission 
was very welcoming and most likely glad to be rid of Moynihan.152  Moynihan’s tenure 
would serve as a rallying point for critics of Ford and Kissinger from the political right 
and a counterpoint for those who would decry the more even-handed approach of the 
Carter administration.  Richard would serve with two more American ambassadors, one 
perhaps even more outspoken than Moynihan in Andrew Young.   
Moynihan’s quest to use the United Nations as a forum not just for the United 
States but for the values of liberalism and human rights was, in the end, a glorious lost 
cause in the first age of neoconservativism.  It gave hope and encouragement to a 
population that for many years had known only inglorious defeats.  That the United 
Nations under pressure from former United Nations Permanent Representative George 
Bush would repeal the Zionism Resolution in 1991 was an event too far in the future to 
contemplate. Neoconservatives had learned a hard lesson about the trustworthiness of 
international institutions. The failure of Moynihan in the face of such intense Third 
World opposition may have almost been inevitable, but it was made all the more probable 
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by not working closely enough with his allies.  This flaw was only partially Moynihan’s 
fault, as every country in an international institution will almost inevitably pursue its own 
self interest.   Moynihan’s alienation of the British in both his conception of the United 
Nations and the execution of his strategy was a major part of his undoing. 
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Chapter 4: The War that Would Not End: Britain, Refugees, and the Aftermath of the 
Vietnam War 
 
The withdrawal from east of Suez in the early 1970s did not completely remove 
from Britain the burdens of empire.  Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands remained constant 
irritants in Britain’s relationship with Spain and Argentina.  Britain was also still legally 
responsible for Rhodesia in the eyes of much of the world, although the amount of actual 
control over the “rogue state” Britain had exercised since the UDI of 1965 was almost 
non-existent.   Hong Kong remained as a British territory but was under the looming 
shadow of Mao’s China.  Hong Kong would do more than anything else to pull Britain 
into the refugee crisis that erupted after the communist conquest of Laos, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam in 1975.   
If the British Empire dissolved in the era of Vietnam, then post-imperial Britain 
struggled on in the post-Vietnam world.1  Britain’s role in the US-Vietnam War was at 
most diplomatic and rhetorical, and the Johnson’s administration demands for support 
from the British and Harold Wilson’s frustrating attempts to bring about a negotiated 
solution in the face of a hostile Cabinet and Labour Party put an end to the era of renewed 
closeness that had marked Anglo-American relations from 1957 to 1963.2  Famously, in a 
fit a pique Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, claimed that Labour’s refusal to send 
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soldiers to Vietnam meant that the US would not defend Britain in the case of a Soviet 
invasion.3  The Labour Government’s commitment not to devalue sterling and the British 
diplomatic attempts to achieve a negotiated end to the war as a signatory to the Geneva 
Agreements were both lost by early 1968, and the setbacks of the Tet Offensive of 1968 
marked the beginning of the end for the Johnson administration.  Likewise, the British 
military withdrawal from the east of Suez marked one of the last steps in the unwinding 
of the empire that had begun in 1947.4  Despite Nixon and Kissinger’s best efforts at 
diplomacy and “Vietnamization”, two years after the withdrawal of American ground 
forces the North Vietnamese Army drove triumphantly in Saigon and dealt a death blow 
to an American ally.  This moment of North Vietnamese victory is generally where 
histories of the war end.5  However, the end of the war did not end the suffering of the 
people of Southeast Asia, and many fled or attempted to flee the new communist regimes 
in Cambodia and Vietnam.  Some of those that fled by boat became known as “small 
boat” refugees.  Many of these refugees ended up in British custody as they flowed into 
Hong Kong. The British struggled to deal with this growing crisis both with their own 
resources and in concert with their allies and the other nations in the region. 
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Most studies of the refugee crisis have focused on the American response to the 
crisis, either the limited American effort to save their allies in the closing days of the war 
or the conflicted American efforts to bring Vietnamese immigrants into the United States 
and the difficulties those immigrants faced once they arrived.  Studies of the American 
response to this crisis have emphasized the Cold War context of the American response, 
even going so far as to argue that the American effort to deal with the refugees and bring 
them into the United States was nothing more than an attempt to continue the war by 
others means.6   
For the United States, the centrality of the Cold War to its approach to refugee 
politics was especially clear in the 1970s.  The issue of limits, restrictions, and the costs 
of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel was the core of Senator Scoop 
Jackson (D, WA) campaign that linked Soviet behavior to Most Favored Nation status 
which was a counter-point to the efforts of the Nixon administration to achieve detente.7  
Both the Ford and Carter administrations admitted large numbers of Indochinese refugees 
to the United States, and Carter experienced some difficulties during his 1980 re-election 
campaign due to his varying responses to the simultaneous refugee crises of the Mariel 
boat lift from Cuba and an influx of Haitian refugees.8  The United States and western 
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countries in general were far more likely to admit refugees that resulted from Cold War 
proxy conflicts than those generated by the crises after 1991.  This led to accusation of 
racism later on, particularly in the comparative European response to crises in Africa and 
Bosnia where Europeans were viewed more favorably for asylum that those refugees 
from the Third World.9 
Britain came into the refugee crisis because of what was left of its shipping 
industries and of its empire.  The British government in Hong Kong and the refugees that 
landed there and the British defense relationship with Brunei forced the British to 
confront this humanitarian crisis.  The United States and France took in the majority of 
the refugees from Southeast Asia after 1975 and Britain and some other countries took in 
smaller numbers as well, but the neighbors of the newly united Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (SRV) overall did not want the waves of refugees generated by the post-war 
collectivization of the communists.  Their refusal to admit refugees meant that many 
refugees (and those that would seek to profit from their desperation) saw Hong Kong as 
the best place to go to try to escape their fate.   
 
 
Britain and Refugees 
                                                           




Part of the challenge that Britain faced in these years was its contrasting histories 
of welcoming refugees and a strong anti-immigrant current in its post-war politics. 
Kathleen Paul’s Whitewashing Britain argued that Home Office and other officials after 
1945 were at first eager to use British emigration as a way of expanding its influence in 
the wider world and then acted independently of, rather than being influenced by, popular 
opinion in acting to restrict Commonwealth (i.e. non-white) immigration prior to the 
1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.10 
The most infamous moment in the history of post-war immigration was the so-
called “Rivers of Blood” speech by Conservative MP Enoch Powell in 1968.  Powell’s 
erudite references to Virgil could not disguise the racialist nature of his remarks.  Powell 
stressed the economic cost of immigration, and for his remarks Heath kicked him out of 
Shadow Cabinet.  Powell spent the rest of his time in Parliament as a backbencher.  
Despite Heath’s rebuke, the power of Powell’s rhetoric carried over into the election.  
One analysis indicated the Conservatives gained 6.7% more votes in the General Election 
of 1970s thanks the public perception that Conservatives were more likely to restrict 
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immigration thanks mostly to Powell’s speech.11  In a 1979 survey, 86% of Britons 
believed the government was allowing too many immigrants into the country.12   
This general hostility to immigration, be it popular, official, or a combination of 
both contrasted with Britain’s heritage (or self-image) of humanitarianism and some 
acceptance of immigrants.  Britain had been accepting of Jews escaping the pogroms of 
late Czarist Russia, and had acted to save some of the refugees of World War II.13  These 
refugee groups included Polish soldiers and other eastern Europeans.  In the aftermath of 
the war, Britain signed the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention that clarified the 
definition of “refugee” status and outlined the responsibilities the sheltering state and the 
refugee had toward each other.14   The refugee, according to the Convention, “should 
have a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, … or 
political opinion.”15 After 1945, groups of refugees welcomed into Britain included Cold 
War refugees (post-1948 Czechs, post-1956 Hungarians, post-1968 Czechs), Indians 
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fleeing Amin’s Uganda, and Chileans.16  In 1977 as the number of refugees in Britain’s 
care started to rise, the Government’s policy was that the refugees would be treated in 
accordance with the Convention.  By that point Britain had accepted 2,500 Chileans in 
the post-1973 period.17    One of the major principles that would constrain the ability of 
London to make decisions was the principle of “non-refoulment” which meant that 
refugees could not forcibly be returned to the place from where they had fled.18  This 
commitment to both the rules and practices of international institutions would shape 
Britain’s response, as would their relationship with the United States and their fiscal 
constraints. 
One of the symptoms of British weakness in the 1970s was the restrictions of its 
choices it faced when its fiscal weakness collided with its humanitarian traditions.  From 
the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 to Czechs after the 
Soviet destruction of “socialism with a human face”, Britain had welcomed at least some 
of those fleeing from repression.    However, in the aftermath of North Vietnam’s 
successful conquest of South Vietnam in 1975 and their subsequent consolidation of 
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power, Britain’s last remnants of empire in Southeast Asia attracted those refugees 
fleeing violence and re-education.    The refugees arrived not just in British territories, 
but also in countries and kingdoms where the British had soldiers.   When British ships 
picked up the refugees, the maritime law which the British had helped to create was 
under scrutiny and the remaining British shipping which was under financial pressure as 
ship’s masters picked up desperate Vietnamese refugees at sea.   
The Cold War’s proxy wars and the refugees they generated also served as 
markers in Britain’s domestic political debates.  In particular, the overthrow of the 
Allende government in Chile in 1973 and the refugees generated by this coup were an 
affront to the Labour Party.  Labour’s members wished to do what they could against the 
new government, and wondered why the Conservatives had recognized it so quickly.  In a 
debate in the Commons 10 weeks after the fall of Allende, the Shadow Minister of 
Overseas Development Judith Hart sparred with Julian Amery, then Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs over the events in Chile and the Conservative 
response.   Among the pieces of evidence that Hart and others in the Opposition 
presented to discredit the new junta were the refugees that had fled in the face of fear and 
violence.19 
The Collapse of South Vietnam 
The General Election of 1970 removed Harold Wilson’s troubled Labour 
government and brought the Conservatives under Edward (Ted) Heath into office.  
Heath’s government stood out for its European orientation and its failure to successfully 
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confront the trade unions that led to a State of Emergency.20    For several reasons, there 
was very little personal comity between Heath and Nixon.  This lack of rapport was 
somewhat surprising. The two men were both conservatives, and despite his orientation 
toward Europe Heath and Lord Home as his Foreign Secretary were supportive of Nixon 
and Kissinger’s efforts to end the United States’ involvement in the war in Vietnam.  
During the desperate effort of the United States and South Vietnam to turn back the 
conventional NVA “Easter” Offensive of 1972, Heath’s government was supportive of 
the American actions.21  Kissinger, despite his dislike of Heath and the British 
government’s later failure to support Israel and the United States’ airlift during the 1973 
war, noted that Heath was almost alone in the United States’ allies in supporting the 
Christmas bombings of 1972 that attempted to secure North Vietnamese acceptance of 
American concessions.22 When the North Vietnamese and the Nixon administration 
finally signed a peace agreement in early 1973, the response on both sides of British 
politics seemed to be one largely of relief.23   
The Shadow Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, as he had promised in his 
response to Home’s announcement in Parliament about the end of the fighting, visited 
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North and South Vietnam as part of a larger trip through Southeast Asia, including Laos, 
Thailand, and Hong Kong in early 1973.  Callaghan took along Tom McNally and Ian 
Mikardo with him as well.  Mikardo was an experienced MP from the left (Bevanite) 
wing of the Labour Party who had served in Parliament since 1945.  McNally was a 
member of the Fabian Society that Callaghan had hired as a political advisor.24   
 
The delegation arrived in South Vietnam on 10 February and spent a week in the 
country.  Prior to their arrival, the delegation had stopped in Hong Kong where, among 
other activities, Callaghan spent $1,170 (HK) Dollars, or about £117 to buy two new 
suits.25  While in South Vietnam, the delegation noted that government hoped the 
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struggle over the future of Indochina would now be political, rather than military, and 
that Thieu and his ministers understood no level of American air support like they 
enjoyed in 1972 would again be forthcoming.  The South Vietnamese would have to 
depend on their own (American supplied) aircraft and equipment to repulse any further 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong offensives.  However, this dependence on machines 
and the very size of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) meant the economic 
strain of the continued war effort would most likely be too much for the country to 
sustain.  Likewise, according to McNally who drafted at least the first draft of the 
delegation’s report, a political solution was only possible if all superpowers refrained 
from interference. Ultimately, South Vietnam’s legitimacy rested not on the ability to 
integrate outside elements into government (like the much discussed “Third Force”) but 
on the ability of the military to defend the country.26 
While in North Vietnam, Callaghan and the others surveyed the damage inflicted 
by the air campaign.  In spite of the campaign, however, Hanoi retained the “sleepy 
elegance of a pre-war French provincial town.”  In contrast to the “Americanised, 
militarised Saigon”, the people of Hanoi possessed a “self discipline and dedication … 
almost beyond belief.”  The equipment removed from factories in preparation for the 
American air campaign lined the roads between Hanoi and Haiphong.  McNally believed 
that the air campaign had convinced the North Vietnamese to abandon their military 
campaign and pursue the goal of reunification by political means.27 
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Despite these assessments about the possibility of negotiations between the two 
sides, Callaghan and his staff at the FCO knew that the war was not over.  Callaghan’s 
told McNally that he did not think the North would “wait for history to take its course.”  
North Vietnam still intended to eventually remove Thieu from office and replace him 
with the Northern-backed Provisional Revolutionary Government.28  Callaghan’s 
judgment was correct.  Satisfied that the United States had separated itself from South 
Vietnam and established a “decent interval”, Nixon and Kissinger mostly turned away 
from Vietnam.  They attempted to keep pressure on the North through diplomatic and 
financial means, but the curtailment of funds for military activity in Southeast Asia by 
Congress that summer limited the ability of the United States to influence activities in the 
region.  In Vietnam, fighting restarted in the fall of 1973 when the ARVN tried to reclaim 
territory from the PRG, but continued aid from the North turned the tide and by the fall of 
1974 the NVA began its conventional offensive that the North believed would allow 
them to win by 1976.  The rise in inflation triggered by the oil shock in late 1973 and 
early 1974 lowered the value of the already declining amount of US aid to South 
Vietnam, and Congress remained intransigent about not supporting the Thieu government 
despite the increase in North Vietnamese military activity.29   
As 1975 turned from winter to spring, it became clear that the ARVN and the 
government of South Vietnam were collapsing.  The poor decision making of Thieu 
accelerated the speed of the collapse.   In abandoning the ARVN defense in the Central 
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Highlands in favor of concentrating forces around Saigon that spring, Thieu had yielded 
vast tracks of land to the North Vietnamese and unwittingly precipitated a general retreat.   
The North Vietnamese had not imagined that they would be able to capture Saigon in 
1975, but their incredible success against the demoralized ARVN and the complete lack 
of an American response allowed them to move ahead with the “Ho Chi Minh” offensive 
earlier than expected.  As the NVA closed in on Saigon and the chaos in South Vietnam 
increased, the embassies of most western governments began preparing to withdraw their 
personnel.30 The private oil companies in the region used helicopters to evacuate their 
workers out of Vietnam, including some who ended up in Brunei.  The Sultan accepted 
this so long as the companies were responsible for the evacuated ethnic Vietnamese.31  
The intransigence of the Sultan to outsiders would be a feature of Brunei’s foreign policy 
in the coming years, and would bring them into disagreement with Britain’s attempt to 
mitigate the coming refugee crisis. 
By April, the situation had deteriorated to the point where Callaghan 
recommended that since Saigon’s fall was inevitable the British embassy should order a 
Service Assisted Evacuation (SAE) when it appeared that the battle for Saigon was about 
to commence. The British had already closed their embassy in Phnom Penh on 21 March 
due to the worsening situation in Cambodia.32 The plan for the British to evacuate their 
embassy personnel was codenamed STELLA.  STELLA had been in existence for several 
years prior to the collapse.  The planners had anticipated that the embassy would have to 
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coordinate the departure not just of the staff but also members of the local banks and oil 
companies.33  The basic concept of STELLA was to position RAF aircraft and a Royal 
Navy frigate (originally the HMS Achilles, then the HMS Mermaid) close to Saigon to 
facilitate the evacuation of British embassy personnel and British civilians. Callaghan 
hoped the British would not be the first embassy to pull out, and he preferred that the 
embassy staff and British would use civilian means if possible to leave the country.  
Callaghan wanted the military evacuation to be the “last resort” because there was hope 
that “an orderly transfer of power” would permit the British to stay.34  Callaghan was 
concerned that in the attendant breakdown of law and order sure to accompany any 
fighting in Saigon the North Vietnamese Army might not respect diplomatic immunity, 
and that because of this uncertainty the safety of the embassy personnel trumped keeping 
them in place to maintain a diplomat station in Saigon.  Understanding this concern, on 
21 April the Embassy requested that the STELLA aircraft stand by on 12 hours notice to 
fly from Singapore.  The embassy personnel believed that despite the relative quiet inside 
Saigon the ARVN’s collapse meant the end was close.35 
The United States ambassador held off ordering an evacuation for as long as 
possible so as not to cause a panic.  The British became aware of the United States’ 
decision to close its embassy on 28 April through information from a meeting chaired by 
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Ford of the National Security Council that was passed to Ramsbotham on the advice of 
Kissinger.36  Confusion and panic marked the American evacuation.  Even as Gerald 
Ford marked the end of American involvement in the war to raucous cheers at Tulane, 
images of American Marines clubbing desperate Vietnamese civilians away from the 
embassy were broadcast around the world.   The chaos surrounding the evacuation meant 
that those officials of the former government who could not fly out had to flee by sea.37 
Consulting with Callaghan and the other diplomats in Saigon as well as learning 
that the Americans had begun evacuating en masse, the British under John Bushnell 
decided to close their embassy on 24 April.38  Once the British in Saigon made their 
decision to shut down, the British embassy in Hanoi informed the North Vietnamese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the closure.  Callaghan’s ambassador in Hanoi relayed the 
reason for temporarily closing the embassy in Saigon was on the grounds of safety.39  On 
24 April, the British embassy turned its interests in Saigon over the French embassy, but 
the French warned that they could not place Britain’s interests over their own.40  The 
embassy staff, along with some Vietnamese, arrived in Singapore late on the 24th.41  
Upon their arrival, Callaghan telegraphed Bushnell that Whitehall was “full of admiration 
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for … your constant good advice … in reaching decisions which have been difficult and 
often unpalatable.”42  The total cost of the operation was £14,992.51.43 The MOD 
incurred the initial expense and then was paid back out of the FCO’s funds.44  The MOD 
then had to pay £325.19 out of that sum back to the FCO for the 3 British servicemen 
who had been part of the evacuation.45   
One part of South Vietnam’s collapse that involved the British was the issue of 
how a government that is about to be destroyed should be treated by international 
institutions. One problem that the British took part in solving was South Vietnam’s 
request for a payment from the IMF against its (GVN) gold on 23 April.  The staff at the 
IMF was reluctant to pay out to a state that might soon cease to exist because a default on 
the loan would cost the IMF about $1 million.  However, the British, American, and 
Indonesian members of the board at the IMF stated that there was no legal reason the 
IMF should not pay the money.46  The Vietnamese officials at their embassy in London 
presented a similar problem of how to deal with a rapidly disappearing state.  The 
Vietnamese members of the embassy, their families, and their personal staff (61 people in 
all) requested to stay in Britain “in case Her Majesty’s Government [decided] to officially 
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recognise the new government.”47 The FCO recommended that a solicitor be employed to 
conduct that handover of the real estate, and that the staff be allowed to stay in Britain if 
another country (most likely the United States or France) would not take them.48 
At the beginning of the crisis, it was the opinion of the Home Office that the 
“United Kingdom is a small and overcrowded country, and so is not a country of 
immigration.”49  However, even before the fall of Saigon, however, Britain had begun 
receiving refugees from Vietnam.  On 6 April, a planeload of 99 children and 47 adults 
sponsored by the Daily Mail arrived at Heathrow.  Many of the children were adopted 
either in Britain or overseas, and the rest were taken in by “voluntary organisations” 
including the British Standing Conference for Aid for Refugees.  The Home Office 
believed that there were not going to be any more direct flights of refugees due to the 
South Vietnamese discouragement.50  Even before Saigon fell, the United States was 
asking its allies to accept “substantially more than” 100 refugees and allow Vietnamese 
diplomats to stay in London.51 
The first small boat refugees that came into British-administered Hong Kong 
came on a boat that wasn’t small.  Clara Maersk took approximately 4,500 Vietnamese 
refugees from the waters off Vietnam to Hong Kong.  Two children had been born on the 
ship, including one named “Clara”.  This mass influx was a shock, but the British 
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authorities took the refugees in, medically checked them, and then sought a place to put 
them for both the short and long term.52  These 4,500 refugees were a strain on Hong 
Kong’s limited resources and space.  Britain accepted only 100, but there might be 
120,000 total refugees in south East Asia caused by the destruction of Vietnam and 
Cambodia.53 
 
MV Clara Maersk, circa 197554 
The British had to contend with the fate of one political refugee in particular.  
Former President Thieu had fled South Vietnam after he had been deposed from power 
on 21 April.  South Vietnam had two more presidents, Tran Van Huong and Douong Van 
(Big Minh) Minh, before it was defeated.55  The change of Thieu government did nothing 
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to deter the NVA, as Hanoi radioed after it learned of the change that Huong was just a 
“puppet of the Thieu empire”.56 Thieu made his way to Taipei and asked the British 
government through his brother Kieu who had been the former ambassador to London 
and now lived in Taiwan if he could relocate to Britain.  Thieu’s wife had made multiple 
visits to Britain, and his son currently attended school at Aldenham near London.  Thieu 
informed the British that he wished “to live in obscurity without any political activity”.57   
Roy Jenkins at the Home Office recommended to Callaghan based on the analysis 
of the Foreign Office and his own sentiments that Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) 
should admit Thieu.  Jenkins told Callaghan that “it has been accepted policy over the 
years to grant asylum to former Heads of State”, but that the initial acceptance should be 
“temporary.”58 Jenkins urged that Thieu’s entry be low key as to not complicate relations 
with the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) or DRV.   Wilson agreed, but 
Macelhose in Hong Kong warned that the Chinese and Vietnamese refugees in camps 
there might object to Thieu passing through Hong Kong.59 
Thieu’s trip to Taiwan was not without trouble.  Thieu’s bodyguard attempted to 
steal correspondence between Thieu and Nixon/Kissinger from around the time of the 
Paris Agreement that Thieu had taken with him when he fled.  The bodyguard instead 
stole Thieu’s clothes and then fled to the United States.  Had he succeeded, however, his 
prize would not have met with much of interest because the correspondence in question 
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had already been published in the New York Times.60  Thieu eventually made it to Britain 
on 20 September 1975.  After he arrived, he presented a thank you gift of four panels 
depicting the seasons to P.S. Astley of the South East Asian Department of the FCO for 
assisting in the relocation.  Astley, concerned about the propriety of accepting these gifts, 
admitted they were simply cheap Taiwanese decorations like “the sort of thing one sees 
in a Chinese restaurant”, but asked to keep them because Thieu was coming over for 
dinner soon.61 
Negotiations with the PRG began in June 1975 in London for the handover of the 
previous government’s embassy in London and other goods, including an Air Vietnam 
plane that had ended up in Hong Kong.  At that time, the PRG stated that they only 
planned to nationalize American property, but that the PRG was looking for international 
partners for continued off-shore oil exploration and that “the time [was] not ripe” for 
reunification.62  
By the summer of 1976, Britain seemed to have the refugee problem within its 
span of responsibility under control. By the summer of 1977, Britain had accepted 430 
Vietnamese refugees, as compared to the 146,000 for the USA and 36,000 for France.  
Hong Kong itself had accepted 154. This did not include the 4-5,000 illegal immigrants 
who had snuck into Hong Kong that were causing trouble with the rest of the Hong Kong 
population.63 The suffering of the boat people continued, as they were rejected or kept 
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offshore around the South China Sea.  The rate of refugee arrival by small boat or rescue 
for 1977 was around 500 refugees per month by country, and the United States was 
pushing for the other countries in the area as well as its European allies and countries in 
South America (a list from which Britain was excluded) to take in more refugees.64   
As the flow of immigration into the South East Asia increased through 1978, the 
UNHCR tried to deal with the situation by arranging a meeting in Geneva in December 
1978 that would involve most of the major players.  David Newsom, the Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs led the United States’ delegation. The Foreign Office’s Evan 
Luard would take the lead for the British.65  The UNHCR and American mission were not 
just trying to alleviate the crisis in Southeast Asia, but also to aid the numerous refugees 
attempting to flee from Eastern Europe.66 Before the conference, Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Holbrooke consulted with Jay at the British embassy in Washington to 
coordinate their approach at the Conference. Holbrooke understood that compared to 
France or Australia there was little Britain could do, but it might be able to use its “moral 
authority” and Luard’s commitment to “human rights” to sway other countries, such as 
Japan, to do more.67 
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The British faced a conundrum of wanting to support the UNHCR, needing to 
preserve good relations with Thailand and Malaysia, and a desire not to “seek a leading 
role because of our limited ability to absorb more refugees.” It would allow the United 
States, France, and Australia to take the lead while agreeing to take in 1500 more 
refugees (mostly from Hong Kong), spend £1.5 million on the UNHCR, and attempt to 
pressure Vietnam to cease this outflow.68 This tentativeness was not unexpected given the 
fact the British were entering the Winter of Discontent.   The conference had the 
Vietnamese present as well as most Western countries, but with little Third World 
participation.  The major result of the conference was the United States’ willingness to 
take in 50,000 refugees a year (a two-fold increase), and a surprisingly low level of 
criticism of Vietnam.  Only Australia and the British under Luard criticized the 
Vietnamese, while the Vietnamese blamed the whole crisis on the inability of some of its 
citizens to get over capitalism.69   
Britain’s conduct before and during the conference showed its struggle to balance 
domestic politics with international commitments.  Outside its commitment to the United 
States, Britain would have had even less incentive to welcome these refugees.  Without 
Hong Kong, it would have had almost no reason to do so.  This combination of alliance 
and the remnants of Empire pushed Britain away from its legal and social identity as a 
country that did not accept immigrants toward a more welcoming attitude.  For the 
United States, even Britain in its moment of weakness was still a moral beacon that could 
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speak to the world for the good of the weak.   Britain, however, would soon face a sterner 
test of its multitude of commitments for even when the international community seemed 
to have the problem of refugees in hand, it was about to get much worse. 
The Trials of the Huey Fong 
During Britain’s winter of discontent, the British authorities in Hong Kong 
struggled to manage the increased flow of refugees from Vietnam, propelled by the 
growing repression of the ethnic Chinese Hoa minority population by an increasingly 
repressive Vietnamese government.  One of the events that marked the upswing in the 
number of refugees in the Southeast Asian seas was the saga of the crew and refugees 
who arrived in Hong Kong aboard the MV Huey Fong.  Huey Fong was a ship that 
claimed to be on a humanitarian mission but was instead on a voyage of exploitation and 
profit.  Its voyage attracted international attention and challenged Hong Kong and the 
British government to deal with desperate people fleeing tyranny, upholding the laws of 
the sea, and managing an isolated outpost of empire in an age of fiscal weakness.    
Huey Fong was originally a cargo ship registered in Panama, and was sailing out 
of Singapore and was destined for Kaohsiung, Taiwan.  Huey Fong sent a telex to Hong 
Kong on 18 December 1978 that it was enroute with approximately 2,700 refugees 
aboard. 70  The British authorities in Hong Kong replied that the Huey Fong was to alter 
its course and remain on course for Taiwan.  The port authorities at Hong Kong repeated 
the message the next day, but Huey Fong refused to alter its course.  On 22 December, 
the Huey Fong informed Hong Kong that it was now only 145 miles away.  The 
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authorities replied that it “would not be allowed to enter Hong Kong waters” due to the 
British “government’s adherence to the principle that shipwrecked survivors rescued by 
ocean going vessels should be landed at the first scheduled port of call and given shelter 
there pending eventual resettlement by the UNHCR in third countries.”71  The term 
“shipwrecked” is significant in the response because that designation carried specific 
requirements for the ships’ master.  According to the laws of the sea, ships’ masters were 
to take shipwreck victims aboard the ships and then continue on to their original 
destination.  The apparent problem with this approach was the number of refugees the 
Huey Fong and ships like it that would follow is that they were logistically unequipped to 
handle several thousand starving, weakened, and desperate people of all ages.  Rather 
than run out of food, ships’ masters would logically head to the nearest friendly port.  
This designation often excluded ports in Brunei, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia.  The 
governments of these states, many of whom had a few years before been a part of 
Britain’s empire, were now hostile to the arrival of Vietnamese refugees.  Hong Kong, 
being a British possession, was governed by a country with a public commitment to 
human rights, international law, and the principles of the United Nations.   
Because of the importance of this rule and the potential to exploit the 
humanitarian impulses of western governments when confronted by refugees that fell 
under their responsibility under international law, the authorities in Hong Kong had to be 
vigilant to prevent smugglers from exploiting their openness.  One of the ways the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council sought to deter such action was to pass a new law on 10 
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January 1979 that held ship’s masters liable if they entered Hong Kong’s waters with 
“shipwreck” victims who were later to prove to be something else.  This law was to be of 
some significance as the truth came out about the Huey Fong. 
When Huey Fong arrived in Hong Kong, there were approximately 5,000 
refugees already residing in Hong Kong who had escaped from Indochina by various 
means.  Based on humanitarian considerations and a belief that little could be done to 
physically alter the ship’s course, the British simply monitored the situation.  A 
reconnaissance aircraft that spotted the Huey Fong on her way in reported that “her decks 
were covered with refugees.”  Eventually, late on 22 December the HMS Wasperton 
intercepted the Huey Fong and then shadowed her as she sailed to Po Toi Island just 
outside Hong Kong’s territorial waters where she was remain for the next 27 days.  The 
Policy Group in the Hong Kong government that had been formed to deal with the 
burgeoning crisis decided that the Huey Fong was to be re-supplied by helicopter because 
it would it would reduce the chance of the refugees would take hostages of any medical 
or humanitarian personnel.  Aerial resupply would also lessen the chances that the 
Vietnamese refugees would leap from their ship to a resupply ship and make their way 
ashore.  The authorities determined that those refugees that would need medical care 
during the ship’s time in the harbor were to be taken by a Wessex helicopter to hospitals 
ashore.  During the planning for the ship’s arrival there was a concern that the refugees 
might fake diseases to get off the ship.  This concern however was to prove unfounded 
until the very end. 
The Hong Kong authorities first attempted to restock the ship so it could return to 
sea.  This included not just food and water, but also lifesaving equipment to ensure the 
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British complied with international law and to prevent the crew or the ship’s owners from 
claiming “force majeure” in the British attempts to resolve the crisis.72  The Ministry of 
Defense ruled the British could not simply take over the ship and put it to sea, so the 
British authorities were forced to use the promise of continued aid would be needed to 
get the ship back on its way.  Simultaneously, the British were attempting to persuade the 
Taiwanese authorities to let the ship dock with its refugees, something the Taiwanese 
were loath to do. 
Eventually, the Governor of Hong Kong Murray Macelhose and the Executive 
Council decided they would have to eventually admit the ship and its refugees, despite 
the damaging precedent this would establish.  In the interim, Macelhose sought to 
continue the pressure against the Master of the Huey Fong to resume his voyage, but 
suspected that it would be futile.  He informed Whitehall of this reality on 5 January 
1979, and decided that with the new law passed on 10 January in place prosecuting those 
who abused the norms of rescuing those at sea the Government could admit refugees 
while maintaining a degree of deterrence against Masters who would exploit this 
generosity.  The ship’s master was presented with the threat of a trial as well as the 
incentive of resupply to get him, the ship, and the refugees on the way.  The threat to the 
master included a warning that the crew and passengers on the boat would be questioned 
if the ship entered Hong Kong’s waters, and that he would face prosecution.  The ship’s 
master was warned again about the possibility of prosecution on the 15th, and the ship 
was resupplied on the 17th.  A day later, the harbor master informed the ship’s master that 
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the Huey Fong could now enter the harbor.   The final trigger for the ship’s entrance was 
the failure of a last minute effort by the American embassy in Taipei to secure assurances 
for the refugees.  At this same time, the refugees aboard the Huey Fong began to threaten 
to send large numbers of its passengers into the hospitals ashore.  Faced with these 
increasingly dire circumstances, Macelhose allow it to enter.  On 2100 on 19 January, the 
Huey Fong entered Hong Kong’s waters and was seized by the Hong Kong police. 
The admission of the Huey Fong worried many locals in Hong Kong, but the 
British promise to accept approximately 1,000 refugees into the British Isles calmed 
concerns in Hong Kong as well as being a small enough number to not raise the ire of the 
British people.  The Government initially housed the refugees in an old RAF barracks 
and the surrounding buildings.  The area was fenced off as well. Almost immediately, the 
police began interviewing the refugees and examining the ship’s logs and charts.  The 
refugees in the hospital were questioned as well, and a disturbing picture of deceit began 
to emerge.  The Huey Fong’s log revealed a 51 hour discrepancy after the ship left 
Bangkok.  The ship’s log stated it had an oil leak on 9 December that delayed its voyage 
for 51 hours.  The log also stated the vessel encountered nine fishing junks (an event that 
would not normally be of note) that were all foundering and full of people begging to be 
saved.   The ship’s crews saved the people and then sailed for Hong Kong out of 
humanitarian necessity.   
The refugees told a different story.  Once the refugees from the Huey Fong came 
ashore, it quickly became apparent that they had not been shipwrecked.  Instead, they had 
given almost all the gold they had left for a chance to become refugees.  The ship had 
altered its log to conceal that it had sailed near to Saigon, rendezvoused with Vietnamese 
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officials, and welcomed the refugees aboard.  To secure their place on the ships, each 
potential refugee had to pay 12 taels of gold. The majority of the refugees were Hoa, 
ethnic Chinese who were the merchants that had stayed behind in South Vietnam after it 
was conquered.  When the Provisional Revolutionary Government was pushed aside by 
the North and Vietnam was reunited in 1976, the Hoa merchants were allowed to retain 
their businesses.  However, as time passed the Communists began cracking down on their 
activities.  This repression, combined with the growing tensions between Vietnam and 
Communist China, induced the Hoa to begin fleeing.  Seeking to profit from this purge, 
the government of Vietnam charged this now persecuted minority an exit fee.  This 
method had several advantages in that it provided currency to the government which was 
in great need of money after 30 years of war, demonstrated the government’s 
commitment to its Communist values, and allowed the Vietnamese to rid their newly 
unified country of a potentially counterrevolutionary element.  This method of purchasing 
permission to leave was a common tactic in the later phases of the Cold War.  A few 
years after this, East Germany set a going rate for those that wished to emigrate that it 
knew West Germany would pay in order to reunite families.  This payment injected much 
needed hard currency into the East German economy as borrowing costs grew during the 
1980s.73  The Soviet Union’s contemporaneous exit tax on Jews attempting to leave, 
ostensibly as repayment for their education, served much the same purpose.74 
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 As the refugees revealed the truth about their voyage when the ship entered the 
harbor, the Far East Economic Review published an article entitled “New Vietnam 
Profits from Human Traffic” that described the voyage of the Huey Fong.  This article 
was a revelation about the nature of the plight of the refugees and the depravity of the 
crew, and paved the way for the prosecution of the ship’s crew and some of their con-
conspirators under the new laws passed in the wake of the Huey Fong’s arrival.75   
The trial of the ship’s master, six members of the ship’s crew, and three 
businessmen with ties to the crew and Vietnam who had attempted to arrange for the 
ship’s arrival, along with one of those businessmen’s sons took five weeks.76  The report 
from the trial revealed a few moments of dark humor, but mostly the story was grim.  
Using evidence from the ship’s log and testimony of some of the conspirators, including 
a shadowy businessman nicknamed “Kwok the Dwarf” who had a family in Singapore 
and a wife in Hong Kong, the Crown presented damning case of greed, conspiracy, and 
duplicity.   
With the growing tensions with China in the fall of 1978, Vietnamese officials 
switched from policy of encouraging the Hoa to leave illegally to a plan to profit from 
their departure.  The motto was “you Chinese should rescue your own Chinese people.”   
The motive for the series of crimes was as “a lust for gold”.  Through a network of 
shadowy contacts, the Vietnamese contacted smugglers in Hong Kong, Taipei, and 
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Bangkok to help them arrange the way to smuggle the troublesome merchants out to sea.   
The senior Vietnamese official behind the scheme had been a “Viet-Cong paymaster” 
prior to 1975.  The negotiations went on for several weeks as each side sought to make 
the maximum amount of money possible.  The rate the Vietnamese charged to escape 
was 12 taels of gold per passenger, with 10 taels going to the government and 2 taels 
going to the networks of smugglers.  One tael of gold was worth approximately £100, and 
the crew of the Huey Fong ended up with 3,273 taels of gold on board when the ship was 
seized.  Some of the most riveting parts of the trial were the descriptions of the 
Vietnamese officials in the newly named Ho Chi Minh City sitting in a room silently 
weighing and counting the massive intake of gold from the soon-to-be refugees.  Those 
refugees were also obliged not just to pay for a chance to escape, but were also compelled 
to sign statements stating that they were “grateful to the government for being so kind” 
and that they had “surrendered [their] property voluntarily”.   The Vietnamese officials 
had lied to the smugglers as well because they claimed that they had arranged for small 
ships to sneak the refugees into Hong Kong.  These small boats, of course, never 
appeared and the crew was forced to remain off Poi Toi Island until the British admitted 
them.   
The Huey Fong rendezvoused with the junks transporting the 3,318 refugees just 
off Ho Chi Minh City after embarking from Bangkok.  A man who the court documents 
described as “Kwok the Dwarf”, one of the conspirators who had been part of connecting 
the North Vietnamese with the smugglers, came aboard the ship in Bangkok and later 
attempted to hide among the refugees.  The Hong Kong authorities discovered his 
presence and identity when the refugees came off the Huey Fong.  Since Kwok’s 
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presence was proof that the Captain had conspired to bring aboard refugees and altered 
his log, the ship’s master claimed during the trial that he had no knowledge of Kwok.  He 
instead claimed that Kwok (whose name appeared in one the cables the ship had sent to 
Vietnam) was “a woman who has slept with me often but whose name I cannot 
remember.” 
At the end of the trial, the crew of the ship as well as the three Hong Kong 
businessmen who arranged for the ship were jailed and the gold they had collected from 
the Vietnamese Communist officials was seized.   While these trials were successful in 
punishing those who had exploited the Vietnamese refugees aboard the Huey Fong, the 
repression inside of Vietnam and the growing tension with China continued the compel 
refugees to take to sea in hopes of escape.  The next ship into Hong Kong’s harbor would 
not provoke a legal crisis, but would force Macelhose and the rest of the local 
government to confront a even more desperate group of people.77   
Skyluck 
While the drama of the Huey Fong trial played out, the next ship to arrive in Hong 
Kong without authorization and loaded with refugees, the Skyluck, was not so lucky.  
Instead of radioing ahead to Hong Kong, the Skyluck simply showed up in harbor on 7 
February 1979.  The ship’s master claimed to have left Singapore on 12 January, 
encountered some sinking fishing boats off Vietnam on 19 and 21 January, and continued 
on to Hong Kong.  The government instantly suspected the master was lying, and the 
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police took charge of the boat and moved it to an isolated part of the harbor. The ship had 
3,000 refugees (2,500 ethnic Chinese and 500 ethnic Vietnamese), which brought the 
total Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong to almost 14,000 people.78  
David Owen responded by sending a message to the British Mission at the UN 
High Commissioner on Refugees in Geneva asking for relief from this burden.  Although 
the British had “[maintained] their traditional humanitarian attitude” toward refugees,  it 
was getting more difficult to do so with the higher and higher costs of the increasing 
number of refugees and less space.79  A day later, the British request to the Philippines to 
take in 1000 of the refugees was rejected as the Philippines was dealing with shiploads of 
refugees, including the Tung An with 1,000 refugees who had recently shown up illegally 
in Manila which was not their ship’s scheduled next port of call.80 
The case against the crew of the Skyluck came together quickly.  The ship was 
originally christened SS Waimate in 1951 after it was built in Leith, Scotland.  The ship 
was flagged out of Panama and registered out of Singapore by 1977 when it was renamed 
Skyluck.  However, the speed the ship was capable of meant that the 10 knots she had 
supposedly done between Singapore and Hong Kong was far less than she was capable 
of.  The voyage took 25 days, a long trip that was “difficult to explain.”81  As the 
authorities in Hong Kong investigated, they determined that the Skyluck had painted the 
name Ky Lu on its side and deposited 606 refugees in the Philippines before it made for 
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Hong Kong.82  The UN High Commissioner, Poul Hartling, commended the British for 
their work, but was concerned that the Philippines were not doing enough.  He was 
pressuring Manila and President Marcos to do more and would be taking a trip to the Far 
East later in February to pressure the governments in the area.83 
Despite this pressure, it was becoming clear both in Hong Kong and in Whitehall 
that although the actions of the ship’s captains in pretending human cargo were refugees 
were now illegal and voided the aspect of international law about allowing a ship to 
proceed to its initial port of call, ships that showed up in Hong Kong could not be pushed 
back out in the sea.  The only way to prevent incidents like this in the future was to get 
early warning of ships and steer them away.84 
The British resupplied the Sky Luck in the same way as the Huey Fong, but the 
refugees started getting restless.  On 12 March, one hundred fifty of the refugees jumped 
over the side and tried to swim to shore.  The British stopped 87, but the rest made it.  
These men were rounded up and taken back to the ship, except those who had to be taken 
to the hospital.85  Conditions on the ship continued to deteriorate.  On 13 June, the 
refugees began refusing food and engaging in a hunger strike.  The refugees were eating 
from the ship’s stores, and tensions on the ship were starting to rise.86   
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On 29 June 1979, the refugees took an even more drastic action.  They cut the 
mooring lines on the ship and let the ship drift.  The refugees forcibly repelled attempts to 
remoor the ship by the harbor police and claimed they would “hang the captain” if the 
authorities tried again.  The ship eventually ran aground and began to break apart in 
rough seas.  Rescue efforts began immediately, and the police took the refugees to the 
Chi Ma Wan Detention Center.87 There was little Macelhose and the other authorities 
could do but remind ship’s masters that they would face prosecution and to ask other 
countries and the UNHCR to do more to take care of the tens of thousands of refugees 
that were continuing to arrive.88 
Conflicts 
This question of resettlement was a difficult one for both the Callaghan and the 
Thatcher governments to come to grips with as the crisis went on.  In Downing Street 
Years, Thatcher wrote that the subject of the Vietnamese boat people came up on her first 
trip overseas as Prime Minister in June 1979 during at a European Council meeting.  A 
few months later, Thatcher brought up the subject of boat people and Britain’s role in 
humanitarian rules at sea at the G7 meeting in Toyko with Soviet Premier Kosygin. 
Thatcher appealed to him to help stop the flow, but Kosygin said that the refugees were 
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all “drug addicts or criminals”. Thatcher’s last mention of the topic spoke of handing off 
the task of dealing with the boat people to the United Nations.89 
The United Nations held a second conference in June 1979 to negotiate an 
international solution.  At the earlier G7 Toyko Conference, Carter announced he would 
“double resettlement numbers”.  Japan responded by increasing aid, and Thatcher agreed 
to take in 10,000 refugees from Hong Kong.90 Once in Britain, a variety of voluntary 
organizations aided the refugees and then those refugees were spread among various 
cities throughout the entire United Kingdom.91 Ultimately, between 1975 and 1990 
Britain settled approximately 18,600 refugees from this area.  The majority were the 
ethnic Chinese that fled to Hong Kong in these years.92  Thatcher was initially reluctant 
to admit any refugees, but the arguments of the Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw and her 
own arguments to the Soviet leadership swayed her judgment.93  
One of the possible schemes the Thatcher government considered to deal with the 
increasing number of refugees in Southeast Asia was to move some of them to the 
Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic.  Like Hong Kong the British only tenuously held 
this outpost, and although Argentina presented a less overwhelming military threat than 
Deng’s China, the Foreign Office had sought a way to rid itself of this problem since at 
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least 1964.94  A small group of Members of Parliament led by Bernard Braine and the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Attempts prevented the Government from 
reaching an understanding with Argentina under the auspices of UNGA Resolution 2065.  
Their rallying cry had been that any agreement must have the consent of the Falklanders.  
When Nicholas Ridley, a Thatcherite MP, visited the Falklands in July 1979 to explore 
the idea of an agreement for some type of shared sovereignty with the residents of the 
Falklands, he also raised the question of whether or not they would be willing to accept 
some Vietnamese refugees.   The islanders agreed to take in approximately 10 families, 
but the FCO was worried about the cost of housing them as well as the difficulty in 
finding them jobs.95  The scheme ran into further problems when it became apparent that 
the Government had no money to move any refugee families to the South Atlantic or to 
house them.  The housing alone would cost approximately £20,000 per family.  Attempts 
were made to acquire money from the UNHCR, but since the South Atlantic was not near 
the top of UNHCR’s list of priorities, the amount of money the British realized they 
could received was “tiny”.96  Ridley was disappointed and urged the British 
representatives in Geneva to try to acquire the funds anyway, but the UNHCR was 
reluctant to see any group of refugees smaller than 100 settle in a new place for reasons 
of allowing them to “retain some cultural identity and the possibility of inter-marriage”.97  
There was also the concern that spending so much money on housing for new arrivals 
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that could provoke a backlash from the farmers outside of Stanley.98  Ridley’s trip was 
also marred by the mauling he received in Parliament by both sides of the House upon his 
return due to beliefs of his excessive desire to share sovereignty over the islands with 
Argentina.  The scheme to settle these refugees in the Falkland Islands appeared to have 
been dropped and other events in the Falkland Islands would soon over take it in 
importance in the mind of British officials.   
This aborted scheme is interesting for a number of reasons.  The first is it lays 
bare the fiscal weakness of Britain at the end of the 1970s.  A country that has a hard time 
moving and housing 40 to 50 extra people on a series of small islands far away is one that 
probably cannot rationally afford to retain to those islands in the face of a hostile threat, 
and is also a country that is still committed to some humanitarian principles.  This, more 
than anything else, probably explains the FCO’s desire to rid themselves of the cost of 
defending the Falklands.  One other major revelation of this incident is the exposure of 
the faith in the United Nations system within the British government.  It is difficult to 
imagine, and illustrative of the divide in approaches to the UN that marked the 
contrasting diplomacy of the United States and the British, the State Department going 
cap in hand to Geneva to ask for more funds to settle such as a small number of refugees.  
There is both a dependency and a confidence in the UNHCR that is revealing about both 
the British mindset toward international institutions and their perceived ability to 
undertake any new expenses.  The last mindset revealed by this incident is the attempt by 
the British to balance their humanitarian impulses with their desire to limit immigration 
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into their country.  There was a clear desire to do something for the refugees and it would 
be unacceptable for either the Government authorities or the press back home if these 
men, women, and children were stranded on the ship indefinitely.  However, admitting 
large numbers of cultural and racially dissimilar people into the United Kingdom would 
possibly undermine any Government’s effort to contribute to the international effort to 
solve this problem and cause a domestic backlash.  Any solution, even one that involved 
complicating Britain’s already tense hold on the Falklands, was worth it.   
It wasn’t only the British government that was experiencing a period of weakness 
in the late 1970s.  It was British shipbuilding and commercial shipping as well.  The 
approach of British industry to the refugee problem is illustrative of the overall problem 
British industries faced at the time.  The supertanker Port Hawkesbury picked up 24 
refugees in the South China Sea in January 1980.  Although the tanker was flagged out of 
Bermuda and working for Gulf Oil, she had a British master and a British crew, as did the 
other 30 ships of the line working for the company.  The ship was in drydock with 
refugees still on board and scheduled to sail to the Middle East, so something had to be 
done.99  David Ropner, the President of the General Council of British Shipping (GCBS) 
had to think about how to keep British shippers in business while recognizing that a 
government that was committed to holding masters and crews to the traditional standards 
of humanitarian practice at sea was supervising him.  The GCBS had proposed a tacit 
understanding with HMG the year prior that would allow ships to drop refugees at the 
first port that would accept them with the guarantee that the British government would 
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support the refugees if no one else would.100  However, HMG rejected this as the 
agreement would be discovered very quickly and would impose an unacceptable fiscal 
and immigration burden on the government.101  Carrington was aware of the financial 
burden the shippers were taking on, and the fact that the admittance of some boat people 
in 1979 had failed to produce negative consequences meant the British might be able to 
take more.102  Nott did tell Ropner that the UNHCR would recoup shippers any funds lost 
for taking in refugees, and HMG would help them apply for the funds.103   
Britain’s attempts to deal with the refugee issue sometimes brought it into conflict 
with other countries.  One of the toughest nations in the area to deal with refugees was 
Brunei.  Brunei had a longstanding defense relationship with Britain, and British military 
personnel were seconded to the Royal Brunei Malay Regiment.  The Sultan through his 
advisors cited Singapore as a example of why he was keeping the Chinese out of his 
country.  He would only accept refugees on British flagged ships where the refugees had 
been designated for resettlement in other countries.  
Brunei was also one of the fiercest rejecters of the ethnic Chinese refugees.  The 
British attributed this to the Sultan’s desire to limit the number of ethnic Chinese in his 
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kingdom so they would not become a “controlling majority.”104  The Sultan’s 
government had turned away ships in 1979, and warned the British that any influx of 
refugees would require additional British forces to deal with the problem, mostly likely 
two companies of Gurhkas from Hong Kong.   The situation was made worse by the fact 
the Brunei government used a “requisitioned” Norwegian tug to push the Cun Long, one 
of the ships bringing in refugees, back out into international waters.105  The British 
stressed to the Sultan that he could not use HMG forces to violate the UN Conventions on 
refugees and embarrass the British government.   HMG stressed that Gurkhas, if loaned 
out to Brunei, would only be used for humanitarian relief and not expulsion.  The balance 
the British had to strike was how to preserve the relationship with the Sultan with the 
need to keep British troops from violating their own rules and international law.106  After 
they approached the Brunei Defence Committee, the Brunei government indicated that it 
took the threat of the withdrawal of British troops from their control as seriously 
jeopardizing to the defense relationship and they would not be swayed from their policy 
of exclusion of refugees.107 Britain responded by reminding the Sultan through Peter 
Blaker MP at the FCO of the British government’s commitment to work with the 
UNHCR and promote the international norms at sea.  The Brunei government would not 
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be swayed, and the British admitted that although they could not shape the internal 
policies of the Brunei government, they would work to force Brunei to adhere to 
international norms concerning refugees.108 
Conclusion 
Although the amount of small boat refugees in Southeast Asia was decreasing in 
1980 due to Vietnam’s improving diplomatic relations with its neighbors and a decrease 
in the amount of political repression inside the country, the worldwide refugee problem 
was expanding with the emergence of growing refugee populations in Africa and Central 
Asia.109   The funding for the UNHCR was growing even more strained, and the majority 
of funding came from the United States ($79 million) and Japan ($64 million) with 
Britain coming in third ($13.6 million).110  In all of 1979, the British had resettled 5,000 
refugees from Southeast Asia in Britain in a move designed mostly to relieve the pressure 
in Hong Kong.111  In contrast in 1979, the United States took 11,900 of the refugees from 
Hong Kong and were still taking in about 1,000 a month in 1980.  The British had hoped 
for more, and knew that every refugee that they had to care for made their job harder, but 
they could not ask more of the country that was already doing more than any other to take 
in additional refugees.112  The United States was also helping move refugees not just to 
the United States for family reunification but also to processing centers in the 
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Philippines.113 The United States was carrying the majority of the burden for the refugee 
population, but one of the major factors ensuring the United States Government would 
continue to do so was Britain’s and other countries’ willingness to share the burden.114 
Britain throughout the crisis balanced its commitment to human rights and 
international institutions, its increasingly perilous fiscal position, and its varying 
commitments to allies and outposts without seeming to fail in any of them.  Britain, a 
small island populated by many who believed that theirs was not an island that needed 
immigration, was still able bring desperate refugees to its shores, stay in the bounds of 
international law, and maintain at least working relations with Brunei, Vietnam, the 
UNHCR, and the United States.   For Britain, the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia after 
the Vietnam War and their response to it was neither directly shaped by Cold War 
concerns or by purely humanitarian motives.  Their response was an attempt to balance 
their remaining “imperial” commitments both formal and informal, the fiscal realities of 
the British economy, their relationship with the United States, and their commitment to 
the norms of international law embodied in the United Nations. 
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Chapter 5: From Grimsby to Lusaka: Henry Kissinger, Labour, and Decolonization in 
Southern Africa in 1976 
 
 After the disasters of 1975, Henry Kissinger shifted his efforts to preserve 
southern African free of further Soviet domination.  Rather than oppose Communist 
expansion with mercenaries and military force, Kissinger sought to use diplomacy to 
solve the long-running problem of white minority rule in the breakaway British colony of 
Southern Rhodesia.  Ian Smith’s ruling white supremacist Rhodesian Front Party had 
been holding out against decolonization since Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration 
of independence (UDI) in 1965.   
From the beginning, Britain had eschewed military force as a way of bringing 
Smith and his regime down. Both Wilson’s and Heath’s governments had sought to end 
the standoff with diplomacy.  Despite the international community’s condemnation, 
Rhodesia initially prospered but then fell into an increasingly brutal “Bush War” or 
Second Chimurenga.1  Subsequently, the fall of the Portuguese empire in the mid-1970s 
had created a vacuum of political power in their former colonies.2  Angola turned into a 
three-way battle between armies backed by Cuba, the Soviet Union3, the United States, 
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and China.4  The Ford Administration’s failure in late 1975 to stop the Cuban-backed 
MPLA forces in Angola via CIA-funded proxy forces alongside the intervention of South 
African Army not only illuminated another in a string of failures in American foreign 
policy, but also risked drawing all of southern Africa into the Cold War with the threat of 
further direct Soviet intervention.5  Faced with diplomatic impasses in much of the rest of 
the world and troubles at home, for much of 1976 the unlikely partnership of American 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and British diplomats under the direction of Anthony 
Crosland conducted a joint diplomatic effort to end white minority rule in Rhodesia.  This 
Anglo-American endeavor had at its heart two distinct goals: the containment of Soviet 
influence and the enabling of the exercise of self-determination by an oppressed people.   
Kissinger and Crosland’s pursuit of these twin goals forced them to rely on each 
other and a wide variety of states to set the stage to convince Ian Smith to grant majority 
rule.  Their choice in particular to enlist South Africa in bringing Smith to heel was an 
anathema to many and seemed to contradict both the expressed goals of ending minority 
rule and stopping Soviet expansion. A more influential South Africa would likely be able 
to retain apartheid and subsequently strengthen the anti-imperialist forces that surrounded 
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it.6  The choice for this diplomatic track begs several questions: why would Kissinger 
take this chance in the face of a weakening position in the government at home and why 
would Ford support him?  Also, why would Crosland and Callaghan, both staunch 
socialists, ally themselves with a Republican administration that had shown Africa south 
of Egypt almost no attention as a matter of policy?7    
Three fundamental questions underlie the following analysis: why did Kissinger 
and Crosland undertake their mission as an Anglo-American project, why did it fail, and 
what are the larger implications of both the project and its failure for the Special 
Relationship in the Third World?  Throughout 1976, the limits imposed on the British 
and the United States by the conception and execution of their diplomacy had a large role 
in shaping the outcome.   In the end, how productive could the Anglo-American 
partnership be when it entered into the arena of Third World politics when both powers 
were at the ebb of the influence?  
Southern Rhodesia was a singular story in the history of decolonization.  In the 
midst of shedding its colonies in the 1960s, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia made the 
transition from colonies to the nations of Zambia and Malawi under the Conservative 
Government of Harold Macmillan and his Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod. Southern 
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Rhodesia (later Rhodesia) with its larger European population rejected British 
decolonization and sought to preserve continued minority rule.8  Harold Wilson pledged 
in 1965 not to invade Rhodesia to reverse Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI).  This decision placed Britain in the unique position of earning the 
criticism of the other newly free African states for not using military force to bring about 
regime change.9  Complicating British diplomacy was the insistence of the so-called 
Front Line States such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia on the principle of No 
Independence before Majority Rule.  Rhodesia was not a politically recognized state, and 
despite the trading embargo put in place by the United Nations the United States and its 
car companies bought Rhodesian chromium in order to make high quality steel.  The 
1971 Byrd Amendment legalized this practice by creating an exception to allow the 
United States to import strategically vital raw materials.10  
The primary American diplomat in the effort to end white rule in Rhodesia was 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  Kissinger had begun his career as an academic, but 
by 1976 he was the leading American (and possibly Western) diplomat of his generation.  
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He had surpassed Ambassador Averell Harriman in securing an end to American 
involvement the Vietnam War, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk in bringing about 
meaningful détente with the Soviet Union.  Kissinger had survived the infighting of the 
Nixon White House and the downfall of so many tied to the Watergate break-in and 
subsequent cover up.11   However, while Kissinger was at the peak of his influence in the 
American government, the possibilities for creative diplomacy were rapidly decreasing.   
What possibilities existed for Kissinger’s foreign policy after the Congressional 
veto on the administration’s attempt to stop Cuban adventurism in Angola?  Détente with 
the Soviets had progressed as far as it could and had even become more of a liability in 
an election year.  The Ford administration would even abandon the term in favor of 
“peace through strength”.12  China was racked with turmoil as Mao moved closer to death 
and his potential successors struggled for power.  North Vietnam was triumphant and 
India was truculent, but the rest of Asia to include Indonesia was holding out against 
communism.13  There was at least the appearance of stability in South America and the 
Middle East, and relations with Europe were stable as well.  Africa was the only place 
left, and the Soviets along with the Cubans had chosen to contest it.   
Scholars such as Jussi Hannamaki and Daniel Sargent have remarked that most 
scholars of Kissinger have focused on his “White House Years” and “Years of Upheaval” 
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where as National Security Advisor he wrested control of the execution of foreign policy 
from the State Department.  These were the years of Shuttle diplomacy, secret missions 
to China that were so secret Kissinger’s clothes got left behind in Pakistan, and the 
painfully protracted negotiations with Le Duc To to bring about the end of America’s 
military involvement with the Vietnam War.  Both Sargent and Hannamaki noted that 
Kissinger’s transition to role of Secretary of State marked a more global, less Great 
Power-centric approach to American diplomacy because of either the necessity of 
circumstance or Kissinger’s new responsibility for managing a large bureaucracy in 
contrast to the more nimble National Security Council.  Sargent notes the importance of 
the 1973 OPEC oil embargo in reorienting Kissinger’s thinking toward the importance of 
commodity prices in relations with the Third World,14 while Hannamaki notes 
Kissinger’s transition from primarily “conceptual” thinking on behalf of Nixon while at 
the National Security Council (NSC) to the head of a major Cabinet department with 
bureaucratic responsibilities.15  While Kissinger’s brain trust was relatively unchanged 
from his time in the White House with Winston Lord in charge of the Policy Planning 
Staff as well as Peter Rodman, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Hal Saunders, and Larry Eagleburger at 
various sections at State. Kissinger as Secretary of State strove to reconcile his ability to 
act quickly and in secret with the need to use normal channels.16 
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 British foreign policy in 1976 was in the hands of a genuine intellectual as well.  
The return of Labour in 1974 and the resignation of Harold Wilson in March 1976 had 
brought an unlikely politician to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  Anthony 
Crosland by his own admission had spent the previous decade and a half deeply 
immersed in the running the British welfare state.17  Crosland, like Kissinger, was a 
veteran of the Second World War and a respected author.  However, where Kissinger’s 
books had explored 19th century diplomacy and the impact of nuclear weapons, Crosland 
had sought to transform socialism from a series of efforts at nationalization into a way of 
making life more equitable.18  He was a Gatskillite in an increasingly Bennite Party.  As 
Labour’s foremost revisionist intellectual, he was living proof of Irving Kristol’s jab that 
the only interesting socialist thinkers lived in democratic countries.19 
As Kissinger and the Ford administration recovered from the debacle in Angola, 
the British tried to decode what Kissinger’s next move would be. As it became clear that 
Kissinger would keep his eye on Africa with the intention of limiting the damage from 
the Soviet-Cuban intervention, the British speculated on what the US actions might look 
like based on Kissinger’s public statements.  The FCO Planning Staff reckoned that US 
policy in Africa would be motivated by the upcoming Presidential primaries, and that the 
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“range of options open to the US administration in 1976 is not a broad one”.20  The 
Foreign Office believed that the United States would not directly intervene (an approach 
that the US had been pursuing outside of Indochina since the articulation of the Nixon 
Doctrine), would attempt to hurt the Cuban economy but not Soviet, and use rhetoric to 
deter any further communist aggression.21  However, the planning staff admitted that only 
by conferring with Kissinger could the British understand what was to come.22   
With the Cubans triumphant in Angola and détente in danger of being detached 
from the behavior of the Soviet Union in the Third World –which was the Politburo’s 
goal all along – Kissinger wanted to block further Soviet expansion in Africa.23  To 
accomplish this, he wanted to use the prestige of the United States to end white minority 
rule in Rhodesia.  This achievement, or even the attempt to solve it, might solve 
numerous problems at once.  It would place the United States against one of the most 
reviled “countries” in the world and on the side of the Third World, it would give the 
Democratic Party one less area to criticize Ford in the upcoming election, and would 
check the Soviets while attempting to restore US credibility with the Chinese who had 
                                                           
20 Edmonds to Crowe, FCO Planning Staff, London, 31 March 1976, FCO 45-1876.  
21 Logevall and Preston, “Introduction: The Adventurous Journey of Nixon in the World,” 5–6. 
22 Memo from Derek Thomas to Crowe, Planning Staff, London, 30 March 1976, FCO 45-1876.  
23 Kissinger’s describes his views on the matter in Kissinger, Years of Renewal, chap. 29. The centrality of 
Africa in the Soviet Union’s ideological campaign to spread socialism is in Arkady N. Shevchenko, 
Breaking with Moscow, 1st ed. (Knopf, 1985), 270–271. How tensions in the Third World helped undo the 
gains of détente from the Soviet perspective is in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador 
to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, Random House, 1995), 470–
471.The leading role of the KGB in Soviet involvement in the Third World is in Andrew and Mitrokhin, 
The World Was Going Our Way, 10–24. The effect of Third World conflicts on weakening the commitment 
to détente with the Executive branch is in Robert Michael Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate 




also recently been checked in Angola.24   To end Rhodesian white rule, Kissinger needed 
a diverse set of allies.  He needed the British with their expertise and ultimate legal 
responsibility for their once and future colony.  While Kissinger was planning his visit to 
Africa, he had dinner with Ambassador Ramsbotham and indicated he would like 
Crosland’s advice before proceeding on his journey to Africa.25   He needed the support 
of the Front Line Presidents who were assisting nationalist guerilla groups led by Robert 
Mubage (Zimbabwe African National Union)and Joshua Nkomo (Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union) in their war against the white government of Rhodesia.  He also needed 
the help of the state that perhaps even more than Rhodesia was the great pariah state of 
the age - South Africa.   
The realism in Kissinger’s approach was at its most evident in using South 
Africa’s influence to force Smith’s hand.  The British repeatedly warned Kissinger that 
African leaders might not trust him, and Kissinger did not want to further squander the 
United States’ prestige by failing.  He chose to deal with Rhodesia by detaching it from 
South Africa and by giving South Africa time to end apartheid as it saw fit.   This is the 
justification that Kissinger gave at the time through the New York Times and later on in 
his memoirs.26  Kissinger’s choice was a stark application of realpolitik even if it was in 
the service of democracy and human rights and seemed to go against the tide of growing 
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rejection of South Africa by the international community through sport, trade, and 
culture.27  The Soweto uprising of 1976 had killed “at least dozens and perhaps 
hundreds.”28  The only justification for Kissinger’s choice would be if it worked on 
Rhodesia immediately and on South Africa in a timely manner.   
Diplomacy in Africa in this time was a risky proposition domestically for Ford.  
Any show of weakness or disruption of the flow of chromium might weaken a shaky 
American economy and thereby strengthen the insurgent campaign of Ronald Reagan for 
the Republican nomination, give Soviet backed forces a more prominent place in 
Southern Africa, or further weaken Kissinger’s command of American policy.29   
While Kissinger’s reputation as a foreign policy thinker by 1976 was 
unchallenged, Crosland was relatively new to diplomacy.  He was a socialist with 
international connections, but he had not been involved in the formulation of policy.  
Crosland left two undated notes in his personal papers from his time at the Foreign Office 
that outlined his vision.  Crosland liked to take notes in a spiral-bound notebook, and 
these included not just thoughts on contemporary issues but also written reflections on 
books.  In a note entitled “Objectives of F.P.”, Crosland outlined some of his priorities.  
The list included assuring Britain’s security through NATO, “lessening a conflict in 
Europe between E[east] and W[est]”, “reducing conflict and [the] risk of war in rest of 
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world”, “stopping spread of nuclear weapons”, dealing with the “N[orth] and S[outh] 
economic conflict”, “assist[ing] human rights and liberties in particular”, and 
“strengthen[ing] int[ernational] bodies: EEC, NATO, UN.”30  These were all 
uncontroversial, but they do illuminate the fact Crosland understood the interlocking 
nature of British foreign policy.  Crosland was, despite his earlier reservations, 
committed to working within the Common Market.  He was for human rights –for who 
was not? 31  Crosland supported other international institutions, wanted to pursue détente, 
and hoped to solve the economic difficulties between North and South. Not on the list, 
however, were the two major foreign policy issues closest to his heart.  Crosland once 
remarked to Callaghan that “when… they cut open my heart, on it will be engraved ‘Fish’ 
and ‘Rhodesia’.”32 
While Kissinger had been preoccupied with Angola, the British had experienced 
another round of failed talks with Ian Smith.  Callaghan, still Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs despite Harold Wilson’s recent announcement of his 
resignation, updated the Commons on the failure.33  Smith had been proposing a series of 
negotiations to visiting British diplomats but had made absolutely no concessions about 
granting majority rule.  Callaghan felt that British diplomacy had hit a dead end, and it 
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was time to enunciate principles for any further diplomacy.  He discussed this plan 
socially with the Queen, and then more formally within the Foreign Office before 
presenting it to Parliament in March.34  Callaghan used the session to establish the 
principles that would guide the diplomacy for the next year.   
Members of the Labour Party were tired of the last decade of fruitless 
negotiations with Smith.  Smith had maintained that white supremacy in Rhodesia would 
endure forever, and the 1000 year leases the European population signed as they came 
into the country in the 1950s and 1960s meant that a good portion of Smith’s Rhodesian 
Front (RF) party agreed with this philosophy.  Smith’s position, however, was not as 
strong as his rhetoric suggested.  The Cuban-backed success of the MPLA in Angola had 
elevated the threat to Rhodesia and was expanding the violence of the Cold War in the 
Third World directly into southern Africa.  If the United States could not defeat the North 
Vietnamese, would not fight the MPLA, and did not want to risk détente, what possible 
ally could Rhodesia have?35   
Callaghan laid out four principles that would define Britain’s approach to 
diplomacy with Smith.  The first was that Smith had to accept the principle of majority 
rule.  The second was that the transition from the white minority government to majority 
rule would take place within two years.  The third was the principle of no independence 
before majority rule.  The fourth was that Smith or any other Rhodesian leader could not 
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cause an excessive delay in the negotiations.   Once these conditions were met, Britain 
would work to establish a new constitution that would include both Europeans and 
Africans in a new state that would be supported financially and diplomatically by Britain.  
Britain’s goals were to service “African aspirations” and assuage “European fears” while 
establishing a constitution that would serve the population and end the violence that was 
affecting not just Rhodesia’s white population but was pulling in more and more of the 
population of southern Africa.36 
Both Reginald Maudling for the Tories and David Steel for the Liberals worried 
about the consequences of the resumption of legal control.  Callaghan assured Labour 
members that he would not tolerate Smith’s continued delays and he would work with the 
Front Line Presidents to keep Cuban influence from expanding,   Callaghan assured Evan 
Luard that the Commonwealth and the EEC would be brought to bear to pressure 
Rhodesia, but that until these conditions could be met or the dynamics of the situation 
changed there was very little the British could do.  Callaghan had come to regard Smith 
as unreliable and that “his suppleness is such that one is never quite sure when one has 
grasped him and when he is out of one's reach again.”37 
Callaghan also drafted a long letter to Kissinger on 15 March explaining Britain’s 
views on Southern Africa.  Kissinger personally supported Callaghan’s bid to be Prime 
Minister, but could not say so openly.38  Callaghan was slightly more optimistic on the 
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situation in Angola than Kissinger, and he felt that the Cuban and Soviet influence would 
be limited to Angola in spite of their military victory.  Callaghan did worry that the 
Communist appearance of being on the side of the Africans made it seem in fact that the 
US allied with the minority regimes against African aspirations.  Callaghan called for the 
US and Britain to “pre-empt” the Soviets.  To shape the situation in Rhodesia, continued 
British aid to Mozambique would help the channel the government’s support of guerilla 
violence toward negotiations.  In addition, if President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania could 
be convinced of the rightness of Callaghan’s principles, he would be a formidable aid in 
bringing about majority rule.  Lastly, Callaghan warned that Smith was “slippery as ever” 
and that he would “play the Russia card.”  Callaghan also believed in spite of the 
American alliance and Labour’s well known antipathy toward white Rhodesia that Smith 
thought the US would come to his aid.  Callaghan ended his missive with the note that 
Kissinger should “take comfort”.39  Kissinger replied that he was broadly in agreement 
with Callaghan’s points, but did not want to be seen taking action on Rhodesia as part of 
Cuban “blackmail”.40   Kissinger clearly valued Callaghan and the British Foreign 
Office’s advice, and wanted to meet with them personally prior to his trip.  To do so, 
however, he had to change his usual itinerary.   
The first meeting between Crosland and Kissinger took place far from London.  
Crosland was in his constituency of Grimsby in North Lincolnshire for the weekend, and 
Kissinger’s flight diverted from Heathrow to the RAF base at Waddington.   The two 
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men covered a great deal of ground in their first meeting.41  The fundamental diplomatic 
issue for Kissinger was how to keep Cubans and Soviets from getting any further support 
and influence in Africa while not aligning the United States with Smith and the 
Rhodesian whites.  Kissinger wanted the advice of Crosland and the Foreign Office on 
how to best work with and along side African leaders.  Antony Duff of the FCO warned 
Kissinger that Nyerere would be suspicious of American intentions, and Crosland warned 
him to make sure concerns about Southern Africa rather than a global struggle against 
communism were the center of Kissinger’s efforts. Kissinger replied the point of his 
efforts was to prevent Southern Africa from being an area of conflict.  Africa, to 
Kissinger, was not worth the fight with the Soviets that would occur if it did become a 
Cold War battleground.  To win the trust of the Africans, the US had endorsed 
Callaghan’s principles as a way of “committing itself as a principle of policy to a greater 
respect for human equality”.42 
There were still the white Rhodesians to consider.  The announcement that 
Kissinger was headed to Africa to declare the United States for majority rule achieved 
through encouraging diplomacy by the Front Line States and that the US policy toward 
white minority rule would be “unrelenting opposition” did real damage to Ford’s 
campaign to retain the Republican nomination.  Ford even more so than Kissinger viewed 
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this choice as “doing the right thing” and the best way of “[heading] off a race war.”43 
Duff warned Kissinger that the United States’ actions in Angola made the Rhodesians 
believe that the US would save them from the Cubans, but Kissinger replied that his 
Lusaka speech would make it clear to the Rhodesians that the United States was against 
minority rule and that the whites needed to stay in their new country. 
Kissinger was also looking to the British to give him specific guidance in how to 
deal with President Nyerere of Tanzania.  Kissinger’s State Department staff, particularly 
his Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Schaufele, understood that 
Nyerere was primus inter pares in southern Africa.44  Schaufele was a Yale educated 
Foreign Service Officer who had served in Congo when it gained independence in 
1960.45 If Kissinger could persuade him that the United States was committed to majority 
rule, then President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and the guerillas would be more likely to 
agree to support the coming Anglo-American initiative.46  Duff stated that Nyerere would 
be suspicious of Kissinger and the Americans.  Kissinger wanted to stress to the African 
leaders the Soviets would be worse imperialists than the British.  The Egyptians had 
kicked out the Soviets, but it had been a difficult process.  Michael Palliser of the FCO 
pointed out most Africans did not see Cuban involvement in Angola as a Soviet imperial 
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project, but Kissinger related the Soviet involvement in Angola to their involvement in 
Syria where even Assad had to go to the Kremlin as “first in line as beggars”.  The 
British delegation finished their advice to Kissinger by reminding him that the African 
leaders he encountered did not want the Cold War to penetrate any further into Africa.  
American support for majority rule was the surest way of keeping the Communists out.47   
In addition to setting conditions for Kissinger’s diplomatic meetings, Crosland 
also engaged Kissinger about the ongoing Cod War in the North Atlantic and Kissinger 
told Crosland that he “would do his best” to prevent US from selling gunboats to Iceland, 
but admitted that he might not be able to stop the sale.  The meeting was a good start 
between the two men even if Crosland believed it was a “firm promise”.48   
After Kissinger’s visit to Britain, he headed for Africa.  His first stop on the trip 
was Tanzania to see Julius Nyerere.  Nyerere was at the forefront in the Third World of 
using socialist theories to attempt to modernize his country.49  Nyerere was the most 
powerful and secure of the Front Line Presidents, and one of the harshest critics of South 
Africa.  He was a leader in the spirit of Bandung who wished to keep to the spirit of non-
alignment and keep the Cold War out of Africa.  
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Only his aide Peter Rodman accompanied Kissinger into the decisive meeting 
with Nyerere in Dar er Salaam.50  Kissinger sought to persuade Nyerere that the United 
States wanted to end minority rule in Rhodesia. He admitted that he had not been deeply 
involved with African affairs before this point but wanted to improve relations now.51  
Despite their differences, Kissinger and Nyerere quickly established a rapport.  When the 
two men were discussing communicating through their ambassadors, Kissinger claimed 
that Reagan would make a good ambassador, as his experience as an actor meant he 
would read his instructions and not deviate from what he had been told to say.52  
Kissinger’s message to Nyerere was the same in this private forum as in public, where he 
stressed the same points and Kissinger used his openness and willingness to explain what 
the United States was trying to do to earn the support of Nyerere.53   Kissinger 
understood that Nyerere was utterly committed to non-alignment, but the US’s need to 
keep communists out and Tanzania’s leadership in southern Africa could function 
together profitably.  Nyerere at the height of his power and influence concurred.  
Negotiation and diplomacy would work in concert with the guerilla war to bring about 
what all parts (with the exception of Smith and at the time the South Africans) wanted – a 
negotiated solution that would quickly bring about majority rule.54 
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The details of the event showed two powerful statesmen at the top of their game.  
Nyerere forbade a planned TANU protest, in contrast to Sir Alec Douglas-Home’s visit 
the year prior where a protest got out of hand.  Despite the avowed socialist nature of the 
Tanzanian government, Kissinger attended “Tanzanian Union Day” which was a 
“trooping the colors” style event.  The Tanzanian soldiers had been taught to goose-step 
by the East Germans, but their training had not accounted for the sandals the soldiers 
would wear resulting in some lost footgear.  Nyerere also introduced Kissinger to his 
mother and some members of his tribe at his home.55  To the British, Nyerere liked 
playing up his image as a revolutionary socialist abroad but in domestic policy he was a 
pragmatic man.  Nyerere shocked the younger Marxists of Tanzania by giving “arch-
imperialist” Kissinger treatment as a “guest of honor”. Only Nyerere’s stature made such 
a gesture possible.56 
Kissinger repeated his successful high-level diplomacy in Tanzania in Zambia.  
For the British, Kissinger had as in Zambia achieved “greater success than anyone on 
either side expected”.  They noted Kissinger had demonstrated “personal charm and 
skillful diplomacy”.  Kaunda, like Nyerere and the British, was suspicious of Smith’s 
intentions but understood Kissinger’s approach to the situation.57 Kaunda told Kissinger 
he supported Callaghan’s principles, but also wanted British military intervention to help 
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speed the process along.  In contrast to a 1975 visit to the White House where he had 
attacked American foreign policy, Kaunda echoed Kissinger and Callaghan’s points and 
spoke out against racialism.58  Kaunda and other Zambians politicians were still 
distrustful of US policy, but were glad Kissinger had finally taken an interest in achieving 
majority rule.59  Kissinger viewed Kaunda as more reasonable and western-oriented than 
Nyerere, but like his fellow Front Line President Kaunda had no desire to be a pawn of 
the West.  He, like Kissinger, ultimately backed Nkomo’s bid for power as it would likely 
lead to a more stable border with Zimbabwe.60  In their meeting, Kissinger stressed to 
Kaunda that his commitment to the creation of Zimbabwe was serious, but he would use 
South Africa to pressure Smith to make the necessary concessions.   
With the ground laid with the Front Line Presidents including Jomo Kenyatta of 
Kenya, Kissinger could take advantage of Kaunda’s hospitality for a speech where he 
would begin his rhetorical offensive designed to end minority rule in Rhodesia as a 
preventative measure against Cuban aggression.  Winston Lord wrote Kissinger’s speech 
as part of the Policy Planning Staff with the assistance of the African bureau within the 
State Department.  The Africa bureau stressed a commitment to human rights, while Lord 
pushed the geopolitical angle that he knew Kissinger would respond to better.61  
Kissinger’s speech, conceived to quarantine Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola, was 
also a pivotal moment in American foreign relations and Kissinger’s own diplomacy.  It 
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established a clear commitment by the United States to eventual majority rule in all of 
southern Africa. Paired with his speeches on the need for greater economic cooperation 
with the Third World and the importance of morality in US foreign policy the year prior, 
Kissinger proved that the Third World and a growing concern for human rights were also 
elements of his foreign policy in 1976.62  
Kissinger reported to Congress after his visit to Africa.  He praised Congress’ 
recent increased support for both Africa and UNCTAD.  He stressed that President Ford 
had approved the text of the Lusaka speech and was committed to the repeal of the Byrd 
Amendment.63  Kissinger repeated the US pledge about majority rule to a CENTO 
meeting as well later that month.64 
As Kissinger updated Congress, Crosland took questions in the House about the 
initiative.65  Crosland reiterated Labour’s commitment not to negotiate with Smith until 
he agreed to the preconditions outlined by Callaghan in March while supporting 
Kissinger’s new diplomatic efforts.  Kissinger’s speech signaled that there was no escape 
for Smith.  Crosland’s confidence in Kissinger was an odd counterpoint to the disasters   
that had befallen American foreign policy and Kissinger personally over the past year.  
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Vietnam and Angola had fallen, he had lost his position as the National Security Advisor 
and had come close to resigning, but his actions had committed the United States to 
majority rule and brought the fall of Smith much closer to the realm of the possible.   
Several of the more imperialist Tories including Winston Churchill (the former Prime 
Minister’s grandson) used Crosland’s statement as a way of criticizing Labour’s decision 
to send financial aid to Mozambique which was sponsoring guerillas fighting the Smith 
regime, but Crosland replied that a refusal to back the Government’s standards and 
Kissinger’s efforts would condemn the entire region to cycles of even greater violence.  
The Tories objected, but there was little they could do.  Kissinger’s speech in Lusaka had 
set him on a course against Smith and with Crosland.  
As Crosland took questions on Kissinger and his diplomacy, some latent anti-
Americanism began to surface.  Jon Biggs-Davison claimed that this Anglo-American 
initiative had “[undermined] every moderate person in Rhodesia and [given] comfort to 
Soviet imperialism in Southern Africa.” 66 Julian Amery compared Kissinger in the 
Africa to Dulles and Eisenhower in the Middle East and their weakening of the British 
position in the post-Suez era.67  Crosland defended Kissinger and compared his speech in 
Lusaka to Macmillan’s “Winds of Change” speech.   
 Peter Morrison mocked Crosland for his early morning meeting with Kissinger at 
an obscure RAF base.68  Morrison’s jab in particular gave lie to the situation.  It was 
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Crosland’s insistence and not Kissinger’s pique that had set the place of their meeting.  If 
it were not for Crosland’s commitment to his corner of Lincolnshire, Kissinger might 
never have had the opportunity to ask “Where is Grimsby?”  The criticism was not 
limited to the Tories.  Frank Allaun, the Labour idealist who would emerge as the 
Chairman of the National Executive Committee in 1978, asked Crosland if he could ask 
Kissinger to “keep the CIA out of Britain.”69 
However, there were still some problems going forward for the partnership.  The 
primary problem was that there was no real plan.  When Christopher Brocklebank-
Fowler, then a Tory who would later defect to the Social Democrats, asked Crosland to 
provide more details on how exactly the British would guarantee the security of the 
people of Rhodesia during the transition, Crosland could not provide an answer.  With 
Labour’s end in mind, Kissinger’s staff and the British began their planning.70 
Time, it seemed to the planners on Kissinger’s staff and in the Rhodesia 
Department of the FCO, was on the side of the Soviet Union and its allies such as Cuba.   
If a “speedy resolution” were to take place, it would forestall the extreme left in the 
national liberation movements from gaining power, would protect the countries of 
Southern Africa –both white and black – from Soviet influence, and “time would be 
gained” for South Africa to establish economic ties with its neighbors and be shown a 
way that could lead to the solution of its “more intransigent racial problems.”71  Kissinger 
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saw not only the threat to Southern Africa in the renewed Communist offensive, but also 
the possibility of an emboldened Cuba ready to strike out at Latin America.72   
As Kissinger prepared for his meeting with South African Prime Minister 
Johannes Vorster in Germany in June, Schaufele met with Rowlands and discussed how 
to proceed.  The British delegation stressed that any South African support might help 
end white rule in Rhodesia, either by pressuring Smith to reverse his position or by 
forcing the white Rhodesians who were dissatisfied with the embargo and the war to 
replace Smith.  The United States would have to take the lead on this issue, however, due 
to distrust of Vorster among the Front Line States.  Schaufele also pointed out that 
Kissinger had stated in testimony before the Senate the day prior that the US would try to 
solve the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia to buy South Africa time “to put her own 
house in order.”73  Schaufele also hinted that the United States’ influence with both the 
insurgents and Smith’s government ultimately might be a matter of how much money the 
US was willing to spend to ensure the whites stayed or that business would come to 
invest.74 The British were equally sensitive to the fiscal realities of the situation. The 
British wanted as much western unity as they could get in creating Zimbabwe, if for no 
other reason it would spread the burden of any financial compensation for the white 
minority.75    
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Kissinger’s penchant for secrecy was on display during his meeting with Prime 
Minister Johannes Vorster of South Africa in Germany in June.  Popular revulsion 
against the South African apartheid government forced the meeting between Kissinger 
and Vorster to take place in Bavaria rather than the “Social Democrat bastion” of 
Hamburg.  To compound this isolation, the two groups were in both hotels nearly 50 
kilometers apart which protestors surrounded.76  In his meetings, Kissinger cut the 
American diplomats in Germany out of the talks so the British diplomats in Germany had 
to rely on reports from London passed through Schaufele for reports about the 
conference.77 
Kissinger and Vorster held several private meetings before announcing the results 
of their talks in front of their collected staffs on 24 June.  Kissinger had leaned hard on 
Vorster while offering what amounted to a bargain for time: action in persuading Smith 
to give up white power in Rhodesia would give South Africa longer to negotiate an 
“outcome acceptable to all parties.”  Vorster countered with the idea of “self-
determination” among multiple “homelands” for each race.  Kissinger told him flatly this 
would “never be accepted.”  Vorster and his advisors began to bow to Kissinger’s logic, 
and looked to Nkomo as the best option they could hope to get for Zimbabwe’s eventual 
leader.78  Regarding the deal, Kissinger was more concerned about getting an agreement 
with South Africa than needing Smith to sign it because Smith might very well not be a 
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part of the next government.  For his part, Vorster found it easier to meet with the British 
as well as African leaders if it looked as if Kissinger was pushing him to do so.79 
After the conference with Vorster, Kissinger stopped in London to meet with 
Callaghan and Crosland.  In contrast to Germany, Ambassador Anne Armstrong was 
present for the meeting.  Armstrong had replaced liberal Republican Elliot Richardson 
who had served for only a short time before moving to another Cabinet post.80  Later that 
summer, Ford would seriously consider Armstrong as his pick for a replacement running 
mate for Nelson Rockefeller before deciding on Bob Dole.  Ford admitted later he should 
have taken the chance on nominating the diplomat who would have been the first female 
Vice Presidential nominee from a major party. 81 
  At this point, it was possible that all the parties working in parallel were moving 
toward a mutually beneficial solution.  Kissinger relayed to Callaghan and Crosland that 
he had sold Vorster on giving South Africa “breathing space” by solving the problem of 
Rhodesia rapidly instead of South African taking Rhodesia and Namibia as a “colonial 
outpost.” Vorster would not accept a purely British proposal for ending white rule, but 
would only take an international one. The Front Line States would prefer the Americans 
in the lead, while Kissinger himself believed the reassertion of British colonial control 
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might be the best way of assisting in a peaceful transition.  Callaghan and Crosland both 
wanted to make sure the whites stayed, if for nothing else to ensure Rhodesia could still 
feed its neighbors.  Kissinger sought to influence events in the area indirectly, by winning 
Nyerere’s and Kaunda’s support to deal with Nkomo and by getting Vorster to put Smith 
in a place where the whites would be forced to agree to a timeline for majority rule.  
Rowlands agreed it might be possible for the British to restore their colonial government, 
but only with Smith gone and a “legal framework” in place that would place Nkomo in 
power as Prime Minister with the full support of the Front Line States.82  In a subsequent 
meeting, German Social Democratic Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt told Callaghan that 
the West German government was excited about Kissinger’s new diplomatic focus on 
Southern Africa, but were opposed to sending British troops which would lead to 
“another Vietnam” and deflected any discussion of compensation for white Rhodesians.83 
The only one excluded from this circle of mutual congratulation was Smith 
himself. Meanwhile, Vorster was pushing Smith to at least accept racial parity in 
Parliament, while Smith thought Nkomo would be the best leader Zimbabwe could hope 
for.  Vorster used the specter of Carter’s victory to urge Smith to make some concession 
to give Kissinger and Ford an advantage in the upcoming election. Vorster also echoed 
Kissinger’s point that for all the fear of communism in the West no one would save 
Rhodesia from the Soviets and the Cubans without proof that Smith in some way was 
committed to majority rule in the future.  Smith countered Vorster was asking him to sign 
his own “death warrant” and attitudes within the RF were hardening, but privately 
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accepted the inevitability of eventual majority rule. He further stated it must be 
“evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary”.84 
Kissinger (through Schaufele, among others) kept the British informed as he 
prepared to head back to Africa, balancing South African distrust of the British, British 
distrust of Smith, Kissinger’s own distrust of his ambassadors, and the quest to line up 
countries that could provide financial backing for Zimbabwe.  Schaufele also reminded 
the British of the experience of Portugal and France who each had to invest to help their 
former white colonists integrate back into society.85   
On 8 July, the American and British principles met at the State Department.  
There were five major areas where the British were concerned: 1) putting a new 
government in place, 2) getting Nkomo into power without it appearing he owed anything 
to the west, 3) finding money for compensation to the whites, 4) how to restore any 
British government in the interim period, and 5) the political problem of “buying off a 
number of Europeans who have been in rebellion against the Crown.”86   
Duff, being pessimistic and realistic in equal shares, reminded the group that any 
agreement with Smith would be suspect.  There was disagreement at this point about how 
complete the plan could be for a post-Smith transition, with Kissinger warning not to get 
too far ahead on the planning, and Crosland needing a document that could gain rapid 
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approval from Prime Minister Callaghan.  The proposed total compensation for the 
whites was to be between £1.3 and £1.5 billion paid out over 25 years.87   
When the reasons for the incentives came up in the planning process, Kissinger 
was dismissive of the mandarins in the Foreign Office who brought up the domestic 
British political cost for Labour of seeming to pay off racist rebels against the Crown.  To 
his staff, Kissinger had articulated four reasons such payments would be necessary: 
domestic political opinion in the United States, domestic political opinion in South 
Africa, domestic political opinion in Britain, and improving the economy of Zimbabwe.  
Kissinger knew of the British desire to solve this problem through negotiation, and he 
and his team had to acknowledge the dual necessity for the British of bringing Smith to 
heel without the threat of arms and of not allowing the butchering or penury of 
Rhodesia’s European settlers.  Kissinger and the mandarins of the Foreign Office held 
very different views on South Africa, and as Kissinger prepared to leave in September he 
was concerned that too much pressure on South Africa might inhibit his ability to put 
indirect pressure on Smith.  To his staff, Kissinger singled out Duff and Rowlands by 
name as the ones who might undercut him.88 
After this cross-Atlantic consultation, Schaufele returned to Africa to update the 
Front Line Presidents on the course of Anglo-American planning.  Nyerere was still 
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skeptical of Kissinger’s initiative, and believed Kissinger might be underestimating 
Smith and in danger of using South Africa as a partner rather than pushing them towards 
ending apartheid.  There was also the danger that a change in government in Britain 
might mean a lack of support for this initiative.  Nyerere gently mocked Callaghan that 
Tanzania enjoyed a higher level of political stability than Britain.89  Schaufele made clear 
that black African support for Kissinger’s diplomacy would be key in securing domestic 
American support.  Schaufele also pressed Nyerere and Kaunda to acknowledge that the 
British should “play an active role”.  Nyerere and Kaunda responded positively to the 
Anglo-American plan, with General Joseph Mobutu of Zaire being told less but still 
responding in a supportive fashion.  Schauefele felt he walked away with a “general 
mandate” from the Front Line Presidents for the plan, and a shared agreement that the 
Presidents regarded the Anglo-American initiative as a way of limiting superpower 
involvement in Africa.90   
Callaghan as well as Kissinger felt the need to keep their other allies in the loop.  
After Schaufele’s trip in July, Callaghan informally but directly relayed the contents of 
the talks to French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Schmidt.91  Soon after, when 
Ford was hosting Schmidt in the United States, Kissinger stressed to British Ambassador 
Peter Ramsbotham the need for speed and secrecy.  Ramsbotham indicated that he would 
prefer a more public approach, but he appreciated the need for speed.  Ramsbotham also 
stressed that the plan “had not received the formal endorsement of ministers” and that the 
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constitutional issues relating to reassuming colonial control would have “weighty 
implications.”92  
Part of Kissinger’s diplomatic offensive in the summer of 1976 included a visit to 
Africa by his Ambassador to the United Nations William Scranton. Scranton toured 
southern Africa reinforcing Kissinger’s message from Lusaka about support for African 
economies and the United States’ wish to end white minority rule in Rhodesia.  Scranton 
had a far warmer reputation at the United Nations than his predecessor (See chapter 3), 
but even he found he had to defend Israel abroad from comparisons to South Africa.  
African leaders Scranton met on his trip expressed serious reservations that the United 
States could change its policies in the face of a clearly beneficial economic relationship 
between Rhodesia and American car companies.  Scranton tried to assure the leaders he 
met that Kissinger’s plan was preferable to war, but many of the leaders he met were 
skeptical anything short of an “all-out guerilla” struggle could liberate Rhodesia from 
Smith and his cronies.93 Later that year, when Angola’s membership came up for a vote 
in the Security Council Scranton was the one who abstained for the United States.  
Although he used the opportunity to criticize the Cuban forces and their “bloody” 
activities, he also stressed the United States’ “support for African solutions to African 
problems.”94 
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Despite Kissinger and Crosland’s best efforts to keep the details of their 
diplomacy quiet, varying accounts of their missions began to leak out.  Nyerere gave an 
interview to the Observer that claimed that the United States wanted to use the African 
states to get Britain to intervene militarily against Smith.  Nyerere, according to the 
article, would only support such a plan if it were to “immediately” impose a ruling triad 
of Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Mugabe.  The British and Kissinger denied to each other that 
this was the plan, and the reporter admitted he might have misunderstood Nyerere.95 
In early August, Kissinger accompanied by Rogers, Schaufele, Armstrong, and 
Rodman again met with Callaghan, Rowlands, Duff, Ramsbotham, and McNally.  
Callaghan voiced his support for Kissinger’s efforts, but offered another warning about 
Smith.  Kissinger echoed the need for teamwork, but made it clear the Front Line States 
had to be involved in the process.  A defined transition period would aid in making any 
plan acceptable to the African states, as would the exclusion of South Africa from the 
formulation of policy.  The group agreed that the British should draft a more detailed 
economic and political plan for the transition, while quiet approaches to South Africa and 
the Front Line States should continue.96   
The major document the Americans and British formulated to shape the political 
and economic transition of Rhodesia back into a colony with a transitional government 
had three major annexes.  The one that would emerge as a rift as well as a major Anglo-
American misunderstanding as well as earn the allies the ire of Smith was Annex C.  
Annex C was the portion of the plan the British developed within the Foreign Office to 
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create a two-tiered transitional government.   There would be some manner of British 
authority reasserted, an Executive Council, and a Legislative Council.  The African-
controlled Parliament would fill the Legislative Council.  The Executive Council would 
control the security services and have representatives of both races, but would have a 
white majority.  The issue that would emerge during the fall’s negotiations was rooted in 
Smith’s desire to see the agreement that the British constructed and Kissinger presented 
him (but not to the Front Line Presidents, who might see the document as too pro-white) 
as the end, rather than a basis for negotiation.  There would also be a major issue in that 
Kissinger was using a document as the basis for negotiation, seemingly backed by the 
British, that in fact was not the official policy of their government.  Although developed 
by the Foreign office, the full Cabinet had never approved the document.  This distinction 
would haunt the coalition in the fall.97 
On 4 September, the American and British principles met in London to determine 
what the next steps would be.  Ted Rowlands had just come back from Africa, and he 
reported Nkomo’s role in the guerilla war was “declining” in favor of Mugabe, and this 
shift in the balance of influence might put the chances of negotiation at risk.  Rowlands 
had also met with Nyerere, who stressed he wanted Britain to have a “diplomatic” but not 
“colonial” role, and did not want an “international” struggle. Nyerere was weary of neo-
colonialism (to which Kissinger added as a likely ironic aside, “he’s right”), and 
Rowlands only alluded to an economic package to assist in the transition.  The consensus 
among the Front Line States, according to Rowlands, was that no one had any idea how 
to unify the opposition, but everyone seemed to think Smith would have to go before a 
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new white government that would negotiate with the rebels could come to power. A near 
simultaneous meeting of the African heads of state in Dar es Salaam produced no unity 
either on how to proceed.  Nyerere did not want to be left with a “hot baby” if 
negotiations failed.  Failure to stop the fighting would mean a civil war, and that meant 
another possible Angola.  In addition, both Kissinger and Crosland expressed frustration 
with domestic public opinion that ran from hostile to indifferent to their cause.  The two 
men described the challenges of conducting the foreign policy in a democracy thusly: 
KISSINGER: After my Lusaka speech, I received 1800 
letters, 23 of which supported it.  After months of public 
education, I have received 120 letters of which 36 support 
it.  So I have moved from 99% against to 66% against. 
CROSLAND: My experience is the same.  My 
constituency in Grimsby is restrained by illiteracy, and 
most of the mail concerns whether I wear white tie with the 
Queen. 
Kissinger had to break Smith’s will for the peace process to go forward.  The need 
to oppose Smith and keep the opposition somewhat united meant that no Front Line 
President could compromise first unless a settlement was at hand, and Callaghan and 
Crosland insisted the British would not go forward without African support.  The key 
remained separating Vorster from Smith.  Kissinger articulated that he would sell Vorster 
on the guarantees that would be part of the transition in giving the whites some say in the 
security forces and the executive, and then use this South African willingness to push 
Smith to bring the Front Line States into agreement.  Kissinger was honest with the 
British and admitted a diplomatic success in bringing about majority rule would only help 
Ford break even, for no white liberal or black would vote for him in the coming election.  
Failure however would be ugly, for in Kissinger’s calculation nothing could be done for 
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at least six months due to change of administrations. One of the British diplomats 
reckoned that an escalation of the guerilla campaign would include “kidnapping and 
killing white women”.  The group agreed that while Kissinger talked to Vorster, 
Schaufele would talk to Front Line Presidents who would attempt to keep them from 
presenting any new initiatives that might disrupt the American efforts.98 
After the meeting with the British, Kissinger reengaged with South Africa.  He 
stressed American weakness in the region and how the US “[had] no cards” in Africa. 
Vorster received a summary of Britain’s plan for the handover including Annex C 
outlining the projected political apportionment of the internment government.  This 
summary would not be given to the Front Line Presidents, because Kissinger and the 
British felt it might be seen as too rewarding to the settlers.  The outline of the plan was 
to allow a transition period of no more than two years, with the interim government 
having a white-controlled executive and a black-controlled Cabinet from the all-parties 
Parliament.  The formula for the interim government would be “white, black, and 
British”. Vorster wanted to make sure the British nominated someone acceptable to 
oversee the transition as well as supervise the Army, police, and civil service.  Kissinger 
explained the British would sell it by virtue of telling the Africans that they would have 
power eventually.  Vorster replied that he hoped the British would improve the deal to 
make it more acceptable to all the parties , but Kissinger replied that if the British were 
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that skilled in dealing with Africa they would still be ruling.  Kissinger also described his 
distrust of Rowlands in working on the deal as he might trend too pro-African.   
Once the substance of the plan was clear, Kissinger and Vorster moved to the 
specifics of the negotiations.  To prevent an escalation of demands by the Front Line 
states, Smith had to agree rapidly and without “800 escape clauses” and then announce 
the transition plan as his own.  Kissinger was keen to avoid conflict with Africans, for 
conflict between the Africans and Kissinger would bring Kissinger into further conflict 
with the Democrats in Congress who would see this disagreement as further evidence of 
Kissinger’s perfidy.99  During his visit to see Smith, Kissinger wanted his meeting with 
Smith to be secret and did not want to meet black South African leaders on his trip 
because he thought both could complicate the negotiations.  Kissinger reminded Vortser 
that there could be no perception that this was a South African plan and there was no 
“quid pro quo”.   The basis for the negotiation would remain the political and economic 
plan developed by the British .100 
Throughout the meeting, Kissinger was solicitous and polite to Vorster, even  
apologizing for not asking him to bless the food before lunch .  This ability to charm 
almost anyone he came in contact with in the course of his diplomacy was one of 
Kissinger’s major assets as a public and private diplomat.  Ford, parts of the press, 
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foreign leaders, all seemed to be amazed by Kissinger’s talents.  However, the number of 
Kissinger’s enemies had begun to mount.  The messy ending with Moynihan the year 
prior had signaled to Robert Novak of the Washington press corps that Kissinger was 
losing his touch when it came to wining bureaucratic fights.101  Congress was pushing 
back not just against his actions and judgment, but against any idea of secret government 
action undertaken by the Executive branch.  Rumsfeld engineered the loss of his job as 
the National Security Advisor, and the emerging foreign policy voices of 
neoconservatives were reviving the rhetoric of Wilson to challenge the ideas of 
détente.102  Kissinger, despite these challenges, still wielded tremendous power to bring 
to bear against Ian Smith.    
Touring the Front Line States prior to his meeting with Smith, Kissinger joked 
with Nyerere that among right wing South Africans he was a communist, and Nyerere 
joked about Kissinger’s possible attendance at the next non-aligned conference.  For the 
substance of Kissinger’s points, Nyerere had no objection to any scheme that would 
encourage Europeans to stay.   He also showed flexibility on what the British role in 
resuming control of the colony would look like. Nyerere agreed that Smith had to accept 
the idea of a rapid transition to majority rule, and wished Kissinger luck.103 
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In Zambia, Kissinger sold Kaunda on the British plan by presenting it as mostly 
as a collection of Nyerere’s and Callaghan’s ideas.  Kissinger believed that conditions 
had been set and Smith would agree to “majority rule in two years, a provisional 
government which has a black prime minister and a black-dominated cabinet with only a 
few white members”.  He told Kaunda that part of Vorster’s reasoning for pressuring 
Smith was to improve South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa.  Kaunda, as well as 
Nyerere earlier, voiced concerns about the control of the civil and security services by the 
whites and whether this would be a point of contention in the negotiations. 
Kissinger also outlined his actions if Smith failed to agree.  If Smith refused to 
acquiesce to majority rule, Kissinger would go on the offensive against him publicly and 
would use South Africa to impose sanctions. When Kaunda reminded Kissinger the 
fighting would still go on despite these negotiations, Kissinger countered with the fact 
that the US was still trying to end minority rule.  The two tracks, echoing Duff’s analysis 
of how Nyerere and Kissinger would work together, would compliment each other.  
Kaunda was also worried that the United States’ support for this initiative would end if 
Carter won, but Kissinger assured him that the details of the diplomacy were being 
communicated to Jimmy Carter via a domestic backchannel through former Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk (then teaching law at the University of Georgia) and support for the 
initiative would continue regardless of the outcome of the Presidential election.104  
As to the structure of the government, Kissinger deflected Kaunda’s questions 
about who would control the security forces during the transition period by promising 
                                                           




South African sanctions on Rhodesia if Smith tried reasserting white control.  If South 
Africa failed to press him, then Kissinger would “consider sanctions” against South 
Africa.  Kissinger flattered Kaunda by praising the beauty of Victoria Falls and by 
comparing Kaunda’s standing up and applauding after the Lusaka speech to Kissinger’s 
handshake with Chou En Lai.  This was clever for Kissinger, for Kaunda acknowledged 
China was supplying the guerillas with weapons that passed through Zambia.105 
As Kissinger had departed for Africa, there was still some doubt in Washington if 
he would succeed.  Liberals in Congress supposed Kissinger had little chance of averting 
war but Kissinger’s diplomacy was the “least best alternative.”  Democrats had also, in 
the opinion of the British, begun to question why Kissinger ignored Africa until the 
Angola crisis.  The British embassy reported that the Ford administration had little to 
gain or lose domestically from their initiative.  Success would not swing black voters to 
their cause, but failure would not help the administration either.106   
By the time Henry Kissinger found himself in the same room as Ian Smith in 
Pretoria on 19 September, the intransigent Rhodesian leader faced one of the most 
experienced and toughened negotiators in American diplomatic history.  Kissinger had at 
this point bargained with Brezhnev, Mao, Le Duc To, Sadat, Meir, King Hussein, Brandt, 
Haldeman, and Dobrynin.107 He possessed the backing of Rhodesia’s only external ally, 
and brought to bear the damaged albeit still powerful prestige of the United States.  
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Kissinger had consulted the Front Line States and their leaders understood that Kissinger 
and the United States were sincere in this attempt to bring about majority rule.  That 
Kissinger would succeed at least in the short terms appears obvious in retrospect, but all 
other diplomatic attempts to reach an agreement with Smith over majority rule had failed.  
Kissinger even saw Smith’s reputation for truculence as an advantage.  Smith’s previous 
rejections of outside diplomacy meant that his agreement as opposed to Muzorewa’s 
would provide a measure of assurance that African leaders would honor any 
agreement.108 
Kissinger’s multinational preparations paid off.  Seven total hours of negotiation 
spread out over two meetings on 19 September 1976 forced Ian Smith to adopt the 
Anglo-American principles leading to majority rule and the creation of Zimbabwe.  
Kissinger wired back to Scowcroft in Washington that the Rhodesians had agreed to 
majority rule in two years, black representatives in the interim government, a Council of 
State to draft a new constitution, the British Parliament reasserting its authority prior to 
majority, and an end to sanctions when the interim government formed.  Kissinger let 
Washington know he was on his way to see Nyerere and Kaunda to tell them the good 
news.  Kissinger now had momentum, and all the parties except for Smith had an interest 
in getting an interim government stood up as soon as possible.109  
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However, to reach this accord Kissinger left room for ambiguity in his agreement 
with Smith that would haunt future negotiations.  Kissinger left Smith with the 
impression that he could bargain for whites to control the Defense and the Law and Order 
Departments.  Smith took this as a promise, rather than a point for future negotiations.110  
The private reaction from the Front Line Presidents to this development was 
positive.  Kaunda was “speechless” about Kissinger’s results.111  However, what had 
been agreed to was already the cause of some confusion.  Nyerere believed the agreement 
was the basis for a conference while Kaunda believed it to be the structure of the new 
government.  Smith would not go to London, and the British would control the follow-on 
conference once the “teams” of blacks and whites formed to negotiate to avoid drawing 
in the Soviets.  The public statements issued by the Front Line Presidents from Lusaka a 
few days later which condemned the compromises to Smith belied this private praise and 
received wide distribution thanks to their publication in Pravda.112 
In his speech accepting the principle of majority rule, Smith made it clear to the 
whites that Kissinger was working in concert with the British to bring the settlement 
about.  Smith sold his countrymen on the deal as a way of continuing to keep 
communism out of Rhodesia and of ending terrorism.  He stressed that he had agreed to a 
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“package deal” and that the Constitution would be drawn up by Rhodesians, but the 
details of Smith’s address were the same in substance to what Kissinger had described to 
both Nyerere and Kaunda.  Smith ended his speech with a call to hope and to show the 
“great fighting spirit” of the past decade that had “earned great respect from the rest of 
the world”.113  White Rhodesians reacted in a wide variety of ways to Smith’s 
capitulation to the Anglo-American initiative, but there seemed to be a growing 
acceptance of the impending reality of majority rule.114 
However, the matter of Annex C awaited Kissinger back in London.  When the 
story broke about Kissinger’s success, Crosland wrote Kissinger that Annex C was not an 
official British government document, despite the fact the British wrote it and set it out as 
the way forward for negotiations.  Crosland had not gained the support of the Cabinet for 
the document, and now Kissinger had to brief the Cabinet on the negotiations.115   
Ambassador Armstrong was nearly beside herself, and Kissinger was able to calm 
her by inviting her into the Cabinet.116 Discussing the matter, both Kissinger’s team and 
the Cabinet agreed the future course was one of negotiations between Smith and the Front 
Line. Lord Elwyn Jones pointed out that the key difference between Kissinger’s 
diplomacy and the earlier talks on the Tiger and Fearless was the inclusion of the Front 
Line States.  This, in turn, was the result of Kissinger’s rapid shuttling from country to 
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country.  For his part, Kissinger credited Smith’s turn of opinion to the guerillas, 
sanctions, and plummeting morale among the young who did not wish to fight forever.  
Kissinger continued that a speedy resolution of the issue would help assure money from 
Congress to support the settlement no matter who won the election.  Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Healey indicated that the British contribution would be 15 million pounds a 
year for five years.  The group agreed that this diplomacy was still worth pursuing despite 
the risks (Healey seemed particularly concerned about all the ways it could go wrong), 
but all things would definitely get worse if they did nothing.117 Callaghan stated that 
Rhodesia was a “debt of honor” but their present fiscal situation had made them initially 
reluctant to get involved.  However, Kissinger’s achievement in securing an agreement 
from Smith meant they would participate.  The two sides agreed that they would not ask 
the guerillas to stop fighting until the interim government was established, and that the 
Front Line Presidents now had a basis for negotiations.118 
In his public comment on the matter, President Ford stressed that the diplomacy 
was in line with Callaghan’s 22 March statement of principles. He called for an “African 
solution to an African problem”, and reiterated American support for an “Independent 
Zimbabwe”.119 The next day in London, Kissinger reminded the Cabinet that Smith 
would bring up the issues of the two white Cabinet ministers for Defense and Law and 
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Order. Crosland argued the British should stick as closely as possible to the original 
agreement to have a place where all the parties could return to during the negotiations.120  
This initially positive reception, however, started to stall when Smith began to 
back away from the deal. By the end of September, Smith sent a message to Crosland, 
Kissinger, and Vorster indicating he might not be able to hold up his end of the bargain 
because of the influence of Mugabe on the rebels.121  Kissinger urged Smith to stick to 
the agreement as the best way to secure a “moderate solution.”  He let Smith know he 
regarded Angola’s statements on the agreement as not helpful.122   As the British 
reiterated the point that the ultimate structure of the transitional government would be 
determined in Geneva, Smith issued more and more objections to this line of diplomacy 
and referenced the paperwork he had seen on 19 September.  The British embassy in 
South Africa was also receiving reports from Air Vice Marshall Harold Hawkins that 
Smith was issuing the protests to keep the harder-line elements in the Rhodesian Front at 
bay and he ultimately understood that “there is room for give and take.” 123   
The Annex C confusion continued between the British and the Americans into 
October, despite the seeming burying of the hatchet by Callaghan when Kissinger came 
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back to London after meeting Smith.  When Schaufele and Rowlands visited Smith on 4 
October, the two men told Smith that the five points he had agreed to were a distillation 
of Annex C.  Smith countered with his belief that the Patriotic Front could not be trusted 
if the terms of the conference were not clear.124  As Smith continued to demand Kissinger 
keep to the promises surrounding Annex C, in particular the composition of the Security 
forces, Kissinger reminded Smith the provisions for the government that he wanted 
“could” be the subject of further diplomacy, but public demands would help him with 
neither the Africans nor the British.125 
Two substantial debates centered on Kissinger’s diplomacy when it resumed 
session in October.  The first centered on Crosland’s announcement of the breakthrough 
with Smith.  The second and more extensive of the two centered on whether or not to 
extend, as the Commons had every year since 1966, the Southern Rhodesia Act of 1965 
which imposed sanctions on the post-UDI government. Barring disaster for the 
Government, renewal of the Act was a virtual certainty.  What Parliament debated was 
the conduct of Labour’s diplomacy and what exactly it was Smith had signed up to do 
after his meeting with Kissinger.  In essence, the Commons was passing judgment on the 
wisdom of working with Henry Kissinger and Kissinger’s abilities as a diplomat.  If the 
Foreign Office had passed the initiative on southern Africa to Kissinger, how good of a 
deal did the British get? 
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The first debate on 12 October was the formal announcement of Smith’s 
decision.126  Crosland credited Rowlands and Duff along with Kissinger of conducting 
the diplomacy that led to Smith’s concession, and announced that Ivor Richard would 
lead the British efforts in Geneva to make Smith’s commitment to majority rule into a 
political reality.   Maudling as the Shadow Foreign Secretary immediately challenged 
Crosland to see if Smith had made a concrete agreement that would inhibit negotiations 
and if there were still forces (meaning the guerillas supported by the Front Line States) 
that were pushing for the immediate political solution.  Crosland and Maudling sparred 
over Smith’s level of commitment to diplomacy and how detailed the plan he had agreed 
to was.  Crosland maintained the British still had room to maneuver and that he had the 
utmost confidence in Richard, despite the belief of some that it would be better if 
Crosland or Kissinger himself were to chair the conference.  Crosland had to answer from 
the Conservatives if whether or not Kissinger had irrevocably committed the British and 
Smith to a particular path, and from Labour on why Smith was given a two year stay of 
execution to continue running a minority government.   There was an angry assertion 
from the Labour side that much of the controversy from the Conservatives rested on 
believing Smith instead of both Crosland and Kissinger. This challenge was ironic 
because Smith’s intransigence would outlast both Kissinger’s and Crosland’s terms in 
office.   Crosland stuck to his opinion there was no specific document to which Smith had 
agreed.  Responding to Thatcher’s assertion that the Foreign Office had been in error 
when it announced Smith’s agreement to a package, Crosland replied that Kissinger 
agreement was nothing more than an “enlargement of the Prime Minister's own statement 
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of 22nd March.”  This assertion would be the basic conflict that would remain between 
Kissinger and Crosland over Annex C.   
The second debate took place one week later on 20 October.127  At the heart of the 
debate over Kissinger’s diplomacy was what Smith had agreed to when he decided to 
agree to majority rule.  The dissent was over whether the five points that Smith had 
signed on for with Kissinger were legal or political.  The Conservatives made the point 
that if Smith had agreed to a specific plan and then negotiations in Geneva forced a 
change on Smith he might possibly be in the right in withdrawing from the conference.  
Labour responded in two ways.  The first was that Smith had agreed to majority rule 
because of weaknesses rather than principle, and the other was that any future avoidance 
of majority rule would make greater levels of violence inevitable.  Rowlands ended the 
debate with a reminder that “no one can fairly accuse the British Government of bad faith 
on that issue” and that in all his negotiations with Smith there was no package deal.   
Crosland stated again that the five points were an area of negotiation rather than 
the end of the matter, but the dissent over Kissinger’s diplomacy was voiced early in by 
Peter Bottomley an anti-Smith Conservative MP who argued that Kissinger’s and 
Schaufele’s refusal to meet with Mugabe and wading into the situation without as much 
diplomatic experience in the area made this confusion over Smith more likely.  This point 
was echoed by Liberal Jeremy Thorpe who praised Kissinger’s diplomacy but argued that 
the package nature of the deal could have easily have mislead Smith.  Ever the dour 
realist, Enoch Powell once again accused the British government of subordinating its 
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interests to that of the United States and accepting responsibility for something it knew it 
did not have the power to effect.  He urged the British to accept the UDI and along with it 
the limits on power that were the reality of the post-war world. 
Other members praised Kissinger, and argued despite Kissinger’s unsavory 
reputation in some circles that the closeness of the Anglo-American diplomacy made it 
impossible for Smith to misunderstand the reality of his situation.  Robert Hughes argued 
that Kissinger’s constructive ambiguity was the key to bringing Smith to the table.  Smith 
still ran a repressive and racist regime, but self-interest might still be able to compel him 
to change.  This self-interest, other members made clear, was what drove the South 
Africans (Ioan Evens, Labour) and Kissinger (Julian Amery, Tory) himself to make the 
decisions he had during the last year.   Amery directly tied Kissinger’s diplomacy to his 
interest in keeping the Soviets and Cubans from getting any further foothold in Southern 
Africa.  Winston Churchill (Tory) echoed this point when he reminded the Commons that 
were it not for the initiative of the Soviets Kissinger would likely never have engaged 
with Smith.  Amery also was worried about violence derailing the Geneva Conference.  
From his view, continued violence would mean that when Smith walked away from the 
table, the fault would be with the guerillas for maintaining the violence.   Kissinger had 
thought about this problem as well but in order to make sure that the Front Line 
Presidents would continue to support the talks it was agreed that the guerillas would not 
be asked to stop fighting, but that they would hopefully reduce the level of the attacks.  
Crosland and Kissinger and their staffs had agreed to this.128   
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Neil Kinnock echoed this realism when he declared that Kissinger’s involvement 
in and of itself was a benefit because it allowed Smith to claim force majeure in 
accepting the principle of majority rule and thereby make its inevitability more 
domestically palatable.  Rhodesia had to matter on the global stage if the man who 
brought about détente and opened up China was getting involved.  Kinnock admitted he 
had criticized Kissinger before, but found his involvement in Rhodesia was assisting the 
cause of majority rule.  Other Labour members remarked that the United States had 
reversed its policy from the Cold War and was no longer supporting a” corrupt minority 
régimes wherever they may have been in Asia, Africa and America (Bruce George)”.    
This had some truth, but the Byrd Amendment allowing the United States to import 
chromium was still the law and Kissinger had been forced to depend on a minority 
regime as well as several one-party states to box Smith in to an agreement.    
In addition to embracing majority rule, Kissinger had hit another mark that made 
the British more inclined to support his efforts.  John Mendelson on the left of the Labour 
Party praised Kissinger not just for working to bring about majority rule but for doing so 
through the United Nations by his rhetoric and his ambassador. Even though other 
members scoffed at this, Mendelson claimed that it added strength and legitimacy to 
Kissinger’s approach.   
The signs for increased Soviet influence in the area were legitimate.  Vasili 
Solodovnikov, the “the top Soviet expert on Africa, a man who has been Chairman of the 
African Institute in Moscow for 10 years” (Patrice Wall, Conservative) had just been 




appointed ambassador to Lusaka.129  This appointment combined with the continued 
financial support to Mozambique, a constant point of the Tories and an increasingly 
untenable commitment for the Labour Government given Britain’s growing fiscal 
problems, meant that the British  had no way of abandoning the situation while 
maintaining good relations with the United States and the Commonwealth.  A complete 
scramble out of Africa would mean ceding control of the situation to a United States who 
would dislike this withdrawal, a Commonwealth who would further isolate Britain, and 
an increasingly influential Soviet Union and Cuba would have proven they could best any 
army in the area.   
When the summit convened in Geneva, Lord Richard assumed the diplomatic 
lead.  Almost immediately, the issue over Annex C emerged as a sticking point in the 
negotiations.  Smith insisted that the specific points of what the transition government 
would look like were up for debate, while the Patriotic Front demanded Smith adhere to 
the five bullets of Annex C. Richard, much to Kissinger’s dismay, became absorbed with 
the issue over the timeline prior to independence rather than adhering to the principles of 
Annex C.130  Smith proved as truculent as ever, and the delegations spun their wheels 
until early January.  Kissinger, now a lame duck with the loss of Ford, intentionally kept 
                                                           
129 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 461. Solodovnikov was the Soviet ambassador 
to Lusaka.  Despite his influence in providing weapons to ZANU and the suspicion by among others 
Nkomo that he was KGB, he was not an intelligence officer. 
 
130 Reinhardt to Kissinger, “Rhodesia Conference: Geneva Prospects: Assessment and Recommendations”, 
Geneva, 19 November 76, DOC 223, Department of State, Southern Africa. 
 
 222
his distance from the conference.  He did, however, blame the British for the ultimate 
failure of the negotiations.131   
Five days after Carter’s inauguration, Parliament held another debate on the 
failure on the Geneva Conference.  Smith’s rejection first of Kissinger’s points as 
anything short of a definitive political settlement and his subsequent rejection of Britain’s 
proposals for the basis of negotiation meant there was little left to do.  This meant no 
American-backed financial support and recourse for both the whites and the guerillas to 
continue the war.  Crosland rejected suggestions that this failure was fatal to an eventual 
peaceful transition, for Smith had done nothing more than repeat the tactics of rejection 
he had employed since 1965.  Despite his scuttling of the conference, Smith had now 
agreed to eventual majority rule. Kissinger’s intervention, in Crosland’s mind, had still 
done some good.  Smith now rejected the British proposals because they would bring 
about Marxism and white flight during the transition, rather than rejecting them simply 
because they would bring about transition.   
Crosland stuck to his belief that there was a “moral and constitutional obligation” 
to keep trying to reach a solution when faced with the question on why Britain should 
keep attempting to lead the parties to a solution. Crosland also answered Enoch Powell 
who accused the Government of accepting “responsibility without power”, but Crosland 
indicated that even though there had been the “possibility of failure”, it was still worth 
the effort.   
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Some of Labour criticized Kissinger’s diplomacy with its secrecy that allowed 
Smith to claim he could negotiate nothing beyond what he agreed to in September, but 
Crosland deftly replied the fault for the failure of the talks still laid with Smith.  Despite 
calls to the contrary, no “Internal Settlement” of “moderate Rhodesians” could ignore the 
power and influence of both the Front Line Presidents and the guerillas.  To the 
suggestion Labour’s hostility toward Smith was the cause of white Rhodesian resistance, 
Crosland simply reminded Parliament that “illegal régimes” deserve a certain amount of 
hostility. Despite the setbacks, Britain would continue to work for a genuinely 
representative multi-racial government in Rhodesia with the assistance of the Front Line 
Presidents, South Africa, and the Carter administration.132 
Through the debate, it was clear there was a growing frustration among the 
Labour side of the house for playing the sucker when it came to Smith making promises.  
Kissinger had thoroughly debunked the idea, if it was in good faith, on the Conservative 
side that Smith might become more conciliatory if the British government made the first 
move.  Smith had only agreed to the transition to majority rule when he had no other 
options and every possible ally and way of escape had vanished.   The Conservatives who 
argued there was nothing British diplomacy could do to solve the problem of white rule 
in southern Africa were, in Crosland’s gibe, a “relic of the nineteenth century.”133 
                                                           
132 Rhodesia, HC Deb, 25 January 1977, vol 924 cc1182-95. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1977/jan/25/rhodesia#S5CV0924P0_19770125_HOC_183, 
Accessed 31 May 14.   
 
133 Rhodesia, HC Deb, 25 January 1977, vol 924 cc1182-95. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1977/jan/25/rhodesia#S5CV0924P0_19770125_HOC_183, 
Accessed 31 May 14.   
 
 224
 While Crosland remained at the Foreign Office, Kissinger had begun to hand over 
the reins at the State Department to Cyrus Vance.  To ensure that the Carter 
administration understood what he had accomplished in the previous year, Kissinger with 
his selected members of his the staff met with Vance, National Security Advisor-
designate Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ambassador-designate Andrew Young the day 
before Carter’s inauguration to try to maintain the course of the administration’s policy. 
 In his memoirs, Kissinger characterizes the meeting as perfunctory.134  That may 
have been Kissinger’s perception, but the men who would shape Carter’s foreign policy 
took a keen interest in Kissinger’s endeavors.  Young in particular was interested in 
Kissinger’s take on the situation and the attempt to create an international fund to support 
Zimbabwe.  Kissinger recounted the history of the negotiations, justified his prioritizing a 
search for an end to minority rule in Rhodesia over the Front Line Presidents’ preference 
for dealing with Namibia, and blamed the British (specifically Ivor Richard) for the 
breakdown in negotiations.  He also recounted how the British discounted Annex C after 
it had formed the basis for much of the previous summer’s diplomatic activity and his 
disbelief that a Government official could hand over an official document that did not 
have official standing.135 
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 Kissinger’s genuinely close relationship with Crosland belied his remaining 
professional bitterness toward the British disavowal of Annex C. In one of the last letters 
Crosland sent to Kissinger, Crosland wrote: 
 “It must be a fairly unusual experience to make a 
new friend, and so quickly, comparatively late in life, and 
our friendship over the last nine months has given me 
enormous pleasure, as well as adding gaiety and wit to the 
sometimes bleak world of foreign policy.  It must be even 
more unusual when the new friend is someone whom one 
greatly admires.”136 
 Crosland went on to make a joke that Kissinger’s “misadministration” of the State 
Department had delayed a gift from Susan Crosland to her sister Ellen.  The details were 
to be found, of course, in Annex C which is “a basis for discussion only, and not (repeat 
not) endorsed by the British Cabinet.”  
The efforts of Crosland and Kissinger in southern Africa were at an end. Their 
friendship had survived the argument over the nature of Annex C, Kissinger’s 
disappointment over the British diplomatic effort to follow up his breakthrough, and 
Crosland’s hostility to accepting the American-backed terms of the IMF loan that same 
year.137  Crosland was still friends with many of the men who criticized Kissinger from 
the right, and Kissinger was notorious for cutting down those men whose criticism might 
harm his reputation.138  What might have been was unknown, for Crosland was to pass 
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away unexpectedly the next month. Crosland’s ashes were scattered at sea from a fishing 
trawler, and the Foreign Office passed on to Crosland’s relatively junior deputy, David 
Owen.139 
Conclusion 
In the end, Kissinger and the British were only partially successful in their pursuit 
of the goal of ending white minority rule in southern Africa.  They had forced Smith to 
cross a rhetorical and diplomatic boundary that made the creation of Zimbabwe a matter 
of time.   Theirs had been an intricate piece of diplomacy involving several close allies of 
the United States, multiple states whose leaders easily fell into the category of British-
born socialism that Moynihan had written about the year prior, and two international 
pariahs.  Kissinger himself and the Ford administration at large was under the dual 
assault at home from the neoconservatives on the right and the growing influence of the 
McGovernite left on the Democratic Party. Kissinger’s last attempt at a foreign policy 
coup had its parallels with Johnson’s dispatching of Harriman supported by former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance and General Andrew Goodpaster to Paris in 
1968 to end the Vietnam War.  In both cases, the ultimate cause of failure was the 
intransigence of the other side of the table.140   Smith still believed he could play for time, 
and that the British would not be able to succeed in ending his regime. Callaghan 
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Johnson’s undercutting of and distrust of Harriman’s efforts, as well as Harriman’s disregard for Johnson’s 
views, see Kabaservice, The Guardian .and Sorley, A Better War, 90–92. 
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compared the efforts of the British and Americans together in 1976 to “playing in the 
three quarter line and you pass the ball to each other.”141  Kissinger with his love of 
soccer would have grasped this metaphor, but in the end he could take no comfort in his 
failure.  
Throughout the debates of 1976, the British discussed the possibility of British 
military force as a tool for resolving the issue of Rhodesia.  To some, the failure to allow 
Rhodesia to have broken away at all in 1965 without a fight was the basis for the 
problem.  To others, the spectacle of British soldiers fighting recent expatriates was a 
specter invoked to stymie any discussion of an outside solution.  British soldiers might 
have a role in enforcing any agreement, but there were several barriers to this happening.  
One was fiscal and one was psychological.  The cost of a unilateral intervention would be 
unbearable in late 1976  when the US State Department was pushing diplomacy while the 
US Treasury was demanding domestic spending be cut and the US Defense Department 
needed Britain to help keep the shipping lines to Europe open and keep deterring the 
Soviets.142  Britons fighting among other Europeans to resolve an ethnic dispute 
involving other Britons was not something the British Army was inexperienced with at 
this point, but a war in Africa was something almost no one on the right or left wanted.  
This truth was the heart of Powell’s objection to continuing British diplomacy that in the 
end Britain had neither the money nor the will to force Smith to buckle under.  Crosland 
was right as well that Britain had assumed responsibility without power, but it still had 
                                                           
141 Transcript of Callaghan Press Conference, 10 March 77, WDC, Box 140, Callaghan Papers. 
142 Callaghan made the point about using British forces in Rhodesia as weakening their European 
commitment to Kissinger ion 5 August.  Callaghan, Kissinger, et al, “Meeting with Dr Kissinger” London, 
5 Aug 76, FCO 36-1829.  
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allies.  Kissinger’s efforts had pushed Smith to the table and forced him to concede the 
inevitability of majority rule, and the continuing of the guerilla war would erode 
Rhodesia’s will and manpower.   
After a decade of relatively cool relations, the first conscious Anglo-American 
project in the Third World in the 1970s proved that close collaboration and correct aims 
do not automatically translate into success.  Kissinger attempted to bring his previous 
credibility, the American alliance with the British, and his genuine concern for not 
permitting further Communist advance into southern Africa into the service of self-
determination of a colonized people. Even this modest goal eluded both him and 
Crosland, for realism as a practical approach has the inherent weakness of limits.  As a 
philosophy that informs the conduct of international relations, realism has only one real 
justification: the successful achievement of the desired end.  To strive valiantly for what 
is impossible, even if it is a moral good, is to the realist an absurdity. It was the dangers 
inherent in the self-righteous quest for a universal ideal that Kissinger had decried in his 
earliest writings.  Kissinger and Crosland could only go so far into pushing Smith for 
they both understood the fiscal and psychological limits of their means.  Smith had bent 
and even broken for a moment but he did not yet believe himself beaten. The means of 
forcing his hand were beyond the limits of the Anglo-American partnership.  However, 
even the effort had value for the future.  Although a realist would regard failure as a 
miscalculation, the effort had carried on Britain’s diplomacy and made Rhodesia an 
enduring issue in American politics.  Neither did this failure decrease American or British 
credibility on the issue with the Front Line.  Although the memory of Kissinger and his 
applications of realpolitik would mark the conduct of the Carter administration, the 
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British and Americans would walk farther down the path that Kissinger and Crosland had 
blazed to play a part in solving the problems in southern Africa. 
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Chapter 6: Division and Discontent: The Limits of Anglo-American Cooperation on Iran 
and Rhodesia 1977-1980 
 
Surprising victories by unlikely candidates were a mainstay of Anglo-American 
politics in the 1970s. When Jimmy Carter won the Democratic nomination in 1976 
Democratic elder statesman Averell Harriman asked “How can Carter be nominated? I 
don’t know him and don’t know anyone who does!”1  The United States’ embassy in 
London reported that “Margaret Thatcher has blazed into national prominence almost 
literally from out of nowhere” upon her election to lead the Conservative Party in 1975.2 
The electoral successes of Thatcher and Carter in the late 1970s were surprises to the 
political establishments of their countries.  Neither Carter nor Thatcher instituted a 
radical shift in the Anglo-American relationship, but each leader sought to mix their 
commitment to the relationship with a drive to honor their domestic political 
commitments. Carter promised a renewed morality in American policy at home and 
abroad, and Thatcher was committed to curbing the excesses of socialism that climaxed 
during the Winter of Discontent.3 Together, these two unlikely leaders would play 
leading roles in defining the outlines of the Anglo-American relationship as the two 
                                                           
1 Quoted in Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam, 1982), 
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countries confronted the foreign policy challenges of the end of white rule in Zimbabwe 
and the taking of American hostages in Iran.   
Rhodesia and Iran were not the only crises in the world in these years, but they 
defined the limits and possibilities of the Anglo-American diplomatic tradition.  The 
energy crisis, closely linked to the Iranian Revolution, involved the United States and 
Britain working with OPEC and the G-7.4  Nuclear strategy and arms control were the 
dominant concerns of NATO. The Soviet deployment of a new medium range missile 
pushed NATO in deploying its own controversial medium-range missile despite serious 
domestic dissent.5  Arms control was perhaps the dominant concern of the American 
foreign policy establishment, and the battle over the contents of the second Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) did much to shape the departure of many 
neoconservatives from the Democrats to later serve in the Reagan administration.6  
Intersecting with these troubles were continued shows of strength by countries in the 
                                                           
4 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 67–71. 
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Third World that had been areas of shared Anglo-American interest over the past 
decades.  
The emergence of modern Iran had begun as a covert Anglo-American project 
that involved engineering the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh and allowing the 
restoration of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1953.  American and British intelligence 
agents, to include Kermit Roosevelt, put the Shah back in power and crushed 
Mosaddegh’s attempt to nationalize Iran’s oil industry.7  As British power in the Middle 
East waned in the decades that followed, the Shah’s Iran became a centerpiece of 
American strategy of stabilizing Central Asia against real and perceived Soviet threats. In 
these years the Shah’s government, formerly a pillar of stability taking an oil-boom 
funded leap toward modernity, fall away and a Shia fundamentalist government take its 
place.8 This revolution introduced a volatile new force into the Cold War that rejected 
both the American and Soviet models of modernity.  This ideological challenge to both 
the Soviet Union and the United States expanded when “Students Following the Line of 
the Iman” challenged the very norms of diplomacy and seized the American embassy in 
                                                           
7 Donald Wilber , CIA Clandestine Service History, "Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,  
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2003). 
8 The best place to start with Carter’s history with Iran is Sick, All Fall down. Westad, The Global Cold 
War, 2005, 292–296. The other major account of the Iranian hostage crisis from inside the Carter 




November 1979 and held the American diplomats captive there for 444 days.9  Faced 
with this breach of international law and the precarious position of their own diplomats, 
Britain had to negotiate its commitments to international law, its alliance with the United 
States, and its relative military and fiscal weakness to play a role in resolving the crisis.  
The joint Anglo-American project to end white minority rule in Rhodesia was of a 
more recent vintage than Iran.  The effort that began as a mix of global anti-communist 
strategy and globe-trotting diplomacy transformed first into a foreign mirror of the 
American civil rights movement and then a show of British diplomatic skill as Henry 
Kissinger and Anthony Crosland’s partnership gave way to the efforts of David Owen 
and Andrew Young.10  Their efforts in turn gave way to the determination of Lord Peter 
Carrington and Prime Minister Thatcher and the establishment of Zimbabwe through the 
Lancaster House Conference.11   
These crises presented a paradox in their respective outcomes.  Britain at its post-
war low point in terms of international prestige was able to muster a formidable coalition 
of allies thanks to forceful diplomacy and personal commitment by the Prime Minister 
and her Foreign Secretary.  The Tory Government defied the right-most elements of the 
party and allowed an avowed Marxist to take charge of what had been the last British 
                                                           
9 The most recent book of the hostage crisis is Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah. For an Iranian perspective 
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10 See Chapter 5.    
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settler colony in Africa.12  Carter in contrast saw an ally become an enemy and his 
country lose the aid of its other allies in its attempt to resolve the hostage crisis.  Neither 
the British nor the United Nations nor the American military could get the diplomats 
back.  In the end, what resolved the crisis was bilateral negotiations between the United 
States and Iran.  Britain and Algeria acted as conduits for both words and money but 
could do little to influence the conduct of either side.     
Given both countries’ commitments to support the other’s foreign policy, the 
resolutions of each crisis was ultimately in the hands of only one of the allies.  Why did 
the previous history of Anglo-American diplomatic cooperation on Iran and Rhodesia fail 
to translate into direct roles for both countries in resolving these issues during the years 
1979-1980? The actions of each country had some effect on the diplomacy of the other, 
but the continued coordination meant less in a world where Anglo-American power was 
diminishing.  
Anglo-American Foreign Policy Figures at the end of the 1970s 
Callaghan and Thatcher each had a prominent Foreign Secretary who shaped their 
Governments’ approach to diplomacy.  For Callaghan, it was David Owen.  For Thatcher, 
it was Lord Carrington.  Owen was the youngest Foreign Minister since Anthony Eden 
and brought a strong personality as well as a sense of mission to his new assignment.  
Owen strived to implement an Anglo-American peace plan for Zimbabwe that was first 
overcome by Smith’s plan to implement an internal solution and then by the defeat of 
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Dinner with Mugabe: The Untold Story of a Freedom Fighter Who Became a Tyrant (Johannesburg: 
Penguin Books, 2008). 
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Labour after the Winter of Discontent.13  Carrington then took up the mantle for the 
Tories.  A committed Heathite and “wet”, he still agreed to serve in Thatcher’s Cabinet 
until he resigned at the outbreak of the Falklands War.14    
American foreign policy was in the hands of a very different Democratic Party 
than had been voted out in 1968.15  There were still representatives from the Johnson 
administration, but there also were new voices from the many factions of the Democratic 
Party.  Carter’s administration was remarkable as well for the extent these personalities 
shaped the approach to policy.  While this focus on people rather than systems is one of 
the key differences between the American and British systems of government, it was 
particularly true for the Carter administration.16  Carter’s Democratic Party had torn itself 
asunder since the middle years of the Johnson administration.  The New Left had, at least 
to the viewing audiences at home, destroyed the outside of the Democratic National 
Convention in 1968.  It had done the same thing to McGovern’s electoral chances from 
inside in 1972.17  In response to the changing demographics of the party, Carter sought to 
be inclusive in his selections for posts inside the Executive Branch.  Responding to 
                                                           
13 David Owen and Kenneth Harris, Personally Speaking to Kenneth Harris (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
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Secretary of State Vance’s note about a panel that State was convening to pick 
replacements for the ones who were “not qualified to carry out their functions”, Carter 
wrote that future panels “need many more women.”18 Carter echoed these remarks when 
the Cabinet met on 7 February 1977.19 
The dominant personalities in the Carter administration for foreign affairs 
regarding the Third World in general were the President himself, Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations Andrew Young.20   
Jimmy Carter was at the beginning of the 1976 election season no one’s pick to be 
the President but his own.  Carter’s indefatigable efforts in the living rooms of Iowa 
propelled him toward the Presidency past such liberal luminaries as Henry “Scoop” 
Jackson, Mo Udall, and Jerry Brown as well as the Democratic reactionary George 
Wallace. 21  Carter was an outlier within the demographic trends of the Democratic Party.  
He was a born again Southern Baptist in an era where evangelicals were just beginning to 
emerge as a political force. He had won the election without emerging from either a 
significant urban Democratic machine or from Congress.22 
                                                           
18 Vance to Carter, “Moving to Replace Ambassadors”, 26 Jan 77, Washington, NLC-126-6-6-1-8. 
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For Carter, “human rights” would be a key part of his foreign policy. He made it a 
centerpiece of his speeches, met with dissidents, and cut off aid to countries for their poor 
performance.  Despite this Presidential level commitment to putting human rights into 
practice, there was still some resistance inside the government.23  In June 1979,  a 
National Security staffer argued that diplomats within the regional bureaus were ignoring 
White House directives on enforcing human rights provisions in order to protect the 
interests of the country against a President “who ‘didn’t understand’ the realities of 
international politics.”  In this terse analysis, it meant that even three years later 
“Kissinger lives.”24   
The Carter administration was far from alone in making a commitment to human 
rights as a guiding principle.  The late 1970s saw a flowering of NGOs dedicated to the 
fight for human rights.  Amnesty International won the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize. Human 
rights were an explicit part of the Labour Government’s policy as well. David Owen, 
during his tenure as Foreign Secretary produced a book entitled simply Human Rights.25  
Owen cited the Magna Carta as the foundational document for human rights in Britain, 
and argued that there was a powerful linkage between democratic socialism and human 
rights.  Owen wanted to show the essential linkage between socialism as a way of 
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improving everyday life and the natural place of human rights in all societies. Much of 
the book is less about human rights and more about what a democratic socialist foreign 
policy should look like for Britain. As early as March 1977, Owen was stressing the role 
of human rights both in public and in Parliament.  Human rights would take a “high 
priority” no matter what government the British were dealing with, but that due to the 
chances of harm to the relationship with “other governments” the specific plan for how 
human rights would shape individual interstate relationships would remain confidential.26   
Carter’s personal relations with Callaghan and the useful working relationship 
that he and Thatcher developed was not a given.  Carter thanked Callaghan for his efforts 
at arranging for support for the handover of the Panama Canal.27 Carter alienated fellow 
democrats as diverse as Menachem Begin, Tip O’Neill, and Helmut Schmidt.28 Thatcher 
in her memoirs portrays a sympathetic yet ineffective Carter. She rates him highly for his 
intelligence, his scientific training –a rarity in politics that they shared, and his sincerity.  
However, she also saw an indecisive man with no clear vision of economics or foreign 
policy whose policies produced conflicting and often sub-optimal results.   In the end, 
Thatcher judged Carter unlucky.29 
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Carter’s initial trip to Britain in 1977 had gone well.  Press reaction within the 
United States to Carter’s visit was generally positive, and Carter had proven himself by 
charming the press, the Queen, and much of Labour.30  Carter honored the smaller 
moments in the Anglo-American relationship as well.  In January 1978, he recognized the 
first trans-Atlantic wireless conversation between Edward VII and President Roosevelt 
with a proclamation.31 Thatcher’s initial meeting with Carter was in May 1977.  On her 
visit to the United States in September 1977 as the Leader of the Opposition, she had met 
with him as well in spite of concerns this meeting might not be appropriate.  Although the 
meeting with Carter in the White House produced only a polite note that praised Carter’s 
“convictions” the rest of the trip went well.  Thatcher impressed both David Rockefeller 
and Cyrus Vance in her meetings with them.32 
Much of the Labour Party welcomed the election of Carter.  Tony Benn was 
impressed with his speech at Notre Dame in the spring of 1977, and passed a copy of The 
Levelers to Carter’s son during the family’s visit to London in 1977.33 Carter addressed 
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Callaghan as “Jim” in his letters, but Thatcher was “Mrs. Thatcher” until her victory in 
1979.34    
Carter’s lack of standing in the national Democratic Party before the campaign 
mirrored his lack of experience in foreign affairs during his time as Georgia’s governor.  
Carter self-consciously sought to expand his grasp of foreign policy, and his tutor in these 
matters was Zbigniew Brzezinski.  A former professor of foreign relations at Columbia 
University, Brzezinski sought to focus Carter more on the balance of “power and 
principle” in relations with the wider world and to not be afraid to take a harder line with 
the Soviets than Vance would endorse.35  Brzezinski founded the Trilateral Commission 
along with oil heir and banker David Rockefeller and other Japanese and Western 
European thinkers and politicians in 1973.   The Commission had quickly become part of 
the foreign policy establishment, and produced the definitive establishment statement on 
decline in the mid-1970s.36 Brzezinski sought to bring a greater degree of architecture to 
American foreign policy than he felt had been present in the Kissinger years.   He later 
concluded that Soviet actions, internal policy disagreements springing from philosophical 
differences, and a lack of public understanding of their policies undercut the 
administration’s foreign policy.37 
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The executor of foreign policy for Carter was his Secretary of State.  Cyrus Vance 
was the establishment.  Along with Harold Brown at Defense, he was picked to reassure 
the still deeply consensus Democratic East Coast establishment that this Southern 
Governor was not going to govern as an outsider.  Carter had campaigned as an outsider, 
a visible repudiation not just of the scandals of Watergate but of the problems of 
Washington in general.  Vance, with his credentials as a New York lawyer as well as a 
Cabinet officer in the Johnson administration, accepted the conventional wisdom of how 
the world should work while trying to change it for the better.  He was in many ways the 
most tragic figure of the Carter administration, a man whose faith in tradition, diplomacy, 
and non-violence was rudely violated by the Soviet Union, the revolutionary students and 
leaders of Iran, and ultimately the decisions of his President.38  Rejecting Carter’s attempt 
to rescue the American hostages by force in 1980, Vance resigned with his conscience 
clear but with American diplomats still in the hands of a radical new power.  Vance 
labored mightily for a lasting peace in the Middle East, for arms control and the limiting 
of the dangers of nuclear war, and for the virtues of diplomacy.39  His memoir of his time 
at the State Department ends with a thoroughly conventional description of how the 
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United States needed to act to meet the challenges of the 1980s.  Vance, even in 
retirement, spoke for the consensus that had been splintering over the past twenty years.40   
 Compared with these two men, the man who most mirrored the outsider status of 
Carter was Andrew Young.  He had been a Congregationalist minister in a Civil Rights 
movement dominated by Baptists.  Young had become the first African-American 
Congressman elected from Georgia in the post-Reconstruction era.  As a Representative 
he was part of the Watergate-era of young Congressmen who broke the seniority system 
in the House of Representatives which made Congress more representative, more 
democratic, and less productive.41 Young was Carter’s link between the domestic shifts in 
the demographics of the Democratic Party and his commitment to human rights abroad.42   
Young was the most controversial of Carter’s nomination to the intellectual right, 
but he was not the only Carter nominee to draw fire.   When Carter nominated former 
Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen to be the Director of Central Intelligence, 
concerns about his previous treatment of classified information and his assistance to 
“Pentagon Papers” leaker Daniel Ellsberg led to Sorensen withdrawing his nomination.43  
The selection of Paul Warnke, a noted “dove” and the author of a well-known article 
“Apes on a Treadmill” that argued the arms race was a matter of Soviet imitation of 
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American actions, to run the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was challenged by 
young neoconservatives on just-elected Senator Moynihan’s staff.44 In one of the best 
recorded slights of the Carter administration, the highest ranking position a supporter 
from the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) received in the Carter 
administration was as Ambassador for “negotiations on the status of Micronesia.”45 
Young’s position at the United Nations made him a visible repudiation of 
Moynihan’s approach of just a year prior.  Members of the mission who had left during 
or after Moynihan’s tenure wrote back to congratulate Young on his approach to 
international relations.  Tap Bennett, who had been dismissive of Moynihan in 1975, now 
wrote from his new position in Belgium at NATO that Young’s visit to South Africa and 
his speech to the business community in Johannesburg in 1977 had been “outstanding.”46 
Where Moynihan had confronted the Third World over its lack of liberty, Young 
confronted the issue of racism.  An illuminating example of Young’s perceptions of the 
problem of racism on the global stage was his criticism of Nixon and Ford as “racist” in 
an interview with Playboy magazine.47  Young did not mean that Nixon and Ford were 
personally prejudiced against minorities (although Nixon was) but that “they had no 
understanding of the problems of colored people everywhere.”48  Young would later 
write that he was able to forge a very human connection with Gerald Ford during their 
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shared physical rehabilitation appointments.49 Young’s willingness to talk with those 
with whom he disagreed sometimes often had concrete political benefits in terms of votes 
gained.50   
Another key difference between Young and the neoconservatives was that Young 
was also far more a committed capitalist than many in the Democratic Party.  This 
commitment sprang from Young’s time in the civil rights movement where Southern 
local businesses had often played an integral role in ending segregation.51  Young made 
this argument about how it was financially beneficial to end apartheid on his visit to 
South Africa in March 1977.  Young’s commitment to capitalism was such that Steve 
Biko, a noted South African leader against apartheid, refused to meet with him.52 Irving 
Kristol, even as he was writing for the Wall Street Journal, had less trust in the average 
businessman who did not understand the morality of what business did.53  
However, in an echo to the dust-up between Moynihan and Richard in 1975, 
Young publicly challenged the British as well.  Responding to criticisms about American 
foreign policy toward South Africa, Young remarked that the Soviets were the “most 
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racist people in the world.”54  Young also remarked that Britain had “invented racism” 
and had “’institutionalized racism’ more than anybody else on the face of the earth.”55  
Questioned about it during a joint press conference with Owen, Young shot back to a 
British reporter that the BBC questioner had been “taunting” him about the racial 
problems in the United States.   He also remarked that racism remained a “pervasive 
problem” “all over the world.”56  Despite the ensuing outcry and Carter’s insistence that 
Young personally apologize to British Permanent Representative Ivor Richard, Young 
kept his job for another two years.  Young’s reputation for bold and often provocative 
pronouncements was so well known that a tame performance was cause for comment by 
the British behind closed doors. 57 
Young did have connections to the Third World, and even with the Moynihan-
conceived “British revolution.”  Young had accompanied Coretta Scott King to India 
when she received the Nehru Award in 1969 on behalf of her fallen husband.   There, he 
met fellow Christian and Nehru compatriot Joachim Alva.  Both Alva and his daughter-
in-law Margaret wrote to congratulate Young after Carter nominated him.  Alva took 
Carter’s selection of Young to the Cabinet and his mother Lillian Carter’s visit to the 
funeral of India’s President Ali Ahmed to mean that the Carter administration was serious 
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about improving relations with the Third World as well as minorities at home.58 Young 
also carried with him to the United Nations his reading of Wendell Wilke’s One World 
which he had received from his father as a young man.59 
 
Young’s criticisms were not the only areas of public contention between the 
United States and Great Britain.  British civil servants were not above trying to use the 
influence of the United States in other areas as well. The Thatcher government’s first 
budget reduced the BBC’s funds for foreign broadcasting.  The BBC’s leaders appealed 
to the American embassy in London to ask if Carter could intervene with Thatcher to 
reverse the cuts.  Ambassador Brewster agreed to this proposition, and the proposal made 
it as far as a memo from Brzezinski to Carter with a letter to Thatcher in which he 
appealed to her as a “long-time friend and ally of Great Britain.”60   
As part of the Carter administration’s push to make human rights the centerpiece 
of its foreign policy, the State Department began to issue yearly reports on the status of 
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human rights.  Britain was among the states that received this report card, and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights Patricia Derian found that British civil servants used 
her reports to influence government policies in Northern Ireland.61  
There are intriguing parallels between Young and Moynihan.  Each had 
experienced the death of their hero.62 Both men were proud Democrats.  Both Moynihan 
and Young were aware of the dangers of the President sidelining his UN Ambassadors as 
Moynihan listed in the opening passage of A Dangerous Place and Young echoed in an 
infamous interview with Dan Rather in early 1977.63   
However, there were differences between the men as well.  Moynihan’s guiding 
concerns were the ethnic and the intellectual, while Young’s were the racial and the 
spiritual.   Moynihan believed in reasoned argument passionately delivered, while Young 
understood struggle and redemption and the need to change hearts.  Moynihan was 
cosmopolitan, while Young was universal.   However, Young’s true importance to the 
politics of his day and to the Anglo-American relationship was his transformation of the 
United Nations into a place of concern about explicit American accommodation to the 
Third World.   
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Young’s attack on the British, whatever else it was, was not so much 
premeditated as it was a belief that racism was the most challenging problem that the 
world faced. Moynihan’s vision of a Third World sprung from an analysis of the 
dominant trends of political economy then practiced in the world’s second most populous 
country with 15% of the global population.   The clear break between the men was their 
perception of what was the true crisis of the era. Moynihan saw a lack of liberty, while 
Young saw the persistence of racism. Despite the PLO’s internal assessment that Young 
was an ally of capitalism and American empire, traditional Republicans and 
neoconservatives alike were worried about the implications of Young’s thinking.64 
Young was the first in a line of prominent Democrats that would threaten to turn the 
Democratic Party down the path of “Third Worldism”.  To conservatives both old and 
new, down that way lay accommodation to the Soviets abroad and most likely the total 
delegitimazation of Israel.65  
Not just neoconservatives found in Young a figure worthy of rallying public 
opinion against the broader contours of the Carter administration.  The Republican 
Governor of New Hampshire Meldrim Thomson circulated a letter written in his role as 
the National Chairman of the Conservative Caucus in June 1977 urging the recipients to 
write to Congress and demand Young’s removal prior to the convening of the General 
Assembly that fall.  The letter accused Young of favoring the Third World over the 
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United States and of disrupting “delicate” negotiations with the South Africans that 
risked turning the whole of southern Africa communist.66 
Young usually replied to his mail with a reply that flatly stated some 
unobjectionable nostrum about a commitment to human rights or democracy. He did 
however occasionally engage his critics personally. A negative May 1977 column by 
William F. Buckley about Young’s speech in South Africa merited a handwritten reply 
about what he “really said in South Africa.”67 Buckley did not just criticize Young in 
print.  He hosted a session of Firing Line featuring the stars the 1977 Young Americans 
for Freedom convention where the first item on the agenda was their call for the 
resignation of Young.  The arguments recounted many other criticisms, but included the 
same criticism that some in the establishment and on the left made against Moynihan that 
his rhetoric and indeed his very presence had become a detriment to the United States.68 
Young’s campaign to end white rule in Rhodesia and throughout all of Southern 
Africa was the focus of his time at the United Nations.  However, Young’s tenure at the 
United Nations ended in scandal when he met with the PLO’s Representative Zehdi Terzi 
against the express policy of the State Department.  Young then dissimulated about his 
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meeting, and the ensuing outcry forced Carter to accept Young’s resignation.69  The 
situation worried many members of the Democratic Party that the splits in the left that 
had begun at Ocean Hill–Brownsville in 1968 were both accelerating and becoming the 
debate of a foreign policy split.70   
A tumultuous moment in black-Jewish relations followed Young’s resignation. 
Members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference met with the PLO’s 
Ambassador for lunch, and others met with Yasser Arafat on a trip to Lebanon.  
However, the NAACP reacted more cautiously, and the SCLC issued a statement 
confirming their commitment to “Israel as a Jewish homeland.”  The split in opinion 
about the issue of Israel and the PLO was a mirror of the split between the Old and New 
Left, where new leaders such as Jesse Jackson who stressed the centrality of identity 
conflicted with older leaders such as Bayard Rustin who came out of the labor 
movement. For his part, the Israeli ambassador further aggravated matters when he 
suggested to a civil rights group that foreign policy was better left to “professionals.”71 
After Young resigned, reactions on the American political right varied.  
Reflecting on her time at the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick believed that what 
“happened with Andy Young” was that he had simply been in a “high-visibility role” for 
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too long.72  Buckley was of an even keel about the turn of events as well.  He attributed 
Young’s motive for meeting with the PLO Representative to a genuine search for peace 
and his dismissal to poor timing and the “Profumo factor” of lying about the encounter.73  
Young’s dismissal just overlapped the 1979 General Election, and so his and Owen’s 
efforts in Rhodesia would pass to a new group of diplomats and politicians.  
Rhodesia 
The campaign of Kissinger and Crosland to bring Smith to heel had ended with 
stalemate in Geneva in December 1976. Smith had successfully played for time and 
prevented Ivor Richard and the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU) from reaching any 
agreement to end minority rule.  The conference never reconvened after Richard 
suspended it on 18 December. With this stalemate the Carter administration began to look 
for a new way forward. 
One of Carter’s first acts in office was to dispatch letters to ten African nations 
asking them to keep faith in the ongoing diplomatic process related to Rhodesia.  Smith’s 
rejection did not undermine the determination of Vance and Crosland to keep up the 
diplomatic pressure, and Vance informed Carter that he would inform South Africa that 
any internal settlement that “excludes important nationalist leaders” would be 
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unacceptable.74   Despite these setbacks, Richard believed that it was still “possible [for] 
the US” to “play a direct role in the Rhodesia settlement efforts.”75 
The Carter administration sought to “[develop] some new alternatives.”76 After 
the initial meetings with Ivor Richard, the two sides committed to working together to 
create “a set of ‘propositions’” that could restart the talks in Geneva.  The two sides 
developed an 11 point plan for moving toward independence which included giving the 
guerillas a “majority in the council of ministers”, assigned a British Resident 
Commissioner, and declared that the process of transition would be both peaceful and 
“irreversible”.77 At a Cabinet meeting on 7 February, Vance was pessimistic about the 
prospect for a rapid resolution in Rhodesia based on his meetings with Ivor Richard.78 
Not everyone mourned the failure in Geneva.  Nyerere told Richard that he was 
glad the talks had failed so the “Nationalist forces could get on with the war for 
Rhodesia’s complete liberation.” The embassy in Dar es Salaam proposed that Nyerere’s 
enthusiasm was rooted in his distrust of Smith and a belief that the only thing that would 
change his mind is a military defeat.79   The Defense and Liberation Committees of the 
Organization for African Unity meeting in early February 1977 also invoked the need for 
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continued armed struggle.  At this time as well, Kaunda was growing more frustrated 
with outside powers not cutting off trade with Smith to include Japan, the US, and the 
British.  Kaunda “vented” to Callaghan over these diplomatic failures, and Vance was 
worried that Young would be subject to the same bad attitude on his visit to Africa in 
early 1977.80 
Just after his confirmation by the Senate, Young with his aide and fellow civil 
rights veteran Stoney Cooks flew to Tanzania to attend a political conference as well as a 
Nigerian cultural festival.  Despite some initial pushback from the bureaucracy at State 
based mostly in cost, Young attended the conferences and in the words of one scholar 
“made an instant hit.”81 Upon his return, Young argued that the way ahead in southern 
African was to work with the British to “develop consensus on … [the] transition 
period.”  In addition, the US had to work with South Africa to get Smith to stop his cross-
border attacks in fear of escalating and internationalizing the crisis.  Young stressed that 
the British still held a “colonial attitude toward Africa” and could not deal with the post-
independence leadership in Africa.  The British were also concerned about relations with 
South Africa and the impact sanctions might have on their economy, as well as some 
worry on the British side that Kissinger had led them down the garden path and now they 
were on their own.82 
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In May 1977, Vice President Walter Mondale and David Owen were discussing 
British plans for Rhodesia with Vorster in Geneva.  Vorster indicated South Africa was 
still willing to work with the British and the US to pressure Smith.  One major shift in 
Owen’s plan over Kissinger’s efforts the year before was that any post-independence 
development fund would not try to prevent white farmers from leaving, but instead would 
serve the black African population.  Balancing reassurances to whites and commitments 
to blacks was one of the diplomatic problems the two countries faced, as was the 
structure of the interim government.  Owen indicated to Mondale that resumed British 
control would be contingent on American approval as well as an end to the violence in 
the country.  In addition, both Smith and the guerillas would have to accept the British 
presence.  Richard’s January plan was still the best developed option at this point, and 
was still the accepted way forward for the United States and the British.83 
Another key point in the Carter administration’s efforts in Rhodesia was the 
repeal of the Byrd Amendment.  Senator Byrd had sponsored the amendment in 1971 as a 
way of ensuring the flow of chromium into the United States and prop up the Smith 
regime.  The Carter administration lobbied Congress to drop the amendment.  Kissinger 
and Ford had a made a half-hearted attempt to convince Congress to repeal the law the 
year before, but Carter threw the full weight of his prestige behind the attempt.84  Young 
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assisted Carter in securing the votes in Congress, and Congress quickly did away with the 
amendment.  This loss served another body blow to the Rhodesian economy.85 
Young visited Britain after his trip to South Africa, and let the British press know 
that he had met with among other figures Robert Mugabe.86  Young’s meeting with 
Mugabe and his consultations with Owen throughout this summer were both ways of 
getting closer to the end of white rule in southern Africa while making sure the Africans 
saw the Soviets as a “negative force.”87   
By September 1977, Young and Richard had agreed to press Smith on the way 
ahead due to the “unequivocal support of the Frontline presidents”. Young wanted to 
press South Africa to pursue a more constructive approach to Rhodesia and Namibia, 
something that might improve their relations with the US and other countries.  Both men 
also agreed Smith was still not entirely trustworthy, but that with more unity the 
Nkomo’s and Mugabe’s forces might prove increasingly credible.  Getting rid of the 
mercenaries and more violent Special units like the “Celous [sp] scouts” and keeping 
Nationalist forces in reserve that could move in once Smith capitulated would solve any 
post-independence security problems.88 Young and Owen met Smith in September and 
attempted to sell him on the plan.  In their meeting, Smith was more cordial with Young 
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than he had traditionally been with his other sparring partners, but the next day Smith 
declared the plan “insane”.  Young later compared Smith to a Mississippi sheriff.89 
At the UN Session in September, Richard and Young made sure to secure 
understanding from the Front Line Representatives as they built their joint proposal.90  
During their meeting with Kaunda’s advisor Mark Chona, Vance stressed that eventually 
South Africa would come under the same pressure as Rhodesia.  If Smith agreed to 
further talks, Chona replied, that would help diplomacy in the UN toward the settlement.  
However, the number of players involved in the diplomacy meant that getting closer to a 
solution was always a challenge.91 
Later in 1977, the Carter administration reexamined its policies toward Southern 
Africa.  Owen and Young’s efforts since January had increased American efforts to 
resolve the situation, but Owen wanted to make sure that the venture remained a joint 
one.  Any negotiated settlement would require parliamentary approval in Britain and an 
approval by referendum in Rhodesia, and the goal was that by the end of 1978 Zimbabwe 
would exist.  Lord Carver would serve as Resident Commissioner and supervise both 
forces during any election period. The transition period would involve a British 
Commissioner and Commonwealth forces to enforce any cease fire as well as a 
development fund to help grow the entire economy. The major problem with this 
arrangement was that neither Britain nor any other Commonwealth force wanted to be 
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responsible for suppressing any violence, and neither element possessing armed force in 
Rhodesia could entirely be trusted. The Front Line Presidents were still skeptical about 
Anglo-American diplomacy, and were just as worried that the various nationalist groups 
would splinter or that the US and Britain would abandon the process.  Smith was still 
“intransigent”, but he was waiting for the Americans and British to make the next 
move.92 
When Owen went before Parliament to both provide an update on the progress he 
and Young had made as well as another one year extension of the Southern Rhodesia Act 
of 1965, the tone of the debate had shifted from the year before.  What had been a debate 
over Kissinger’s actions and promises to Smith now focused on the difficulties of turning 
even parts of the Rhodesian government or security forces over to the guerillas. Owen 
stressed that Rhodesia was still Britain’s responsibility, but that he was working with 
Young to bring about a settlement.93 
Faced with a worsening war and growing economic pressure, Smith decided to 
opt for a political move that would work to negate the efforts of Owen, Young, and the 
Front Line Presidents to discredit him.  Smith opted for an “internal solution” where 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa would take power, but whites would still hold the majority in the 
legislature and the security forces.94 At the same time, the member of the Patriotic Front 
met with Lord Carver, the presumptive British Commissioner, on the island of Malta.  
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Young was able to forge a connection to both Mugabe and Nkomo over their shared 
Christian faith, but Smith was still proceeding with his internal settlement.95  
Smith used 1978 to attempt to consolidate his position while Owen and Young 
continued to push for a settlement.  The guerilla war grew worse for the whites and the 
Africans as the cross-border raids increased and the guerillas began targeting civilian 
airliners.  White morale, which had been high for the first ten years after UDI, began to 
plummet as conscription grew more demanding, emigration increased, and the economy 
slid downhill.96 When pushed even further, Smith decided to allow elections that included 
balloting for all Africans not in the Patriotic Front.  Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the 
first black Prime Minister of the newly renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  This election, 
however, coincided with the British General Election that swung the Parliament to the 
Conservatives and made Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister.  
Opinions on the legitimacy of the election varied. The Nation sent a 
correspondent to Zimbabwe and found that the election was a “sham” and that the 
election did nothing more than put a “black mask” on “white power”.97 Freedom House, 
an American-based organization that produced a yearly report on the status of civil 
democracy in countries around the world, sent nine men to Zimbabwe to observe the 
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election.  The team concluded that 64% of the potential electorate had voted, and that the 
election “represented a significant advance to multiracial majority rule.”98 
As it became clearer that the Conservatives would most likely triumph in the 
General Election, the White House (specifically Brzezinski) began to think about how 
Margaret Thatcher would approach foreign policy.  The London embassy believed the 
difference between her and Labour would be mostly one of “tone”.  She was “pro-
American, pro-European, anti-Soviet and distrustful of change in the third world.”  She 
was also relatively inexperienced in foreign affairs, but the general Tory view was to 
preserve détente and approving of SALT, although wanting to ensure cooperation was 
tied to Soviet behavior. 99 
Prior to the General Election, Carter had hoped for a Labour victory.  Callaghan 
had escorted Carter on his trip to Britain and introduced him to the politics of the union 
hall.  Carter had reciprocated the warmth, welcoming Callaghan to the White House in 
1977 and bonding over time in the Navy.  Both men were quite socially “conservative” in 
their personal and religious convictions.  Carter was Baptist, and Callaghan was a 
monarchist.100 When the Conservatives won in 1979, Brzezinski wrote a memo to Carter 
that stressed that Thatcher and the Tories would “move with considerably more caution 
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than Labor [sp] in southern Africa”.  However, her selection of experienced Tories in the 
field of foreign affairs would “help compensate for her own lack of experience.” 
Although Thatcher and the other members of her Cabinet were quite keenly pro-US, the 
chance that her government might recognize the internal settlement in Rhodesia with 
Muzorewa was the one area where there was a real chance of trans-Atlantic tension.101 
Carter balanced the perception he supported Labour with a personal call to Thatcher.102 
Reminding Carter of their earlier 1977 meeting, Brzezinski referred to Thatcher as 
“dogmatic” then but “pragmatic” now.103 
With the election of Thatcher and Smith successfully implementing his internal 
settlement, Carter was worried that Britain would decide to cut its losses and acquiesce to 
the existence of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.  This time is perhaps the key moment of the United 
States’ diplomacy regarding the end of Rhodesia.  Young lobbied hard for Carter to reject 
the “internal settlement” and to keep sanctions in place because lifting sanctions would 
destroy much of the good will the administration had worked so hard to build in Africa.   
If either Carter or Thatcher decided to lift sanctions, that decision would create a good 
deal of pressure on the other party to do the same. Young was assisted in the this effort 
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by Representative Stephen Solarz from Brooklyn who was the decisive force in Congress 
in keeping sanctions in place against the efforts of Senator Jesse Helms.104  
In Britain, the decisive force keeping Thatcher from supporting the internal 
settlement was Lord Carrington.  Thatcher came into office sympathetic to the internal 
settlement, but Carrington convinced her otherwise.105 In his autobiography, Carrington 
pays homage to Thatcher’s “striking firmness of purpose and integrity of character.”  She 
also was possessed of a strong will and a sense of bravery rooted in duty.106  She could 
not be moved on reasons of philosophy, but would take “in everything” she received 
from her advisors.  This trait of the Prime Minister’s put a premium on ministers being 
“precise in the advice and information” that they provided.107 Once Thatcher had made 
her choice, she and Carrington had to formulate a new way ahead for Rhodesia.  Rather 
than continue further down the road of the Anglo-American agreement, Thatcher decided 
to take a new tack. She instead decided to solve the problem by returning it to British 
control.  Before that could happen, the British had to convince the Front Line States that 
this was the best approach.108  
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Thatcher would make her case for the British overseeing the resolution of the 
Rhodesia crisis at the August 1979 Commonwealth Meeting.  In the 1970s, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat had been at the forefront of calls for the New International 
Economic Order that would seek to remedy the inequities between North and South. Prior 
to the meeting, Thatcher expressed her concern to Commonwealth Secretary-General 
Shridath Ramphal that the members would be able to “transcend artificial divisions” and 
focus on the work at hand.  Because of the mixed membership between developed and 
less developed countries in the Commonwealth, the British regarded it as the best forum 
for issues related to the NIEO as the UN.109 
In preparation for Lusaka, the Commonwealth Secretariat distributed a list of the 
topics for the plenary sessions.  Two of the top three international issues of concern were 
Southeast Asia including the current state of politics in China and the refugee crisis from 
Vietnam, and Southern Africa which involved the struggle for self-determination in 
Zimbabwe.110  The Queen formally chaired Commonwealth meetings and arranged for “a 
banquet and two receptions.”  She attended the beginning of the conference, and the 
British leveraged her presence to calm some of Kaunda’s potentially inflammatory 
rhetoric.  This intrusion in politics was a risk for the monarchy, but useful in ensuring the 
smooth proceedings of the conference.111  Thatcher was nervous about the presence of the 
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Queen, but HM left after two days leaving Thatcher and Carrington to represent 
Britain.112  At the conference, discussions among the delegates were “traditionally 
undertaken in an informal, friendly and relatively unstructured way.”113 
 Thatcher addressed the opening session on 1 August.  Her speech paid tribute to 
the Commonwealth, but painted a grim picture of the future of the Third World if 
inflation and oil prices continued to rise unchecked.   She praised the role of the United 
Nations and other Commonwealth countries, notably Malaysia, in dealing with the 
refugee crisis in Asia.  For the “Rhodesia problem”, she and her country were committed 
to “genuine black majority rule.” Having made the same pledge in the Commons before 
she left for Lusaka, Britain had manifestly rejected Smith’s internal settlement.114 For 
their part, the Carter administration viewed the speech as “constructive and well-
received”.115  
Thatcher put to good use her ability to be the master of her brief in Lusaka.  
Carrington later recalled that when she was harangued by Commonwealth members 
about their economic problems and more aid was demanded, Thatcher would “stage 
whisper … for the sheet of paper setting out the details of the aid HMG was providing .. 
she put it in her purse and brought it out threateningly whenever any delegates started 
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lecturing her.”116  She had also worn glasses when getting off the plane for fear of an acid 
attack.  The glasses were not remarkable as much as her determination to get off the 
plane. 
 In spite of the fears about a diplomatic impasse before the conference, the matter 
of Rhodesia took up only half a day at the formal conference.  It was at the “weekend 
retreat” in the midst of the conference where the issue was resolved.117  On Friday August 
3rd, Southern Africa had come up as a topic among the heads of state.  Nyerere led the 
conversation and reminded the participants that Rhodesia represented a near-unique 
failure in the process of decolonization and that many countries had preserved rights for 
the minority in their constitutions.  However, Rhodesia had gone too far in preserving 
power for the whites, and there was no support for the internal settlement in black Africa.  
The other African ministers agreed, but many were impressed with Thatcher’s clear 
statement at the opening.118 Thatcher stated during the session on 3 August that Rhodesia 
had made progress in electing an African Prime Minister, but it was up to assembled 
leaders of the Commonwealth to ensure that progress continued.  She reasserted that the 
Constitution was “defective”, that the consultation with the Commonwealth countries had 
been very helpful, and that Britain as a “responsible colonial power” would find the 
solution to Rhodesia’s “problem.”119  Thatcher’s cumulative remarks were having their 
desired effect.  The press at the conference and the other Commonwealth Heads of State 
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were convinced she wanted to end minority rule in Zimbabwe.  Her linkage of the next 
constitution for Zimbabwe to the process of how many of the other countries had secured 
their post-independence constitution was important in convincing the conference that 
Britain could run a Constitutional Convention.120 
 That weekend, a small group of leaders to include Ramphal, Nyerere, Kaunda, 
and several others met with Thatcher and Carrington.  It was in these two sessions that 
the language of the communiqué came together.  It was in the words of the British 
diplomat Sir Walter Allison “better than we might have hoped.”121 At the end of the 
weekend, Thatcher wrote Jimmy Carter a letter outlining what the small group had 
achieved.  She assured him that they were working toward the “type of constitutional 
change” that the American government had been hoping would be the outcome of the 
conference.122 
The rest of the conference was remarkably calm, so much so that Carrington 
remarked in one telegram that a session was “constructive, if unexciting”.123 At the last 
session, chaired by Kaunda as the hosting head of government, several leaders praised 
Thatcher for her clarity and determination on the subject of Rhodesia.  Kaunda reminded 
Thatcher near the end of the conference that he had never “entertained hatred for the 
British people.”124 Grenada’s Prime Minister Maurice Bishop who’s New Jewel Party 
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had seized power earlier that year praised her for “clearly assuming Britain’s 
responsibility.”125 Carrington closed his note on the final session by noting that 
Thatcher’s leadership and decision on Rhodesia and its effect on the rest of the 
Commonwealth would be “for the historians … the significance of the Lusaka 
Conference.”126  
The communiqué the Commonwealth issued at the end of the conference 
confirmed that the internal settlement was “defective” and that the only way to ensure the 
“free elections” that would lead to a “democratic constitution” was a Constitutional 
Conference.127  The communiqué also echoed Thatcher in praising the efforts of the 
UNHCR in dealing with the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, as well as the efforts of 
Hong Kong and Singapore to alleviate the crisis.128  The language on Rhodesia mirrored 
that of the United Nations which condemned the internal settlement in the UN Security 
Council on 30 April in Resolution 448 which termed the settlement “null and void.”129 
As the British announced their success and the plan for the Lancaster House 
Conference, the need to keep the Americans “fully informed” was at the forefront of 
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British considerations.130  Carrington’s announcement of the success of the conference 
mentioned previous consultations with the United States, but his emphasis was on 
cooperation with the Commonwealth and the British-led initiative.131  Carrington wanted 
the Americans involved, but did not want them to leak any information early.132 
The British from the beginning were worried about the eventual success of the 
conference starting with whether all parties would accept their invitations.133  Muzorewa 
would be the leader of the official Rhodesian party, with Smith included as a “Minister 
without Portfolio.”134 The concern over attendance included the Foreign Office’s concern 
to limit Prime Minister Thatcher’s involvement.  Too much involvement meant that the 
heads of state and government would appeal to her over the head of Carrington.135   In 
addition, maintaining the support of the Commonwealth was an important part of the 
Foreign Office’s plan.  Ramphal at the Commonwealth Secretariat assured the Foreign 
Office that Nkomo planned to use the Non-Aligned Conference in early September 1979 
in Cuba to keep the rest of the Third World in line behind the conference.136  The 
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conference’s final communiqué indicated the Non Aligned Movement would only 
support the conference if it “established genuine minority rule.”137 
Eventually all the parties agreed to come to the conference.  Prime Minister 
Murorewa “accepted ‘without conditions’” but was unhappy with Smith’s participation.  
The Patriotic Front agreed as well, but they were still upset with the specific security 
proposals.  However, the Patriotic Front was under pressure from the Commonwealth to 
attend the conference.  The British worried that any intransigence on the part of the 
Rhodesian Front would trigger a withdrawal by the Patriotic Front.  The British would 
need to balance keeping the Commonwealth involved with “carrying the United States 
government with us” to keep the conditions external to the conference in check.138  If 
either the United States or the Commonwealth did not see the terms as legitimate and 
bringing about a “legitimate constitution” the international community would reject the 
terms of the agreement.139  
At this point, former revolutionary turned member of the “internal settlement” 
government Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole believed among others that Britain “was now 
in a more powerful position than it had ever been on the Rhodesian Issue.”140  The most 
intransigent of the black African leaders, Mugabe, used a trip through Yugoslavia on the 
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way to the Conference to denounce the previous internal settlement.  Mugabe noted that 
the UN and the United States had both been involved in making Britain once again a “full 
de-colonizing power.” He characterized previous Anglo-American proposals as 
“realistic’, but insisted that the guerillas would form the new security forces.  He 
accepted Britain as the authority for the conference, and wanted to make sure that the 
next Non-Aligned Conference in Havana backed the results of the Conference.141 
Thatcher and Carrington assured Murorewa that the British goal was an independent 
Zimbabwe that was acceptable to every international party.142  Once the conference 
began, Carrington took the lead and took about the task first of establishing the 
Constitution.   The next tasks were agreeing on how to make the transition, and then 
lastly setting conditions for the security handover.143   
As the conference progressed, the United States’ diplomats continued to support 
the British effort.  The embassy in London passed information from the American 
consulate in New York that President Samora Machel of Mozambigue had used the 
OAU’s prestige to keep Nkomo and Mugabe at the negotiations without precondition.144 
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The Patriotic Front agreed to come to London, but insisted they were there because of 
British failure and the success of Zimbabwean arms.145 
There was continued concern that both the Patriotic Front or Smith’s National 
Front could both sabotage the talks, and the British were concerned they had to guarantee 
elections to ensure American support.146  Ian Smith claimed early on that he was 
receiving support from the British Cabinet so that he would not have to give in to 
pressure to amend the Constitution.147 Two staffers for Senator Jesse Helms were also in 
London and passing information to the Rhodesian Front that the United States was 
planning on lifting sanctions in October.148 The Rhodesian Department at the FCO urged 
its contacts in the State Department such as Anthony Lake, then the Director of the Policy 
Planning Staff, to stress that some of the whites from Salisbury might grow more 
intransigent with greater perception of American support that would come with lifting 
sanctions.149 Helms did succeed in passing a bill in the Senate that allowed Carter to 
release Rhodesia from sanctions in November, but Carter deferred on lifting them until 
after the conference.150 By mid-October, Carrington believed that there “was no need for 
Washington to take further action at this stage.”  Excessive amounts of outside 
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involvement would both encourage intransigence on the outside parties and undermine 
the British Parliament’s legal authority to approve any settlement.151  Meeting a few days 
later, Lake relayed that the Carter administration supported the compromise Britain had 
reached for the Constitution, and contrary pressures in the Senate would not sway Carter. 
Duff also assured Lake at this point that a development fund from the international 
community was not an issue at this point.152 This meeting did not end American indirect 
involvement in the talks.  A week later, Vance helped assure the Front Line Presidents 
that the British were sincere about their efforts to bring the majority to power.153 
As part of the negotiations over the Constitution in October, Mugabe wanted to 
move beyond the British-run framework to one supervised by the United Nations.  Even 
when the Constitution was settled, Mugabe and the Patriotic Front would have preferred a 
United Nations force to a Commonwealth Force to supervise the elections. However, this 
proposal was unacceptable to Muzorewa and Smith, and even where the United Nations 
had been present in earlier end-of-colony elections in Africa the colonial power ran the 
election while the UN supervised.154  As the security force structure came into agreement, 
multiple Commonwealth countries agreed to contribute forces.155 The force would not 
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just monitor the elections but would first supervise the cease-fire.156 These countries were 
willing to participate because both the security forces and the Patriotic Front enjoy a 
general amnesty for their actions since the UDI.157 
This persuasion of the American Senate was not the only piece of public 
diplomacy undertaken by the Conservatives.  Thatcher’s lead in discussing foreign policy 
at Blackpool in her leader’s speech in December stressed that it was Britain that had 
made good on the promise of bringing about Zimbabwe in line with the country’s past 
experiences with decolonization.158  As early as October, Thatcher stressed that 
Carrington’s efforts were both in Britain’s interests and a way of enhancing “Britain’s 
standing in the world.”159 Thatcher possessed the authority to lift sanctions in November 
when the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act expired, but delayed doing so until December 
when all sides had reached the final agreement about the future of Zimbabwe.160 Britain’s 
sanctions ended on 12 December, and the United States followed three days later.161 
At the conclusion of the conference, Carrington declared that “fourteen weeks of 
concerted and concentrated effort” had laid the “foundations for a free, independent and 
                                                           
156 Carrington to Parsons et al, “Rhodesia: Statement by the British Government”, London, 23 Nov 79, 
FCO 36-2442. 
157 MEMCON, Duff and General Walls, et al, “Second Session of Bilateral Meeting”, London, 5 December 
79, FCO 36-2443. 
158 Margaret Thatcher, “Leader's speech, Blackpool 1979” http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-
archive.htm?speech=125, Accessed 10 Nov 2014. 
159 Lyne to Renwick, “Prime Minister’s Speech at Blackpool”, London, 10 Oct 79, FCO 36-2439. 
160 Carrington to Jenkins et al, “Rhodesia” London, 10 Dec 79, FCO 36-2443. 
161 Carter, “Executive Order 12183 - Revoking Rhodesian Sanctions” Washington, 16 December 1979, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31837&st=&st1=, Accessed 11 Nov 2014. 
 
 273
democratic society.”162 Days earlier, Carter had welcomed Thatcher to the White House 
and noted that he was “deeply grateful and filled with admiration at the successful efforts 
that you have brought to resolving the longstanding problems in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.”163  
As part of the agreement, Winston Churchill’s son-in-law Lord Soames became 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s last Governor-General and supervised the election in February 
1980.  There was a growing disquiet over the increasing likelihood that Mugabe would 
win the election.  Vance mentioned to Michael Palliser that the “international 
community” would not accept a government that excluded Mugabe from a coalition if he 
won the “largest number of black seats.”164  Like the previous election, Freedom House 
came and observed the election.165  Freedom House sent Leonard Sussman and Raymond 
Gastil from their staff, anti-Communist social democrat Bayard Rustin, and political 
scientist Howard Penniman.166 These observers found the election the “relatively free 
expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and to constitute a necessary 
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step toward unfettered majority rule."167 Mugabe, despite accusation of intimidation 
during the election, was now Prime Minister. 
Despite the relatively peaceful constitutional and electoral end to the seven year 
Chimurenga, at the ceremony in Salisbury where the British lowered their flag and Bob 
Marley performed “Zimbabwe”, there were signs of the discord to come. Carrington and 
children’s author Laurens van der Post (there as the guest of the Prince of Wales) noted 
that Nkomo had turned his back on his revolutionary comrade Mugabe as a gesture of 
contempt for Mugabe’s ethnically based victory.168  However, Zimbabwe was born and 
Mugabe held the reins of power.   Britain’s last African colony was gone.  
Iran 
If the creation of Zimbabwe was a British triumph, then the fall of the Shah and 
the humiliation of the United States at the hands of radicalized Iranian students was an 
American defeat.  Britain was no longer the equal partner it had been when the two 
countries overthrew Mossadagh in 1953.  However, British and American diplomats 
worked together to advise the Shah in the years before the revolution as he still sought to 
balance being a regional power with being an American client state.   
 Britain’s primary diplomat in Iran before the fall of the Shah was Anthony 
Parsons.  Parsons, a career diplomat, had spent most of his career in the Middle East with 
short tenures at the United Nations during the late 1960s and the American Department 
                                                           
167 Freedom House, “Report of the Freedom House Observer Team: The Common Role Election in 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), February 1980,” World Affairs 143, no. 1 (Summer 1980): 90. 




during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  He had seen revolution at a distance in 1958 with the 
death of Said in Iraq and up close in Sudan in 1964.169   He had been witness to the 
decolonization of Britain’s Middle Eastern Empire and headed to Iran just after OPEC 
had quadrupled oil prices in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.  He was the 
Ambassador there for almost the entire time that Labour was in power from 1974 to 
1979.  Opinions of his performance in the role varied.  As the crisis grew in early 1979, 
Tony Benn complained to his diary that Parsons had been feeding the Cabinet bad 
information throughout the crisis from both Tehran and New York.170  
When Parsons arrived, Iran was in the midst of the White Revolution as the Shah 
used oil revenue to modernize his country.  However, in building economic advantage 
prior to the ever-delayed political liberalization the Shah had managed to alienate not just 
the traditionalist Shia clerics of the villages but also the educated urban middle class of 
Tehran.  However, as long as economic growth kept up, the country was relatively quiet.  
The “oil shock” of 1974, so destructive to both the Third World and West, was a short 
term boom to Iran.  Britain sold 36% of its military exports to Iran, and Tehran was 
becoming a hub of foreign business investment.171  The American presence, in particular, 
was quite substantial.  However, this rapid attempt at modernization provoked a growing 
domestic discontent, and the Shah began to attempt to liberalize Iran through domestic 
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reforms as the economy began to falter.172  Tocqueville’s quip that “the most critical 
moment for bad governments is the one which witnesses their first steps toward reform” 
was certainly true of Iran.173 
 With the influx of money into Iran due to the global spike in oil prices and the 
Shah’s aggressive courtship of outside capital and expertise, the economy quickly 
overheated and the country’s infrastructure could not keep up with the increased urban 
population and demand for consumer goods.  The Shah’s White Revolution had 
combined authoritarian rule with attempts to impose western education and land reform 
on the traditional rural population.  The introduction of Western education into rural 
areas, especially where women taught male children, alienated the traditional Shia 
clerics.174  Land reform weakened the power of the rural elite and increased the 
population inflow into urban centers.   All of these factors meant that the Shah had 
alienated almost every possible base of support except the military.  Outside observers 
even heard criticism of the Shah from his closest representatives.175 
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 Although the American embassy fell in late 1979, 1978 from the month of 
Moharram (which includes the Day of Ashura, a significant day in the Shia tradition) to 
the next Moharram was when the Shah lost control. What began as a localized revolt in 
Qom centered on the death of Ayatollah Khomeini’s son and the Shah’s ham-fisted 
response blossomed in to a full-scale revolt.176  The brutality of the Shah’s repression 
grew, as did questions within the United States of the wisdom and morality of supplying 
the Shah with anti-riot gear.  
Parsons and Ambassador William Sullivan often met with the Shah together, and 
Parsons grew increasingly skeptical of the Shah’s ability to rule.  He later attributed this 
insight to the time spent in Sudan before the coup there.177 Sullivan was more positive in 
his assessments of the Shah’s abilities until almost the end.  When Sullivan did change 
his mind, the effect on official opinion in Washington was dramatic and tilted most of the 
Carter administration’s officials other than Brzezinski away from supporting the Shah in 
his final days.178  Despite this change, Sullivan would still offer some support to the Shah 
even as his rule became less and less tenable.  National Security Council member 
Commander Gary Sick noted that Ambassador Sullivan’s reversal of opinion on 2 Nov 
1978 had perhaps an even greater effect on American policy as it made it possible for 
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elements of the American government to admit that the Shah’s regime was not resilient 
enough to survive.179   
The White House was aware of the potential danger to Americans in Iran as the 
Shah’s grip on power grew shakier.  In November 1978 after Sullivan’s shocking change 
of opinion, Brzezinski was warned that the religious fervor of the season combined with 
the possible repression of the Shah’s security forces could trigger a public backlash 
against Americans or other foreigners. Some Americans in Iran had already received 
death threats.  Despite these warnings, the consensus between Sullivan and Parsons was 
that if the Shah made it through December, he might be able to pull off the transition to 
the role of a constitutional monarch against Khomeini’s wishes.180  This British 
concurrence with American reporting was still true a month later as the Shah struggled to 
turn day-to-day politics over to his Prime Minister while he tried to deal with larger 
political issues.181 
The analysis of the National Security Council in late 1978 focused on the 
increasing violence.  Parsons’ reports about the increasing number of deaths in recent 
urban riots raised concerns about the safety of American citizens.  Companies had 
already begun to send family members home, and wives and children of military families 
had to pay their way home in the absence of a formal evacuation.  There was a concern 
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that the Communists would attack families to draw an American or an Iranian response or 
to cause an evacuation which would undermine the Shah. The council wanted to stay 
away from criticisms of the Shah at this time and to not put pressure on him about the 
specific form of the next government.182 
As the Shah’s multiple attempts to form a government failed and the cycle of 
repression in the streets escalated, the Iranian government began to splinter.  The Shah 
had deliberately avoided putting his most repressive generals in positions of power.183  
Eventually, the Shah fled on 16 January 1979 and turned the government over to Shapour 
Bakhtiar.  Bakhtiar allowed the Ayatollah Khomeini to return to Iran from Paris, and the 
Ayatollah’s followers quickly began to take the leading role in the Revolution.184 
While the Revolution gathered steam, students assaulted the American embassy in 
Tehran on 14 February 1979.   The siege only lasted two hours and ended when the 
provisional deputy Prime Minister escorted the armed militants away.185 This attack 
resulted in the embassy shipping its classified material back to the United States and 
reducing its staffing.  However, as 1979 wore on, material and people started flowing 
back to the embassy as the US government grew more comfortable working with the 
moderates in Khomeini’s revolutionary government.  This included meetings with the 
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remaining charge d’affairs Bruce Laingen and a meeting by Brzezinski with Iranian 
moderates in Algiers.186 
As 1979 went on and the Ayatollah gained more power, the revolution grew more 
destructive to the non-theocratic elements.  The new Constitution made the Ayatollah the 
supreme human power in Iran.187  To both the American and the Soviets, the revolution 
presented a challenge. America’s client and strategic bulwark had been lost as had an 
important source of the world’s oil.  For the Soviets, a cleric had spearheaded and now 
controlled an anti-imperial revolution.  The later Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted 
in Moscow’s embassy coming under multiple attacks in 1980.  The new regime was 
hostile to both sides in the Cold War.188 
While the Ayatollah consolidated power, the Shah was increasingly ill with 
cancer.  After time in the Bahamas and Mexico, the Shah was admitted to New York for 
treatment. Outraged at this decision, a group of Iranian students seized the American 
embassy on 4 November 1979.  The ruling clerics did not direct this action, but in a 
single day the students further radicalized the revolution and gave the Ayatollah a 
powerful weapon.  Three of the American staff were stuck in the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry and would remain there for most of the crisis.189 
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In the chaos surrounding the capture of the American embassy, few noticed that 
the British embassy had suffered a similar fate.  For five hours on 5 November, Iranian 
radicals seized British diplomats and their families before fading away.  This was similar 
to the raid on the American embassy months before, but it illustrated that the British 
embassy was just as vulnerable as the American one.190  Parliament was initially more 
concerned with the safety of the diplomats’ families than the American embassy, and was 
unsure who to protest to given the confusing structure of the Iranian government.191 
One of the only ways that the United States government had to influence the 
situation inside Iran was fiscal pressure through sanctions.  For these sanctions to be 
effective, the United States would need the aid of its allies.  When asked in late 
November if she planned to block Iranian funds in Britain, Thatcher initially replied that 
the government did not have the authority to do so.192 Vance met with Henderson along 
with Donald McHenry on 22 December to secure British support for sanctions on Iran.  
Henderson expressed concern that British sanctions could trigger violence against British 
interests in Iran.  McHenry replied that the danger must be weighed against the damage 
Iranian actions were inflicting on the “role of international law”.  The British wanted to 
execute their actions through the United Nations and to ensure that sanctions would not 
cover humanitarian exports and “means of communication.” Both sides agreed that the 
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Soviet Union’s emphasis on the “inviolability” of embassies had helped.  Henderson also 
noted that the British embassy was quietly reducing its staff, and that the 300 or so 
“unofficial Britishers” in Iran had begun to leave for the holidays.193  By the time of the 
hostage taking, the British government estimated that between 400-500 Britons were 
living in Tehran.194 Conversely, the year prior the British government tracked 10,079 
students from Iran studying in Britain.195  In contrast, in 1976 there had been nearly 
100,000 Americans in Iran, many of whom were connected to the expansion of the 
Shah’s military and his modernization projects.196 
While there were concerns about the number of Iranian students in the US and 
Britain, Khomeini’s reach showed itself in some unexpected places as well. When 
Islamic extremists inside Saudi Arabia seized the Grand Mosque, Khomeini blamed the 
United States.  With a week, crowds burned down American embassies in Islamabad and 
Tripoli.  In Islamabad, one Marine died during the attack.197 
The United States’ push for sanctions on Iran ran into another difficulty.  On 
Christmas 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  This event was perhaps the last 
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straw for Carter and pushed him decisively in favor of Brzezinski’s more hostile view of 
the Soviet Union over Vance’s more diplomatic approach. The tensions surrounding the 
Soviet actions led to the Soviet Union vetoing UN Resolution 461 to authorize sanctions 
against Iran.  Without the legal authority of a UN resolution, Thatcher’s government 
could do very little economically against Iran.198 During Young’s tenure at the United 
Nations, the Soviets had not vetoed any of his resolutions.  This impressive record for the 
Carter administration could not stand against the Soviet Union’s aggression.199  Without 
the backing of the United Nations, the only sanctions against Iran were the assets in 
excess of $12 billion in assets that remained frozen in the United States. The effect on the 
Iranian economy went beyond the loss of this combination of private and corporate 
currency.  Carter’s freeze meant that Iranian assets in European banks could not process 
transactions through the currency hub in New York.  Iran protested, but since Iran had 
been found at fault by the International Court of Justice and the financial institutions that 
processed the transactions were in the United States and therefore under American law 
there was no recourse for the revolutionary regime in Tehran.200  
Less successful at an international level at resolving the crisis was Secretary 
General Waldheim’s attempt to find a diplomatic solution.  Waldheim wrote Khomeini 
two days after the siege began.  The tone of his letter was solicitous in the extreme, but he 
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reminded the Ayatollah that the safety of diplomats was “codified” and “long-standing”. 
The letter did no good.201  Waldheim received a letter back from Bani-sadr that blamed 
Eisenhower, Dulles, Eden, and American censorship for the current crisis and claimed the 
crisis could be resolved if the United States admitted its guilt and returned Iran’s frozen 
and stolen assets.202 Waldheim later went to Tehran to see if he could negotiate the 
hostages’ release, but Khomeini refused him an audience and Waldheim endured the 
same propaganda campaign that most visiting Westerners received.203 
As the crisis went on and even seemed to expand, what concerned the Foreign 
Office the most was the increasing tendency of the Carter administration to make 
decisions without consulting their allies. Announcing the Carter doctrine that called for 
repelling any outside force entering the Middle East, ignoring NATO in the policy for 
Afghanistan, withdrawing their Moscow ambassador, the embargo of grain against the 
Soviets, and the choice to boycott the Olympics: the United States did all these things 
without consulting any major European ally.204  
Although there was widespread belief that a rescue mission might be in the works, 
there was also skepticism about its viability. In Carrington’s mind, an “Entebbe-like” 
operation to rescue the hostages was impossible.  Any premature American military 
action would dissipate sympathy and would create equivalence in the region with the 
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Carrington and the FCO were also worried that any 
internal disruption would simply strengthen the hand of the revolutionaries and push 
Khomeini to further defiance.205 Conversely, Gary Sick of the NSC held the opinion that 
the only way to push Khomeini to release the hostages (outside of a purely military 
intervention) was through sanctions. One of the British ideas for ending the immediate 
crisis at this point came from Anthony Parsons.  Parsons’ suggestion for ending the crisis 
was using the Human Rights Council.  In brief, immediately after the American hostages 
were released, the United Nations would launch an investigation into the situation in Iran 
prior to the Revolution. When Henderson presented this idea at a meeting with 
representatives of the National Security Council and the State Department, State’s Iran 
expert Henry Precht informed Henderson that McHenry at the US Mission in New York 
had not informed them of the proposal but that it was “not realistic.”206  The British view 
from the embassy suggested that the split of opinion that had marked the conduct of 
Carter’s foreign policy so far continued with Vance pushing for diplomacy and 
Brzezinski pushing for a mission to rescue the hostages.207 
While Carter struggled to find a way to free the hostages, he was also attempting 
to win his party’s nomination for the Presidency.  Neoconservatives had perhaps their 
worst fears confirmed when in March 1980 Young’s successor Donald McHenry voted 
along with the majority on the Security Council to condemn Israeli actions in their West 
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Bank settlements.   The Carter administration had initially backed away from the vote 
until three weeks later when Vance in one of his last acts as Secretary of State confirmed 
that the vote accurately reflected the United States’ policy. This admission extended the 
Democratic primaries by giving Kennedy an important win in New York and 
significantly weakened Carter’s chances for re-election.208  This was the breaking point 
for many neoconservatives who saw an administration that fused the appeasement of the 
establishment with the appeasement of the Third World.  McHenry served out his term, 
but his vote and the refusal of the Carter administration to fully repudiate it pushed 
neoconservatives to the right and reinforced the need for a more combative presence at 
the United Nations. 
Indicative of the mood in the Democratic-controlled Senate as the crisis wore on, 
Frank Church and Jacob Javits sent a joint letter to Cyrus Vance urging him to consult 
with the Senate about any impending military action against Iran.  Carter’s public 
statements had not ruled out military force as a possibility, and the continued failures in 
Iran along with Carter’s direction of an American capability to respond militarily to 
outside (ie Soviet) threats to the Middle East demanded that the President fulfill the law 
by consulting the Senate.209  Carter did not inform the Senate before but did file a report 
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after the rescue attempt.210  Javits and Church were both out of the Senate less than a year 
later.211 
After the mission failed, Carter sent Thatcher a personal note explaining reasons 
for the failure and that the “sole purpose” of the mission had been “the release of the 
hostages.”212  He also pledged not to conduct further military action without consulting 
his allies.213  Despite the failures of the rescue attempt, Carrington and Henderson both 
believed that Britain was still a stronger ally than either France or Germany.  However, 
Europe at large seemed to the American people to be unhelpful in an increasingly dire 
world.214 This growing divergence became clear during Carrington’s visit to Washington 
in early May.  Carrington met with Muskie, Brzezinski, and members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.   He wanted to ensure these politicians knew there was 
little stomach in Europe for renewed military action while sanctions were hurting 
Europeans more than Americans.215  
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International opinion was mostly hostile to the American rescue attempt.  There 
were exceptions to this sentiment in the aftermath.  En route to an OAU summit the week 
after the attempt, Nyerere called on Iran to release the American hostages and for the 
evacuation of “foreign” troops from Afghanistan.216  British reports from Tehran 
indicated that although the Iranians had scattered the hostages to prevent a second 
attempt, there was a new threat to foreigners.217  The British embassy proposed the Carter 
administration provide the United Nations or the Non Aligned Movement as a forum for 
the Iranians to air their grievances, to “do nothing” and let the incident decrease in 
importance, or even to find a way to let the Iranians place the diplomats on trial and then 
expel them.  The false “show trial” had been a practice of Israel and Syria in the past 
decades, but it had the weakness of getting a rigged trial to turn out the way everyone 
wanted and for the Iranians to “keep the bargain.”218 
Just after the rescue mission, there was a strange but shorter sequel.  On 30 April, 
Iranian Arab separatists seized the Iranian embassy in London.  The siege went on for 
several days until Thatcher ordered the British Army’s anti-terrorist force to storm the 
embassy and return it to Iranian control. This was not the first time an embassy was 
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assaulted in London.  In 1973, three Pakistanis attacked the Indian High Commission and 
took hostages.  Two of the terrorists were killed and one was arrested.219  
Throughout the London siege, Thatcher used the British ambassador in Dubai to 
keep the Iranians informed.  This dialogue had the purpose not just of securing tacit 
Iranian acceptance of the British handling of the crisis, but also of laying a foundation of 
reciprocity which might be used later to resolve the hostage crisis.220 
As time dragged on, it became apparent that Britain’s role in ending the hostage 
crisis would be a fiscal conduit rather than as a diplomatic partner. The main conduit for 
the American connection to the British financial actions was the American embassy in 
Grosvenor Square, then headed by former Yale President Kingman Brewster.  Brewster 
was a popular ambassador with the British. He served more as a symbol of Carter’s 
commitment to appoint qualified men and women to be ambassadors than as a 
policymaker.221 The embassy had been the site of anti-Shah protests prior to the 
Revolution which then morphed into more purely anti-American protests.222  Brewster 
was a liberal New England patrician Republican, one of a dying breed.  Brewster’s 
knowledge of finance and international law was an important part of creating a method 
by which the United States could release funds back to Iran that it had frozen.  
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Exchanging these billions, along with an apology and the departure of Carter, helped put 
an end to the hostage crisis.223  
As it became clear that the United States and Iran would exchange each other’s 
frozen assets as the way of ending the standoff, a Labour backbencher asked if some of 
the Iranian funds could be used to fund the education of Iranian students in Britain.  
Douglas Hurd, then a Minister of State at the Foreign Office, stated that it would be 
“entirely inappropriate” for the British government to make that request.224 
Conclusion 
At the end of Carter’s term in office, Zimbabwe had faded as an issue from the 
front lines of the struggle for self-determination in southern Africa.  What remained and 
would surpass it as an issue in the next decade was the struggle over apartheid in South 
Africa.225  Iran would struggle in its brutal border war with Iraq, and would begin 
supporting terrorism and kidnapping throughout the Middle East.226   
By 1981, the Third World with its revolutions, cartel control, and numbers, 
seemed to have checked the United States. Khomeini remained in power in Iran when 
Carter had left the White House.  Mugabe and Nkomo and the leaders of the 
Commonwealth brought Smith to Lancaster House, and Carrington’s skills and patience 
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as a diplomat kept them there.  In the analysis of Kissinger’s point man for African 
issues, the combination of Carter’s liberal desires and Thatcher’s firmness was the 
winning combination that forced Smith to capitulate.227   
The fundamental reason the United States and Britain could not successfully 
undertake a joint project to solve the problems of either Rhodesia or Iran was the power 
of the Third World in 1979.  For Iran, the disintegration of the Shah’s regime and the 
power that now rested with the mullahs meant that all the United States could do was 
work at the edges.  In Iran, there was even less the British could do than the United 
States. In Rhodesia, the decisive moment in settling the crisis was not Thatcher’s 
relationship with Carter but Thatcher’s convincing of her fellow Commonwealth leaders 
that Britain was serious about ending Smith’s rule.  The United States played only an 
indirect role in bringing about a settlement.   
This moment of Third World power would wane with the debt and low 
commodities prices of the next decade.  However, the strength of the Third World had 
ended Johnson’s presidency, the British Empire, Bretton Woods, and conquered Vietnam.  
Its triumph over the best laid Anglo-American plans at a moment of weakness for both 
countries was a logical outcome of the trends of the previous decade.   
The diplomatic effort over Rhodesia and Iran do reveal one insight into the nature 
of the Special Relationship.  Carter’s closest relations with foreign leaders were not with 
fellow democrats.   Carter admired Sadat, and forged a close relationship with Omar 
                                                           




Torrijos. His relations with democrats were less cordial.  Carter and Begin were never as 
close as Carter and Sadat, and Schmidt and Carter had a break in 1980 over leaks about 
Germany’s positions on nuclear weapons.  In contrast, Carter’s relations with Thatcher 
were the closest of any democratic leader without the personal warmth that Carter shared 
with Callaghan or Thatcher shared with Reagan.  This closeness translated into 
Thatcher’s ability to use the Commonwealth to pressure Smith, and for Carter to know 
the British government was doing all it could during the hostage crisis.  Respect mattered 
more than rapport.   
Both politicians also understood the importance of whom they would send to the 
United Nations and who they sent to each other’s country as an Ambassador.  Thatcher 
sent an ambassador to Washington who had echoed in print her views on British decline, 
and sent an Ambassador to the United Nations would was one of the few civil servants 
she trusted.  Carter dispatched a true Establishment figure to Britain and a true believer to 
the United Nations.  Each appointed as their chief foreign policy advisor a figure who 
was deeply reassuring the other country’s foreign policy establishment.  Each would lose 
that same advisor over the issue of military force.  
The Thatcher-Carter Years of the Anglo-American relationship saw two 
politicians who had defied the odds wrestle with issues that had vexed their predecessors.  
Thatcher’s success was no great comfort to Carter’s fortunes, and Carter’s defeat 
provided Thatcher with a more personally and politically compatible American President 
as her partner.  However, Reagan’s choices at the United Nations would prove a far 
greater challenge to the Anglo-American relationship than any of Young’s words or 
McHenry’s votes.  That bomb would lay buried until Argentina exploded it in 1982.
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Chapter 7: “Stubbornly Democratic”1: The Aftermath of the 1970s on Anglo-American 
Politics 
 
The end of the Carter administration was the climax of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 
apostasy from the orthodoxy of the Democratic Party.  The first years of the Reagan 
administration and the re-election campaign in 1982 brought Moynihan back into the 
Democratic fold.  Moynihan did not join in the transition of the neoconservatives from 
dissenting Democrats to erstwhile Republicans.  He maintained his iconoclastic status in 
Washington, but the standard conservative critique of Moynihan’s twenty four years in 
the Senate was that he said all the right things but voted the wrong way.2 
 Moynihan signaled his intention to remain a force within the Democratic Party 
much the same way he had brought neoconservatism into the struggle over the future of 
the Third World: with an article in Commentary.  Published in February 1981, “’Joining 
the Jackals’: The U.S. at the UN 1977-1980” took Moynihan’s earlier work as a rubric 
and used it to evaluate the conduct of the Carter administration. Moynihan was more 
sanguine about the Third World than he had been in 1975.  The end of the Emergency in 
India had restored that country to its place as the world’s largest democracy.  Some 
Caribbean and Central American countries were maintaining both positive relations with 
the US and a friendly voting record in the United Nations.  However, in Moynihan’s 
analysis the majority of the Third World was still inclined against the United States and 
                                                           
1 Moynihan, “‘Joining the Jackals’: The U.S. at the UN 1977-1980.” In his article, Moynihan refers to 
Israel with this term.  It would seem to equally apply to both Britain and the United States.  
2 William F. Buckley, CSPAN Interview “Getting it Right”, 26 March 2003, http://www.c-




in favor of an internationalized version of British socialism.  Carter and his 
administration were found wanting in their ability to manage this reality.   
Moynihan saved some of his choicest criticisms for Ambassador Donald 
McHenry’s vote against Israel in the Security Council in March 1980.  The vote and 
Vance’s subsequent defense of it before Congress was perceived to have cost Carter a 
win in the New York primary, as well as costing him the chance to end Senator Edward 
Kennedy’s ultimately futile and self-involved insurgency.  A dollar spent combating 
Kennedy was a dollar lost with which to fight Reagan later, and this may have been the 
difference between victory and defeat in November.3  Moynihan, however, was 
concerned with more than the results of the 1980 election.  The defeat of Carter pointed 
to a larger problem in the Democratic Party.   
 Moynihan did not so much Carter as he did the McGovernite coalition within the 
Democratic Party.   Moynihan believed the influence of these voices was less important 
in the execution of foreign policy than in its conception.  The vision that had triumphed 
in much of the Democratic Party was one where “if the United States denied itself the 
means of aggression, it would cease to be aggressive.”4  This vision, along with the 
Carter administration’s attempt to move beyond the Cold War to focus on economic aid 
and human rights, placed the Third World in the forefront of Carter’s foreign policy 
calculations.  Moynihan sought to judge Carter and his administration on their foreign 
policy performance, therefore, in the Third World’s preferred arena: the United Nations.  
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 The real villain of Moynihan’s piece was neither Andrew Young nor Jimmy 
Carter.  It was not the staff of the United States’ Mission with whom Moynihan had such 
a rocky relationship.  It was Cyrus Vance.  Vance, by either commission or omission, had 
missed the fact that his (and the country’s) mission to the United Nations had allowed not 
just an ally but the Camp David process and the expulsion of the USSR from Egypt to be 
brought under assault.    His influence on the State Department was such that even after 
his resignation the Mission allowed the General Assembly to judge Israel guilty of 
violating the Fourth Geneva Convention in December 1980. Israel had faced an 
escalating campaign of de-legitimization since the early 1970s, and now it looked as if 
that campaign (run from the Third World and at least tacitly supported by the USSR) was 
nearing its culmination.   
What was worse for Moynihan than these individual votes was that the 
Democratic Party as a whole had begun to succumb to the Third World’s view of the 
United States.  The gentlemen of the Establishment (of whom Moynihan and the 
neoconservatives had been skeptical) had seemingly lost their nerve.  First they had 
crumbled before the New Left at home, and now they bowed to the Third World abroad. 
The election of Reagan meant the end of their influence on the Republican Party.5 
Some of the neoconservatives saw the contradictions of the Carter administration 
in more general terms. For Carl Gersham, one of Moynihan’s intellectual allies during the 
battles of 1975, the struggle between Brzezinski and Vance was one of power rather than 
                                                           
5 Kabaservice, The Guardians. Kabaservice argues that George H.W. Bush was not a member of the 
Establishment due to his beliefs and his public embrace of the conservatism of the American Southwest.  In 
contrast, Elliot Richardson retained the perspective and beliefs of the northeastern Establishment and was 
out of place in the 1980’s Republican Party.   
 
 296
end.  Vance’s principles were arms control and détente, while Brzezinski’s goal was 
managing the growing interconnectedness of the world.  Neither man, to Gersham, was 
actually for bringing about democracy (even social democracy) within the Communist 
world.6 Gersham was too harsh in his assessment. In the end, Carter and Brzezinski were 
able to see the difference between the Soviet Union’s actions and their rhetoric.  Vance, 
with his abiding concern about arms control and diplomacy above all else, could not. 
Carter increased defense spending and created the baseline for military capability that 
would allow the US to intervene directly in the Middle East.7  
The ultimate irony of Moynihan’s life and career was that he was so singular a 
figure he could not carry either party with him.  He could not even give as many cheers 
for capitalism as Kristol, and his passion for liberty and his intellectual consistency put 
him at odds with both parties.  Moynihan cheered for Kennedy in 1980, but Kennedy’s 
views on foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union were far more conciliatory than 
Carter’s. Moynihan was secure in the Senate with New York’s support, but it was 
doubtful that his politics would play among many other of the 49 states.  The criticism 
from the New York Times and others at the end of his career that he had not accomplished 
much legislatively was less a result of Moynihan’s political skills than the profound 
hesitation within both political parties to follow ideas to their logical conclusions.8  To 
                                                           
6 Carl Gersham, “The Rise & Fall of the New Foreign-Policy Establishment,” Commentary, July 1980. 
7 Paul Davis, Observations on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1982). 
 
8 Moynihan was genuinely angered that the New York Times would publish such a cruel piece in the 
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Moynihan, the Republicans thought too much of the Soviets and the Democrats thought 
too well of them.  Moynihan’s middle way, which he at least considered an extension of 
containment, was simply an electoral non-starter on the national level.9  
The World in 1980 
The political and economic situations in the United States and Britain were worse 
at the end of 1980 than they had been in 1975.   In Britain, unemployment was growing 
and with it grew the Tory dread that Thatcher’s government was failing just like 
Heath’s.10  In the United States, another Third World crisis had ended another 
Democratic presidency.  The second oil crisis of the decade had spawned gas lines and 
triggered a recession.  The Cold War had returned thanks to the issue of Intermediate 
Range missiles in Europe and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.11   
Anglo-American diplomacy had eliminated some of the problems of 1975.  Most 
notably, Zimbabwe had come into existence without an expansion of Soviet influence in 
Southern Africa.  Britain had played a small but crucial role in finally ending the hostage 
crisis with Iran, but the United States still faced a dangerous regional power whose 
actions would continue to plague the Reagan administration.12  Both the United States 
and Britain were cooperating with the UNHCR to solve the problems related to the 
                                                           
9 Moynihan to George Mitchell, (undated, likely 1991-1992), Reprinted in Ibid., 590. 
10 Moore, Margaret Thatcher, 522. 
11 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 861–870. 
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continuing refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, but the global refugee crisis continued to 
grow.13   
Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, but the Carter administration’s commitment to the 
project forced Carter to defend Young long after it would have been expedient to remove 
him.  By appointing a Permanent Representative to the United Nations that was in some 
ways a recognition of the contributions of a domestic interest group, Carter took a risk in 
politicizing the United Nations.  Whereas Moynihan’s rhetoric propelled him into the 
Senate from New York, Young’s diplomacy inflamed both traditional conservatives and 
the emerging neoconservative movement.  
One of the major impacts of the growing role of the United Nations in Anglo-
American relations in the 1970s was the adoption of an intellectually combative approach 
to the United Nations by Republicans.  This neoconservative focus on the United Nations 
meant it became more rather than less of a factor in American politics.  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s ambassador for his first term, lasted far longer than Moynihan at 
Turtle Bay while firing off rhetoric even more damaging to the electoral prospects of 
those on the left of the American political spectrum.14  Neoconservatives saw the United 
Nations not just as a dangerous place, but also as an important place as befitted their 
background in the Democratic Party. Rather than ignore it, Democrats saw it as a place 
worth fighting in and fighting for.  Kirkpatrick’s presence was a visible symbol that it 
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was the neoconservative rather than the isolationist or Establishment streams of 
conservative thought that had triumphed in this area of foreign policy after 1980.  
Kirkpatrick and the elements of the State Department that supported her in 1982 earned 
the wrath of those on the British political right.15 However, Weinberger’s aid and 
Reagan’s choices ultimately overruled Kirkpatrick.16 
Reagan, like Ford, reached across party lines to put a Democrat in the United 
Nations who again believed it was a place to struggle against illiberal forces.  Moynihan 
argued for more liberal democracy as the long term hope for the United States.  
Kirkpatrick had much the same long-term aim, but she was far more willing to publicly 
defend “authoritarian” allies with the caveat that they would be more likely to turn 
toward liberal democracy.17  What Kirkpatrick (and nearly everyone else) failed to 
foresee was the rapid transitions of Communist governments in Eastern Europe a decade 
later.  Totalitarian governments could turn democratic.  They just had to first fail utterly.  
The importance of the United Nations as a forum for justifying Anglo-American 
actions continued past the Cold War.  The UN’s lack of approval for NATO’s operations 
in Kosovo in 1999 was one controversial piece of the bombing campaign. Colin Powell’s 
insistence on bringing the case against Saddam Hussein to the United Nations was as 
much an attempt to gain domestic support for the war as it was an attempt to sway the 
world.   George Bush made the case against the Baathist regime in Iraq in September 
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2002, and Powell again in February 2003.  Eventually, to be too critical of the United 
Nations was fundamentally disqualifying for service at Turtle Bay.  John Bolton 
expressed variations on the themes of Moynihan voiced a generation earlier, but his 
nomination never made it past the Senate.  
As a factor in domestic politics, the United Nations was far more important in 
American political life than in Britain.  British governments of both persuasions accepted 
the boundaries imposed by the United Nations far more than the United States did.  
Kirkpatrick’s presence at the United Nations was an enduring repudiation of Carter by 
the Reagan administration. In the years hence, Carter’s reputation has waned and waxed, 
and far more than Ford’s been the subject of continuing debate in American Presidential 
elections.  Part of the reason for this enduring struggle over the rightness of Carter was 
the administration’s often contradictory foreign policy.  Proponents of Carter promote his 
dedication to human rights to defend his Presidency, while Carter’s antagonists cite Iran 
and inflation as the prime examples of why Carter was broadly a failure.18  
Despite the debates over Iran, Afghanistan, and Carter’s conception of human 
rights, one area where Carter’s foreign policy was unquestioningly successful was his 
relations with Britain, particularly when compared to Reagan’s first term in office.  
Carter’s team argued about the correct course of American foreign policy, but his 
administration’s normal relations with the British had some advantages.  They could at 
least take credit in the fact their actions did lead to questions over whether HMG was in 
                                                           
18 The revisionist views of the Carter administration are captured in Douglas Brinkley, Gerald R. Ford, 
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fact in charge of what happened regarding nuclear weapons in Britain following an 
American military strike on Libya.19  Members of the Carter administration did not dine 
with members of a foreign government who were to invade a British territory the next 
day.20  Jimmy Carter did not order the invasion of a Commonwealth country without the 
consent of the British.21  Although Carter had poor relations with foreign leaders that 
ranged from Schmidt to Begin to the Ayatollah, he worked well with the British in many 
areas in the Third World and beyond.   
Carter’s great failure was not his mixture of morality and appeals to political 
expediency, but it was his failure to make his change of opinion matter.  A new 
forcefulness and purpose triggered by both the renewed aggression of the Soviet Union 
outside its borders or rhetorical volleys at the Students Following the Line of Iman meant 
nothing when the Soviets remained intransigent, the hostages remained in captivity, and 
inflation and gas prices rose precipitously.  These failures which seemed to conservative 
commentators at the time an echo of Britain’s weaknesses in the 1930s were fatal to 
Carter’s Presidency. 
Carter’s true heir might not have been Barack Obama, but George W. Bush.  
Instead of striving for order, Bush strove for liberty within some limits (China for 
example was not a focus of his efforts).  He viewed despotism as the true danger to the 
United States.  Had 100,000 people in Ohio voted the other way in 2004, Bush and Carter 
would share the legacy of leaving office in the midst of escalating foreign policy 
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disasters.  Bush’s second term was most notable for his rejection of the advice of the Iraq 
Study Group and forfeiting the Republican Party’s electoral prospects to enact the 
Surge.22 A second Carter term might have produced similar results if Carter without 
Vance or Young in the administration had adopted a harsher line against Soviet actions 
against the wishes of many in his party and the protests of the nuclear freeze movement.  
The relationship between Carter and Thatcher was perhaps the least “special” of 
the relations between a Prime Minister and a President during the Cold War.  It did not 
have the tensions of Truman and Clement Attlee, the conflict between Eisenhower and 
Eden, Macmillan and Kennedy’s self-styled dramatics, Wilson and Johnson’s feud, 
Nixon and Heath’s distance, or the warmness between both Ford and Carter with 
Callaghan.  Thatcher supported Carter’s nuclear strategy and gave what help she could in 
Iran, while Carter supported Carrington’s efforts in Lusaka and Lancaster House without 
direct American involvement in the day-to-day negotiations.  
Like Ford and Carter, James Callaghan deserves reconsideration as well. 
Callaghan had, much like Attlee before him, a way of being both a low-key and 
reassuring leader and a skilled manager of a group of proud, intellectual, and driven 
political animals.  A man who could balance Roy Jenkins’ Euro-enthusiasms, Denis 
Healey’s erudition, Tony Benn’s rabble-rousing, and David Owen’s crusading while 
countering both Margaret Thatcher’s criticisms and the campaigns of the IRA seems to 
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merit a greater regard than he is given.  Callaghan kept Britain a strong member of 
NATO, held Argentina in check, and achieved a temporary peace with the unions until 
the late fall of 1978.23  
Thatcher was more able than Callaghan to balance a relationship with the United 
States with the demands of her party and of the Commonwealth.  One of the factors that 
made this possible was a lack of anti-American voices in her Cabinet.  High Tory 
criticism of the United States by politicians like Enoch Powell and journalists such as 
Henry Fairlie was not as prominent in the ruling Tories as the anti-American criticisms of 
Tony Benn were in Labour.24  Thatcher was a democratic head of government that Carter 
could work with, even if she and he stood far apart on the tone and content of 
governance.   
Despite the enduring debate over Carter’s legacy, the politician who deserves 
reconsideration most from this era is Gerald Ford.  Ford left office after a loss that proved 
he could neither unite nor inspire the Republican Party.  He came closer to losing the 
nomination that Carter did four years later, and lost a close election thanks to a gaffe in 
the second Presidential debate.25  Like Truman, Ford was a man who rose to the job.  
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Like Truman, he came up in politics through the legislative branch.  He faced a hostile 
Congress and a divided party and was able to govern in spite of his problems.    
The rehabilitation of Ford must begin with how his contemporaries viewed him.  
He was an odd choice for a man to earn so much respect, but Ford looms large in many of 
his contemporaries’ lives as both a statesman and a good man.  He was Kissinger’s 
protector, Young’s agent of stability in that most tumultuous of American times, 
Callaghan’s friend – far more than Carter, and Moynihan’s example.26 
He did the right things, even if he did not always know it.  Vladivostok and 
Helsinki were forthright diplomatic efforts at preserving something of détente and maybe 
even searching for a sense of normalcy between the two superpowers.  Ford did not 
challenge the spending authority of Congress when South Vietnam was dissolving and 
the funds it needed to stretch its survival were cut off.  He pardoned Nixon in spite of the 
cost and then appeared before Congress to justify his choice.  In an era of partisan tension 
and questions over the most basic of Constitutional views, Ford respected Congress 
enough to both veto their legislation and listen to their concerns.  Although Ford was not 
a “consensus” politician (no President with his number of vetoes could claim to be), he 
was able to work with European leaders of almost every political background.   
The end of the crises of the 1970s did result in one of the more curious 
phenomena of the 1980s.  There was a resurgence of interest in the British Empire in 
American popular culture.  Despite the rioting and climbing unemployment during the 
first few years of her government, Thatcher’s reforms triggered an unexpected nostalgia 
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in the United States for the glory days of the British Empire.  Shows such as “Upstairs, 
Downstairs” and “Brideshead Revisited” on PBS and “Gandhi” and “Chariots of Fire” on 
the big screen portrayed a more positive view of Britain than the pettiness, bureaucratic 
nonsense, and sense of futility depicted in British shows such as “Monty Python” or 
“Fawlty Towers” from the 1970s.27   
It was not just British stories that gave the popular culture of the 1980s a sense of 
glamour. Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger sat at the fulcrum of American politics and 
diplomacy during the 1970s.  They were the bridge between the more realpolitik 
approach of the Nixon administration and the human rights focus of the Carter 
administration. After Ford left the White House, he and Kissinger did not spend much 
time together.  Kissinger went on to found a successful consulting firm, and Ford retired 
into being an elder statesman spending time with the other leaders of his day.28  However, 
the two men had a reunion of sorts when they both appeared in a cameo in the nighttime 
soap Dynasty in 1983.29 
The Third World and the Special Relationship 
The question of why dealing with the Third World resulted in a closer Anglo-
American relationship from 1975 to 1980 reveals a paradoxical answer.  The efforts to 
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resolve some of the problems of the Third World either through international institutions 
or an explicitly Anglo-American framework was a way of uniting domestic and foreign 
policy concerns under a moral framework.  This unusual unity was the link in American 
foreign policy between the end of the Ford administration and the beginning of the Carter 
administration.  Easing the plight of the Third World, striving for peace in Southern 
Africa, and aiding refugees were all defensible on a combination of grounds.   Cold 
Warriors could point to the need to contain the Soviet threat and the defense of 
democratic allies.  Those on the left could point to the growing importance of human 
rights created through greater self-determination, the end of racist regimes, and the 
alleviation of human suffering.   
The paradox of these results was that while the Anglo-American partnership 
generally resolved the issues it confronted, the effort had an impact of helping to end the 
post-war consensus within the United States.  Britain’s post-war consensus came under 
attack primarily due to factors inside of the country, but the breakdown of the Golden 
Age in the United States was intimately tied to foreign policy.  Neoconservatives 
described Britain’s problems in the 1970s as the worst case of what could go wrong with 
social democracy.30  Had the relationship not mattered so much, Britain’s problems 
would not matter either as an example or as a warning.   Politicians and thinkers on the 
right invoked Britain’s past and present as a warning. Justin Vaisse lists Churchill first 
among the “heroes” of the “Second Age” neoconservatives.31  However, the 
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neoconservative search for an American Churchill would founder on the utopian visions 
of Reagan and the tragic detachment of George Bush.32 
The years of 1975 to 1980 forced the British to deal with the full spectrum of 
American diplomats, from the fiery intellectuals (Moynihan) to the idealistic 
peacemakers (Young) to the paragons of the Establishment (Vance) to the cold executors 
of realpolitik (Kissinger).  It is a measure of Britain’s stability that its governments were 
able to work successfully with all of these politicians.  Only Moynihan who deliberately 
targeted the British government of the day in both his personal and public rhetoric had to 
go.  Foreign Office officials like Duff and Rowlands or diplomats like Parsons were 
equally capable under either American or British party.   
Conclusion 
The rise of the political right in the United States and Britain is a common 
political narrative of the 1970s.  While conservative parties won elections in 1979 in 
Britain and 1980 in the United States, the true political debates of the era were within the 
parties on their left.  For the Democrats, the 1970s were a struggle between what became 
incompatible factions.  Civil rights activists looked to move beyond political equality to 
claim a fairer share of the jobs and prosperity of previous generations.  Establishment 
figures groped for ways of managing change, even if it meant negotiating their own 
demise.  Cold War liberals, disenchanted with the realpolitik and détente of Kissinger, 
the failure of nerve of the establishment in the face of the New Left, and the increasing 
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Third World assault on the United States and Israel, sought to restore with their rhetoric a 
world with a concern for law, liberty, and public morality.   
For the British, neither the half-hearted attempt at a more free market approach of 
Ted Heath nor the confidence and coordination of James Callaghan brought domestic 
accord.  Britain, having gone farther down the path of socialism in the 1940s and 1960s, 
now turned to a leader who sought to restore Britain’s glory not through empire and 
conquest but through a commitment to thrift and efficiency that would lead to morality. 
However, even Thatcher’s most ardent advocates will admit while her reforms improved 
the overall state of the British economy they ultimately did nothing for Britain’s moral 
state.33  
The road that led to the liberal defeat ran through the Third World.  The 
consensus foreign and economic policies within Britain and the United States existed at 
the same time formal empire was ending.  The power of the Third World after 
decolonization counted in numbers at the United Nations and in control of oil through 
OPEC had an unexpected consequence.  One of the factors that led to decolonization was 
the impossibility of fighting the Cold War, building a “New Jerusalem” at home, and 
investing enough money in colonies to bring up the standard of living and productivity.34  
When empire ceased to profitable, it usually ceased.  Empire particularly in the Middle 
East served to control the price of oil and with it the global rate of inflation.  When OPEC 
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asserted its control, social democracy came under direct attack.  OPEC was trying to 
punish Israel, but instead it punished the “vital center”.  Conservatives in both the United 
States and Britain drew much of their rhetorical advantage from the economic conditions 
the power and material possessions of the Third World had triggered.  However, the 
Special Relationship lacked the power it had possessed earlier.  Britain and the United 
States could no longer drive Iran’s internal politics with spies and money, and the 
institution they created for world peace now regularly voted against them.    Kissinger’s 
diplomatic skills that had served him so well failed to force one isolated African leader to 
keep his word, and Thatcher and Carrington had to depend on the Third World to keep 
the Patriotic Front at the table in 1979.  
The United States and Britain walked hand-in-hand together through the tumult of 
the Third World after the Vietnam War.  While both countries struggled at home to find a 
way forward in a world where their power had faded, they met the crises in their areas of 
shared interest together with as much cooperation as personality and politics allowed.  
Sidelined for a decade, the “Special Relationship” became a normal part of the foreign 
policy for both countries as they worked together in a world that had grown beyond their 
control.  Their trials together at the moment of the Third World’s greatest influence 
proved that the two countries could work toward common goals while respecting each 
other’s independence.  This time of balance and normalcy had neither the drama of war 
nor the disenchantment of separation, but it was as useful as it was necessary.  That 
legacy is worth remembering as long as the United States and Britain seek to work 
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